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PURSUING "ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE": 
THE DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
Richard J. Lazarus * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Environmental protection policy has been almost exclusively con-
cerned with two basic issues during the last several decades: (1) what is 
an acceptable level of pollution; and (2) what kinds of legal rules would 
be best suited for reducing pollution to that level. By contrast, policy-
makers have paid much less attention to the distributional effects, includ-
ing the potential for distributional inequities, of environmental protection 
generally. 
To be sure, scholars have engaged in considerable discussion of how 
the costs of environmental controls affect particular industries, and how 
these costs place a disproportionate burden on new versus existing, and 
large versus small, industrial sources of pollution.! But there has been at 
best only an ad hoc accounting of how the benefits of environmental pro-
tection are spread among groups of persons. And, when the costs of pol-
lution control have been considered, such discussions have been narrowly 
confined to the economic costS.2 There has been virtually no accounting 
of how pollution controls redistribute environmental risks among groups 
• Professor of Law, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri. Thanks are owed to Peter 
Byrne, Luke Cole, Chris Desan, Barbara Flagg, Michael Gerrard, and Chris Schroeder, and also to 
Tobie Bernstein, Wendy Brown, Richard Delgado, Rachel Godsil, Arnold Reitze, Douglas Wil-
liams, and participants in Northwestern University School of Law's faculty workshop for their com-
ments on earlier drafts, which much improved this Article. Washington University law students 
Jennifer Sheehan, Christopher Perzan, and Patricia Verga provided valuable research assistance, but 
most deserving of thanks is Kevin Brown, Class of 1992, who taught me that this was a topic war-
ranting greater academic inquiry. 
! See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. 
REv. 1333, 1335-36 (1985); B. Peter Pashigian, The Effect of Environmental Regulation on Optimal 
Plant Size and Factor Shares, 27 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1984); Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk 
Regulation, 69 VA. L. REv. 1025 (1983); WILLIAM TUCKER, PROGRESS AND PRIVILEGE: AMERICA 
IN THE AGE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM (1982) (author contends that environmentalism has unwit-
tingly aided big business at the expense of small business and has inappropriately discounted the 
advantages of human process); Keith Schneider, Rules Forcing Towns to Pick Big New Dumps or Big 
Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1992, at AI; but see Daniel A. Farber & Phillip P. Frickey, The Jurispru-
dence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv. 873, 895-96 (1987) (questioning substantiality of evidence 
that environmental laws favor larger plants). 
2 See infra note 44. 
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of persons, thereby imposing a cost on some for the benefit of others. 3 
The 1970s marked the heyday of the modem environmental era.4 
Earth Day in 1970 caught the imagination of a nation seeking consensus 
in the midst of the internal conflict engendered by the Vietnam war. 
Largely ignored in the celebration that accompanied the passage of a se-
ries of ambitious environmental protection laws during this time were 
those distinct voices within minority communities that questioned the 
value of environmentalism to their communities. They did not share in 
the national consensus that these new laws marked a significant move-
ment towards a more socially progressive era. Some minority leaders 
described environmentalism as "irrelevant" at best and, at worst, "a de-
liberate attempt by a bigoted and selfish white middle-class society to 
perpetuate its own values and protect its own life style at the expense of 
the poor and the underprivileged."5 Environmentalists were seen as ig-
noring both the "urban environment" and the needs of the poor in favor 
of seeking "governmental assistance to avoid the unpleasant externalities 
of the very system from which they themselves have already benefitted so 
extensively."6 As one commentator described, environmentalists "would 
prefer more wilderness . .. for a more secure enclave in nature from the 
restlessness of history and the demands of the poor."7 A prominent 
3 One notable exception in the context of environmental land use regulation is DANIEL R. 
MANDELKER, ENVIRONMENT AND EQUITY: A REGULATORY CHALLENGE (1981). 
4 President Nixon signed the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 
83 Stat. 445 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1988» on January 1, 1970, and Congress followed 
soon afterwards by passing the Clean Air Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (current 
version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7404-7407, 7415-7418, 7601-7602 (1988», the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-240, 86 Stat. 47 (omitted as superseded by 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1251-1287 (1988», the Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codi-
fied at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988», the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-140, 89 Stat. 751 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 136-136y (1988», the 
Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 2601-2671 (1988», and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988», followed by substantial revisions in 
1977 of both the clean air, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988», and clean water, Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 
95-217,91 Stat. 1566 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1287 (1988», legislation. See Richard J. Laza-
rus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 311, 323-28 (1991). 
5 James N. Smith, The Coming of Age of Environmentalism in American Society, in ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN URBAN AMERICA 1 (James N. Smith ed., 1974) [herein-
after ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE]. 
6 Peter Marcuse, Conservation for Whom?, in ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND SOCIAL Jus-
TICE, supra note 5, at 17, 27; see also Charles E. Little, The Double Standard of Open Space, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 73, 75 ("The logic of our policy 
seems to rest on this syllogism: inner cities have no greenery; poor people live in inner cites; there-
fore parks, open space, and wilderness are not necessary for them. City parks budgets shrink, the 
disenfranchised are barred from suburbia, and National Park tourism policies tend to exclude the 
non-affluent."). 
7 Rev. Richard Neuhaus, In Defense of People: A Thesis Revisited, in ENVIRONMENTAL QUAL-
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black elected official put it even more bluntly: "[T]he nation's concern 
with the environment has done what George Wallace has been unable to 
do: distract the nation from the human problems of black and brown 
Americans. "8 
Neither the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
nor the mainstream environmental groups appear to have paid attention 
to these charges.9 Quite possibly, this was because such claims were so 
unsettling and potentially divisive, particularly to the extent that they 
implicated the welfare of racial minorities. The environmental move-
ment of the 1970s finds much of its structural roots and moral inspiration 
in the civil rights movement that preceded it.IO Hence, for many in the 
environmental community, the notion that the two social movements 
could be at odds was very likely too personally obnoxious to be believed 
or even tolerated. 11 
1TY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 59, 62 (excerpt from conference presentation of Rev. 
Neuhaus). 
8 Leonard G. Ritt & John M. Ostheimer, Congressional Voting and Ecological Issues, 3 ENVTL. 
AFF. 459, 465 & n.18 (1974) (quoting The Rise of Anti-Ecology?, TIME, Aug. 3, 1970, at 42 (quoting 
Richard Hatcher, Mayor of Gary, Indiana)). More recently, Professor Derrick Bell fantasized the 
possibility that white Americans would agree to the enslaving of all black Americans in exchange for 
"gold to bailout near insolvent federal, state and local governments, chemicals to purify the almost 
uninhabitable environment, and a safe, affordable nuclear technology to relieve the nation's energy 
woes." Derrick A. Bell, Racism: A Prophecy for the Year 2000, 42 RUTGERS L. REv. 93, 98 (1989). 
9 Greenpeace, U.S.A., is one frequently cited exception. See Safir Ahmed, Seeing Red Over the 
Green Movement, RIVERFRONT TIMES, Nov. 6-12, 1991, at 10, 11; Norris MacDonald, Environmen-
tal Activities in Communities of Color, in ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: ISSUES AND DILEMMAS 32,34 
(Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1991) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM]; see also infra pp. 
835-38. 
10 The environmental movement's prominence in the aftermath of the civil rights movements' 
successes in the 19605 was not mere happenstance. Environmental groups not only adopted organi-
zational structures, civil disobedience approaches, and litigation strategies based on those utilized by 
civil rights organizations, but also used the rhetorical power of the civil rights movement on behalf 
of environmental protection. Environmental rights were analogized to civil rights, and parallels 
were drawn between the emancipation of African-Americans and the emancipation of wildlife, plant 
life, and nature in general. See generally RODERICK F. NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE 6-7,34-35, 
144-45,162-63, 199-213 (1989) (concept of natural rights of people expanded to support the rights of 
nature as free from human domination); CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 13, 25, 
28-29 (1990) (Bill of Rights in the U.s. Constitution supported the notion that citizens have the right 
to be protected from pollution); PETER YEAGER, THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE PUBLIC REGULA-
TION OF PRIVATE POLLUTION 107 (1991) (conservationists, like the civil rights activists, relied on 
the courts to affect change); see also, ELIZABETH DODSON GRAY, WHY THE GREEN NIGGER? RE-
MYTHING GENESIS 1-8 (1979) (purported hierarchy of man above animals and nature is an illusion); 
PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 234 (2d ed. 1990) (outlining belief that animals deserve more 
humane methods of limiting their numbers by reducing fertility rather than by hunting); CHRISTO-
PHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR NATURAL OB-
JECTS 49-53 (1974) (heightened awareness of the interplay of humanity and nature as functional 
parts of a single organism called the planet Earth). 
II Neuhaus, supra note 7, at 68 (paul Swatek of the Sierra Club describing as "reprehensible" 
Rev. John Neuhaus' characterization of environmentalism as elitist and fascist). Other explanations 
for the lack of attention to these concerns are more practical in nature. Few, if any, of those expres-
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More recently, however, the number of those suggesting that there 
may be serious distributional problems in environmental protection pol-
icy has significantly increased, and the character of their claims has 
shifted. Prominent voices in racial minority communities across the 
country are now forcefully contending that existing environmental pro-
tection laws do not adequately reflect minority interests and, in some 
instances, even perpetuate racially discriminatory policies.12 For these 
individuals, the potential for a regressive distribution of the economic 
costs associated with pollution control is, while often mentioned, not the 
principal focus of their concerns. Rather, it is the prevalence of hazard-
ous pollutants in the communities where they live and work that draws 
the brunt of their attention. One shorthand expression for such claims is 
"environmental racism," 13 but "environmental justice" (or "equity") ap-
pears to have emerged as the more politically attractive expression, pre-
sumably because its connotation is more positive and, at the same time, 
less divisive. 
Until very recently, the legal academic community has paid rela-
tively little attention to these emerging issues of "environmental jus-
sing such concerns had ready access to those making policy decisions. Furthermore, it made little 
sense strategically to risk alienating those within the environmental community, many of whom had 
historically voiced support for minority concerns. 
12 Roberto Suro, Pollution-Weary Minorities Try Civil Rights Tack, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993, 
at AI. The year 1991 witnessed a proliferation of events, the most significant being the convening in 
October of "The First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit" in Washington, 
D.C. Approximately 300 delegates from minority community organizations working on environ-
mental issues attended, as well as an additional 200 "participants" and "observers" from state and 
federal government agencies, academic institutions, and mainstream environmental organizations. 
The purpose of the meeting was to initiate a dialogue between these community organizations and, 
even more significantly, to make a strong national statement regarding the seriousness of the 
problems in the distribution of environmental risks. See Minorities Joining Environmental Move-
ment, Charge ''Environmental Racism" at Conference, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) at 1656 (Nov. I, 1991); 
Keith Schneider, Minorities Join to Fight Polluting Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1991, at 
A20. During the fall of 1991, the State of New York Assembly held a series of four public hearings 
around the state on "Minorities and the Environment." See MINORITIES AND THE ENVIRONMENT: 
AN EXPLORATION INTO THE EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND CONDI-
TIONS ON MINORITY AND LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES (1992) (reprinting of hearings transcripts). 
Finally, even more recently, Representative Henry Waxman, chair of the House Subcommittee on 
Health and the Environment of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, held a hearing on 
February 25, 1992, on environmental justice issues. This was the first congressional hearing on the 
issue. Representatives from governmental agencies, minority environmental groups, and main-
stream environmental organizations testified. See Disproportionate Impact of Lead Poisoning on Mi-
nority Communities: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter Lead Poisoning Hearings] 
(not yet published; copy on file with the Northwestern University Law Review). 
13 Dr. Benjamin Chavis of the United Church of Christ's Commission for Racial Justice appar-
ently first used the term "environmental racism" in the early 1980s to describe the tendency of 
government and business to locate in minority communities hazardous waste disposal treatment, 
storage, and disposal facilities, and industries that emit toxic pollutants. We Speak for Ourselves: 
Social Justice, Race & Environment, RACE, POVERTY & ENV'T, Winter 1991, at 12 (book review). 
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tice."14 This absence of legal commentary contrasts sharply with a 
growing literature in other academic and popular periodicals,15 with the 
more recent efforts to increase awareness of environmental justice con-
cerns within government,16 and with the filing of lawsuits derived from 
such concerns in the context of formal litigation. 17 
14 Students at the University of California at Berkeley Law School and New York University 
Law School held conferences on the subject in 1990. See Daniel Suman, Reportback . •• Fighting 
LULU's: Effective Community Organizing, RACE, POVERTY & ENV'T, Summer 1990, at 6. Students 
at Harvard Law School sponsored a one-day workshop in March 1991 and again in November 1992, 
and students at Washington University in St. Louis did the same in November 1991. Finally, stu-
dents at the University of Michigan, Columbia University, and University of Minnesota law schools 
sponsored meetings on the issue in January, March, and October 1992, respectively. 
There are to date just a handful of articles and student notes on the issue, all of recent origin. 
The first publication to address the issue in significant depth was a student note published in the 
University of Michigan Law Review, which focused on the availability of equal protection claims to 
remedy discriminatory siting of hazardous waste facilities, and the inadequacies of current state and 
federal legislation. See Rachel D. Godsil, Comment, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. 
L. REv. 394 (1991); see also Luke W. Cole, Remedying Environmental Racism: A View From the 
Field, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1991 (1992). Luke Cole of the California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., is 
publishing an article, contemporaneous to this piece, on "environmental poverty law." See Luke W. 
Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty 
Law, 19 EcOLOGY L.Q. (forthcoming Dec. 1992) [hereinafter Cole, The Need for Environmental 
Poverty Law]. Descriptions of the issue focusing almost exclusively on hazardous waste facility siting 
are contained in R. George Wright, Hazardous Waste Disposal and the Problems of Stigmatic and 
Racial Injury, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 777 (1991); Kelly M. Colquette & Elizabeth A. H. Robertson, 
Environmental Racism: The Causes, Consequences, and Commendations,S TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 153 
(1991); and Naikang Tsao, Comment, Ameliorating Environmental Racism: A Citizen's Guide to 
Combatting the Discriminatory Siting of Toxic Waste Dumps, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 366 (1992). Fi-
nally, there is a symposium issue on the subject in the University of Kansas Journal of Law and 
Public Policy, which contains a series of short essays on the topic, the most significant of which is an 
essay by Professors Regina Austin and Michael Schill discussing "minority grassroots environ-
mentalism." See Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black. Brown, Poor & Poisoned: Minority Grass-
roots Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 69 (1991). 
15 See, e.g., ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY (1990) [hereinafter BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE]; Paul Mohai, Black Environmental-
ism, 71 Soc. SCI. Q. 744 (1990); Robert D. Bullard, Ecological Inequities and the New South: Black 
Communities Under Siege, 17 J. ETHNIC STUD., Winter 1990, at 101 [hereinafter Bullard, Ecological 
Inequities and the New South]; David Kallick, The Struggle for Community: Race, Class and the 
Environment, 21 Soc. POL'Y, Fall 1990, at 18; Gar Smith, Freeways, Communities and "Environ-
mental Racism", RACE, POVERTY & ENV'T, Apr. 1990, at 7; Pat Bryant, Toxies and Racial Justice, 
20 Soc. POL'Y, Summer 1989, at 48; Dick Russell, Environmental Racism: Minority Communities 
and their Battle Against Toxins, AMICUS J., Spring 1989, at 22; Robert D. Bullard & Beverly Hen-
drix Wright, Environmentalism and the Polities of Equity: Emergent Trends in the Black Commu-
nity, 12 MID AM. REv. Soc. 21 (1987) [hereinafter Bullard & Wright, Environmentalism and the 
Polities of Equity]; Robert D. Bullard & Beverly Hendrix Wright, The Polities of Pollution: Implica-
tionsfor the Black Community, 47 PHYLON 71 (1986) [hereinafter Bullard & Wright, The Polities of 
Pollution]; Robert D. Bullard, Solid Waste Sites and the Black Houston Community, 53 SOC. IN-
QUIRY 273 (1983) [hereinafter Bullard, Solid Waste Sites]; Susan Zakin, The Ominous Color of Toxic 
Dumping, SIERRA, July-Aug. 1978, at 14; Julian McCaull, Discriminatory Air Pollution, 18 ENV'T, 
Mar. 1976, at 26. 
16 See infra notes 62-76 and accompanying text. 
17 See EI Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc., No. C91-2083 
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The purpose of this Article is to explore the distributional side of 
environmental protection and, more particularly, to explain the signifi-
cance of including environmental justice concerns into the fashioning of 
environmental protection policy. Unlike earlier legal commentary, haz-
ardous waste facility siting is not this Article's dominant focus. It offers 
a broader, more systemic, examination of environmental protection laws 
and policies. 
The Article is divided into three parts. First, it describes the nature 
of the problem. This includes a discussion of the varied distributional 
implications of environmental protection laws, as well as the ways in 
which racial minorities could receive too few of the benefits, or too many 
of the burdens, associated with those laws. 18 The second part of the Arti-
cle accepts (without purporting to verify) the thesis that distributional 
inequities exist, and seeks to explain such inequities theoretically in terms 
of the present institutional framework for the fashioning of environmen-
tal protection policy and the probable distributional implications of that 
framework. The final part of the Article outlines how environmental jus-
tice concerns might be pursued within present and future environmental 
protection law and policy. 
II. THE BENEFITS AND BURDENS OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION LAWS 
A. The Potential for Distributional Inequity 
Environmental protection confers benefits and imposes burdens in 
several ways.19 To the extent that the recipients of related benefits and 
burdens are identical, no problem of discrimination is presented (there 
may, of course, be other problems with the tradeoff). But identical recip-
ients are rarely, if ever, the result.20 Hardly any laws provide pareto 
(N.D. Cal. July 8, 1991) (complaint filed); R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991), 
aff'd, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992); Bordeaux Action Comm. v. Metro. Gov't of NashviIIe, No. 90-
0214 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 12, 1990) (complaint filed); NAACP v. Gorsuch, No. 82-768-Civ-5 
(E.D.N.C. Aug. 10, 1982) (denying preliminary injunction); Bean v. Southwestern Waste Mgmt. 
Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd without op., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986); El Pueblo 
para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. County of Kings, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,357 (Cal. App. 
Dep't Super. Ct. 1991); see also Frances F. Marcus, Medical Waste Divides Mississippi Cities, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 24, 1992, at A13 (describes "environmental racism" lawsuits being brought on behalf of 
minority community to prevent burning of medical wastes at incinerator). 
18 This Article does not purport to single out for separate discussion the distinct distributional 
issues affecting Native Americans, largely because those issues are closely intertwined with questions 
of Indian sovereignty that, while important, are more case-specific than this Article's outlook. 
19 See generally RICHARD B. STEWART & JAMES E. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POL-
ICY 168-73 (2d ed. 1978). 
20 One obvious source of disparity, which is not a focus of this Article, is intergenerational in 
character. The beneficiaries of much environmental protection are future generations while the im-
mediate economic costs of such protection fall on the present. Conversely, future generations are the 
group most harmed by environmental degradation, while current generations reap the associated 
economic value. 
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optimality in the classic sense of making everyone better off and no one 
worse Off.21 Virtually all laws have distributional consequences, includ-
ing those laws designed to further a particular conception of the public 
interest.22 Problems of discrimination, therefore, may arise in the dispar-
ities between the distribution of benefits and their related burdens.23 
The benefits of environmental protection are obvious and significant. 
A reduction in pollution decreases the public health risks associated with 
exposure to pollution. It also enhances public welfare by allowing 
greater opportunity for enjoyment of the amenities associated with a 
cleaner natural environment. Many would also contend that environ-
mental protection furthers the human spirit by restoring balance between 
humankind and the natural environment. More pragmatically, environ-
mental protection laws are the source of new jobs in pollution control 
industries. EPA recently estimated, for instance, that the recently 
amended Clean Air Act would result in the creation of 30,000 to 45,000 
full-time equivalent positions during 1996-2000.24 
The burdens of environmental protection range from the obvious to 
the more subtle. They include the economic costs borne by both the pro-
ducer and the consumer of goods and services that become more expen-
sive as a result of environmental legislation. For consumers, product and 
service prices may increase; some may become unavailable because the 
costs of environmental compliance renders their production unprofitable; 
while other goods and services may be specifically banned because of 
their adverse impact on the natural environment. For those persons who 
produce goods and services made more costly by environmental laws, 
personal income may decrease, employment opportunities may be re-
duced or displaced, and certain employment opportunities may be elimi-
nated altogether. Finally, environmental protection requires 
governmental expenditures, the source of which varies from general per-
21 See EDGAR K. BROWNING & JACKQUELENE M. BROWNING, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 
AND ApPLICATIONS 559 (3d ed. 1989). 
22 Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211, 
1214 (1991); BURTON A. WEISBROD ET AL., PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN EcONOMIC AND INSTI-
TUTIONAL ANALYSIS 103, 555 (1978). 
23 Of course, the perception among developing nations of just such a disparity is what prompted 
many of them, during the recent United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development 
held in Rio De Janeiro, to demand monies from wealthier nations. The justification for these pay-
ments was to compensate the developing nations for the costs associated with their taking action (for 
example, greater protection oftropica1 rain forests) that would provide environmental benefits to the 
entire world, including industrialized nations. See, e.g., Paul Lewis, Negotiators in Rio Agree to 
Increase Aid to Third World, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1992, at AI. Indeed, the availability of such 
transfer payments was not an incidental concern at the Earth Summit. Rather, it was a central focus 
of the negotiations. See Paul Lewis, Pact on Environment Near, but Hurdles on Aid Remain, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 12, 1992, at AI0; Paul Lewis, Pact Nears on Billions to Protect Nature in Third-World 
Countries, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1992, at AI. 
24 Business Gainsfrom CM Exceeding $ 50 Billion Projected in Draft EPA Study, INSIDE EPA, 
Jan. 17, 1992, at 1, 10. 
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sonal and corporate income taxes to special environmental taxes.25 
These expenditures necessarily decrease public monies available for other 
social welfare programs. 
The burdens of environmental protection, however, also include the 
redistribution of the risks that invariably occur with pollution control 
techniques that treat pollution following its production. For instance, air 
pollution scrubbers and municipal wastewater treatment facilities reduce 
air and water pollution, but only by creating a sludge that, when dis-
posed, will likely impose risks on a segment of the population different 
than the segment which would have been exposed to the initial pollution 
in the air or water.26 Additionally, the incineration of hazardous wastes 
stored in drums and tanks converts a land disposal problem into an air 
pollution issue (leaving, of course, a sludge residue that presents a differ-
ent land disposal problem), and thereby may change the identity of those 
in the general population exposed to the resulting pollution,21 Just trans-
porting solid and hazardous wastes from one geographic area to another 
for treatment or storage results in a major redistribution of the risks asso-
ciated with environmental protection. Indeed, such transportation, and 
the resulting shift of environmental risks, has been the recent subject of 
massive litigation, as various jurisdictions have sought to export their 
wastes or prevent the importation of waste from elsewhere.28 
Nor does the purported prevention of pollution, as opposed to its 
treatment, necessarily eliminate the distributional issue. "Pollution pre-
vention" frequently depends upon production processes that reduce one 
kind of pollution by increasing another.29 For example, water pollution 
25 "In 1987, EPA, the states, and local governments spent about $40 billion for environmental 
protection. If recent trends continue, they will need to spend approximately $61 billion annually by 
the year 2000." U.S. EPA, A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC COSTS OF ENVIRONMEN-
TAL PROTECTION: 1981-2000 at ii (1991). The Federal Internal Revenue Code includes three "envi-
ronmental taxes," including a tax on petroleum, a tax on certain chemicals, and a tax on certain 
imported substances. See 26 U.S.c. §§ 4611-4612, 4661-4662, 4671-4672 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). 
Revenues from these taxes are used, inter alia, to fund the Hazardous Substances Trust Fund pro-
vided for by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 
42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). See generally Richard A. Westin, Tax Considerations, in 1 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, ch. 9 (Michael Gerrard ed., 1992). 
26 CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, CONTROLLING CRoss-MEDIA POLLUTANTS 8-9 (1984). 
27 It also creates a new land disposal problem. For instance, a municipal resource recovery 
facility in Chicago, Illinois, that incinerates 350,000 tons of municipal solid waste each year pro-
duces 110,000 to 140,000 tons of ash, much of which is hazardous, that must be disposed. See 
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 948 F.2d 345, 345-46 (7th Cir. 1991). 
28 See, e.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources, 112 S. 
Ct. 2019 (1992); Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992); National Solid 
Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envt'l Mgmt., 910 F.2d 713 (lith Cir. 1990), modified, 
reh'g denied, 924 F.2d 1001 (lith Cir. 1991), and cert. denied, III S. Ct. 2800 (1991); Government 
Suppliers Conso!. Servo v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Senators See 'Civil War' Over 
Waste Imports; Coats Says He Will Offer Import Ban Again, [Current Developments] Envt. Rep. 
(BNA) 485 (1991). 
29 As its name suggests, "pollution prevention" contemplates techniques for reducing the 
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may increase as air pollution is decreased, or a decrease in the mining of 
one kind of natural resource may be limited or completely offset by the 
increase in mining of another. Such shifts in the type of pollution or 
activity allowed will almost invariably shift those risks arising with the 
"new" pollution or activity to different persons. Hence, pollution may 
decrease for society as a whole, yet simultaneously increase for certain 
sUbpopulations. 
Racial minorities could therefore be disproportionately disadvan-
taged by environmental laws in a number of ways. For example, with 
regard to the benefits of environmental protection, the natural environ-
ments that are selected for protection may be less accessible, or otherwise 
less important, to minorities. This may be the result of priorities ex-
pressly established by statute, or by agency regulations or enforcement 
agenda. 
Inequities in the ultimate distribution of environmental protection 
benefits may also result, paradoxically, from environmental improvement 
itself. A cleaner physical environment may increase property values to 
such an extent that members of a racial minority with fewer economic 
resources can no longer afford to live in that community.30 Indeed, the 
exclusionary impact of environmental protection can be more than just 
an incidental effect; it can be the raison d'etre, with environmental qual-
ity acting as a socially acceptable facade for attitudes that cannot be 
broadcast.31 
Minorities may at the same time incur a share of the burdens of 
environmental protection that are disproportionate to those benefits that 
they receive. Higher product and service prices may be regressive, as 
may some taxes depending on their form.32 Although whites are poorer 
in greater absolute numbers than nonwhites, the latter group is dispro-
portionately poorer in terms of population percentages. Minorities may 
also more likely be the victims of reduced or eliminated job opportuni-
ties. Similarly, they may be less likely to enjoy the economic, educa-
tional, or personal positions necessary to exploit the new job 
opportunities that environmental protection creates.33 Finally, minori-
amount of pollution created in the first instance. It is contrasted with end-of-pipe controls of pollu-
tion, which seek to minimize pollution'S threat after creation. See generally Pollution Prevention 
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101-13109 (Supp. II 1990) (need for more focused management to 
prevent pollution at the source rather than at time of treatment and disposal); Frances H. Irwin, An 
Integrated Framework for Preventing Pollution and Protecting the Environment, 22 ENvrL. L. 1 
(1992) (the complex relationship of environmental effects requires an integrated framework of ideas 
to more effectively prevent environmental problems). 
30 A. MYRICK FREEMAN ET AL., THE EcONOMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 143 (1973); see 
also A. Dan Tarlock, Western Water Law, Global Warming, and Growth Limitations, 24 Loy. L.A. 
L. REV. 979, 1001 & n.lS2 (1991) (discussing regressive nature of growth limitations). 
31 See infra note 82 and accompanying text. 
32 Sandra Postel, The Greening of America's Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1991, at Cll. 
33 Of course, this would depend on the types of jobs created. To the extent that the environmen-
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ties may receive an unfair share of the environmental risks that are redis-
tributed by environmental protection. Elimination of the risks in one 
location may result in the creation or increase of risks in another location 
where the exposure to minorities is greater. 
B. Evidence of Environmental Inequity 
To date, there has been relatively little systematic empirical investi-
gation concerning the extent of inequity in the distribution of the benefits 
and burdens of environmental protection. The evidence that is available, 
however, "lend[s] support to the view that, on balance, programs for en-
vironmental improvement promote the interests of higher-income groups 
more than those of the poor; they may well increase the degree of ine-
quality in the distribution of real income."34 
There are especially few studies, apart from anecdotal accounts, re-
garding the specific issue that racial minorities are distinctly disadvan-
taged by environmental protection laws. Those few studies, however, 
lend substantial credence to the claim that such disadvantages do exist, 
and suggest some reasons for their occurrence. As summarized in a re-
cent congressional report, "[e]arlier studies conducted by government 
agencies and non-profit environmental organizations have concluded that 
disproportionate effects stem from many factors, including racism, inade-
quate health care, low-quality housing, high-hazard workplace environ-
ments, limited access to environmental information, and simple lack of 
sufficient political power."35 Without a doubt, the available evidence is 
not immune from challenge. But for present purposes, it seems enough 
to suggest the strong possibility that virtually all of the theoretical distri-
butional inequities outlined earlier in this Article are in fact occurring. 
1. Benefits Of Environmental Protection.-The reduction of pollu-
tion mandated by environmental protection laws is likely to have the 
greatest potential for a redistribution that is favorable to minority com-
munities. After all, for the same reasons that minorities may dispropor-
tionately be the recipients of redistributed environmental risks, they also 
were more likely subject to greater pollution in the first instance. There 
is substantial support for the thesis that minorities have historically been 
more likely to live in closer proximity to polluting industries than nonmi-
norities.36 There is likewise substantial evidence that minorities occupy 
tal protection services required were both more labor-intensive and less dependent on skilled labor, 
job opportunities might be available, albeit less desirable. A stated purpose of New York City's 
recycling law, for instance, is to increase employment opportunities "for unskilled workers and 
handicapped persons." NEW YORK CITY CHARTER & ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, ch. 3, n.* (Supp. 
1990). 
34 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 
253 (2d ed. 1988). 
35 H.R. REP. No. 428, WIst Cong., 2d Sess. 41-42 (1990). 
36 For instance, a 1972 study concluded that in St. Louis, Kansas City, and Washington, D.C., 
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significantly more environmentally hazardous jobs and, as a result, suffer 
a disproportionately higher number of environmentally-related injuries.37 
there was a significant difference between whites and blacks in exposure levels to suspended particu-
lates and sulfur oxide. See A. Myrick Freeman III, Distribution of Environmental Quality, in ENVI-
RONMENTAL QUALITY ANALYSIS: THEORY AND METHOD IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 243, 264 
(Allen V. Kneese & Blair T. Bower eds., 1972) ("In each city the average black family has a higher 
exposure to both air pollutants than does the average family (black or white) with an income under 
$3,000."); McCaull, supra note 15, at 26 (A 1975 report "shows that chances of being exposed to 
poor-quality air in urban areas are greatest for persons in poverty, in occupations below the manage-
ment or professional level, in low-rent districts, and in the black population."). The phenomenon 
appears likely to be the same today. See Frances F. Marcus, As Jobs Come Calling. the Non-Wary 
Unite, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1991, at A16 (describing proposal to build $700 million plant for 
processing wood pulp and manufacturing rayon in mostly black community in Louisiana; minority 
community opposed; governor, local white business interests in favor because of jobs and economic 
activity that it will bring to community); Paul Ruffins, Blacks Suffer Health Hazards Yet Remain 
Inactive on Environment, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1989, § 5, at 3 ("71 % of blacks and 50% of Lati-
nos-as opposed to only 34% of whites-reside in cities and breathe the most polluted air. Often 
they live in old housing with the highest concentrations of lead in the paint and plumbing. Between 
1976 and 1980, more than 50% of all black infants under the age of 3 who were tested had blood 
lead levels higher than the Center for Disease Control's proposed standards .... Minorities are also 
likely to be exposed to toxins by working in the most hazardous jobs in the most unhealthy indus-
tries."). See generally Paul Mohai & Bunyon Bryant, Environmental Racism: Reviewing the Evi-
dence, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A TIME FOR DISCOURSE 13-
176 (Bunyon Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992); Cynthia Hamilton, Industrial and Environmental 
Racism: The Denial of Justice, in ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 9, at 25 (race and poverty 
together bring about environmental inequities); William K. Reilly, The Green Thumb of Capitalism: 
The Environmental Benefits of Sustained Growth, 54 POL'y REv. 16 (1990) (urban poor experience 
environmental degradation most directly); Bullard & Wright, The Politics of Pol/ution, supra note 15, 
at 71 (much of industry found near minority and lower-income neighborhoods); BULLARD, DUMP-
ING IN DIXIE, supra note 15, at 8; Paul Mohai & Bunyon Bryant, Environmental Inequities and the 
Inner City (paper delivered at the Sixth Annual Technological Literacy Conference of the National 
Association for Science, Technology & Society, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 1991» (copy on file with 
author). 
37 See Beverly Hendrix Wright, The Effects of Occupational Injury, Illness, and Disease on the 
Health Status of Black Americans, in THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE MICHIGAN CONFERENCE ON 
RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 128, 128-41 (Bunyon Bryant & Paul 
Mohai eds., 1990) [hereinafter MICHIGAN CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS]. The Michigan Conference 
Proceedings have recently been republished in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
HAZARDS, supra note 36. Professor Wright describes three (necessarily overlapping) causal explana-
tions for why there is a disproportionately high risk of injury, disease, and death among black work-
ers: (1) socially induced disease (resulting from "social, rather than physical, genetic or 
environmental causes"), id. at 131; (2) physically induced disease ("those that occur because of 
intrinsic factors such as diets, smoking or genetics"), id. at 133; and (3) environmentally induced 
disease ("occur due to exposures in the environment"), id. at 135. In discussing each, she contends 
that discriminatory attitudes and practices are at the root of the disproportionate impacts. 
With regard to socially induced causes, Professor Wright discusses the prevalence of hyperten-
sion among minority workers and argues that "the social practice of discriminatory job placement 
has resulted in the assignment of Blacks to extremely hazardous jobs that are also stress inducing." 
Id. at 132-33. With regard to physically induced causes, Professor Wright contends that they are 
often subterfuges by management to shift the "blame" to the victim when, in fact, "[m]yths or racist 
stereotypes are often used to camouflage discriminatory job placement practices resulting in the 
purposeful exposure of black workers to hazardous work conditions." Id. at 134. 
Regarding environmentally induced factors, Professor Wright acknowledges the softness of 
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However, for these same reasons, any across-the-board reduction in pol-
lution (or increase in occupational safety) should confer on minorities a 
larger benefit commensurate with their historically larger burden.38 
It is not at all certain, however, that this expected proportional re-
dressing of the past has in fact occurred. Without addressing the factor 
of race, several empirical studies have suggested that the distribution of 
benefits from a reduction in pollution is neutral or even regressive.39 
These benefits include federal subsidies to publicly-owned wastewater 
treatment plants,4O and the advantages of better air pollution control,41 
some of the data relating cause (exposure to pollutants) to effect (injury), id. at 135, but she ulti-
mately concludes that existing data is sufficient to "suggest that the excess risk of cancer that exists 
for black workers as compared to white workers may be due to greater exposure of black workers to 
carcinogens in the workplace." Id. at 137. She cites several examples, including: (1) a tire manufac-
turing plant in which 27% of the black workers, but only three percent of the white workers, worked 
in the most hazardous jobs at the plant, id. at 135-36; and (2) a ten-year study of the steel industry 
showing that 89% of the nonwhite cokeplant workers, but only 32% of white workers, were em-
ployed in the hazardous coke oven jobs and, possibly as a result, that the nonwhite workers "exper-
ienced double the expected death rate from malignant neoplasms." Id. at 136. Reportedly, one 
historical reason for the disproportionate number of Blacks working in the coke ovens was the myth 
that black workers "absorb heat better." Id. at 133 (quoting Morris E. Davis, Occupational Hazards 
and Black Workers, URB. HEALTH, Aug. 1977, at 16, 17). For a comparison of the occupations with 
the highest percentage of nonwhite workers and those with the highest incidence of occupational 
illness and injury, see JAMES C. ROBINSON, TOIL AND TOXICS: WORKPLACE STRUGGLES AND 
POLITICAL STRATEGIES FOR OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH 96-98 (1991) (rate of occupational injury for 
California workers varies considerably with ethnicity); Morris E. Davis & Andrew S. Rowland, 
Problems Faced by Minority Workers, in OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH: RECOGNIZING AND PREVENT-
ING WORK-RELATED DISEASE 417,419-20 (Barry S. Levy & David H. Wegman eds., 1983) (statis-
tics showing the annual percentage of nonwhite workers sufferingjob-reIated injury and illness in the 
manufacturing industries); see also Peter T. Kilborn, For Hispanic Immigrants. a Higher Job-Injury 
Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1992, at Al (hispanic factory and industrial workers are injured more 
often than nonhispanic and black workers). 
38 See E. Donald Elliott, A Cabin on the Mountain: Reflections on the Distributional Conse-
quences of Environmental Protection Programs, 1 !CAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 5, 7 (1991) ("In my 
judgment, minorities and the poor probably benefit disproportionately from environmental protec-
tion measures."); William K. Reilly, Environmental Equity: EPA's Position, 18 EPA J. 18, 22 
(Marchi April 1992) ("It is undeniable that minorities usually benefit from-are, indeed, the chief 
beneficiaries of-more general efforts to protect the environment."). 
39 The possible structural reasons for this phenomenon are outlined later in this Article at infra 
pp.806-25. 
40 Robert A. Collins, The Distributive Effects of Public Law 92-500, 4 J. ENVTL. EcON. & 
MGMT. 344, 353 (1977). Professor Collins further found that the lowest-income classes received 
some net benefit from the federal subsidy, while the middle income classes were net losers. Id. at 
352-53. 
41 See Michael Gelobter, Toward A Model of "Environmental Discrimination", in MICHIGAN 
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 37, at 92 ("all changes in exposure have been regressively 
distributed since 1970 (the year in which the Clean Air Act was adopted)"); F. Reed Johnson, 
Income Distributional Effects of Air Pollution Abatement: A General Equilibrium Approach, 8 AT-
LANTIC EcON. J. to, 17 (1980) (While environmental policy "costs are approximately proportional 
to income," data from previous studies "tend[s] to confirm the supposition that environmental policy 
incidence is regressive, with only the top two income classes obtaining positive net benefits.") (sum-
marizing results of a Swedish study on the income distributional effects of air pollution control). 
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including those associated with programs directed at improving urban air 
quality.42 A similar conclusion has been drawn regarding the impact of 
federal occupational health and safety laws.43 
2. The Burdens of Environmental Protection.-The burdens associ-
ated with environmental protection generally take two forms. First, 
there are the economic costs of pollution control. These are typically 
imposed on either the government or industry in the first instance, but 
are ultimately redistributed through taxes and higher prices for con-
sumer goods. They may also be indirectly redistributed through salary 
cuts and layoffs. Second, as previously described, there are the burdens 
of environmental risks that are necessarily redistributed by environmen-
tal protection laws. Although these laws strive for a net reduction of 
risks, some discrete populations may suffer a net increase in the process. 
The "burden" dimension to environmental protection has received 
significantly more attention than the "benefit" side. Additionally, until 
quite recently most studies addressing the distribution of environmental 
protection burdens have focused on the economic costs associated with 
such protection. Less attention has been paid to the distribution of envi-
ronmental risks. 
Most of the studies lend considerable support to the thesis that dis-
tributional inequities exist insofar as the distribution of burdens may be 
regressive. Moreover, to the extent that these studies have specifically 
considered the distributional effects upon racial minorities, preliminary 
inquiries strongly suggest that inequities exist there as well. 
(a) Economic costs.-Economists have occasionally studied 
how the costs and benefits of pollution control are distributed.44 These 
42 David Harrison, Jr. & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Distribution of Benefitsfrom Improvements in 
Urban Air Quality,S J. ENVTL. EcON. & MGMT. 313, 314 (1978) ("[T]he absolute level of benefits, 
measured in dollars ... rises consistently and substantially with income. Only when expressed as a 
percentage of income are air quality benefits pro-poor."). 
43 See Beverly Hendrix Wright, The Effects of Occupational Injury, Illness, and Disease on the 
Health Status of Black Americans, in MICHIGAN CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 37, at 128, 
129 ("Blacks and other minority workers ... have not benefitted from these improvements to the 
degree that white workers have."). 
44 BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 34, at 235-56; Roger H. Bezdek et aI., The Economic and 
Employment Effects of Investment and Pollution Abatement and Control Technology, 18 AMBIO 274 
(1989); Taylor H. Bingham et al., Distribution of the Generation of Air Pollution, 14 J. ENVTL. EcON. 
& MGMT. 30 (1987); Harry F. Campbell, On the Income Distributional Effects of Environmental 
Management Policies, 12 WATER REsOURCES 1077, 1077-80 (1976); Collins, supra note 40, at 344; 
Nancy S. Dorfman & Arthur Snow, Who Will Pay For Pollution Controll-The Distribution By 
Income of the Burden of the National Environmental Protection Program 1972-80, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 
101, 101-15 (1975); Freeman, supra note 36; Leonard P. Gianessi & Henry M. Peskin, The Distribu-
tion of the Costs of Federal Water Pollution Control Policy, 56 LAND EcON. 85-102 (Feb. 1980); 
David E. Hansen & S. I. Schwartz, Income Distribution Effects of the California Land Conservation 
Act, 59 AM. J. AGRIC. EcON. 294, 294-301 (1977); Harrison & Rubinfeld, supra note 42, at 313-32; 
Johnson, supra note 41, at 10-21; Adam Rose et aI., Assessing Who Gains and Who Loses from 
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analyses generally suggest that pollution controls are regressive. As one 
commentator put it fairly early on, "[u]nfortunately, the further one 
moves towards 'putting a price on pollution' the more regressive the bur-
den generally becomes .... [W]hen it comes to cleaning up the environ-
ment, policy makers will be confronted with the classical dilemma 
between distributional fairness and allocative efficiency."45 
Economists offer several explanations for this distributional phe-
nomenon. Some speculate that many of the environmental amenities 
guaranteed by protective legislation are available, as a practical matter, 
only to those with the wealth and time for their enjoyment. Further-
more, even when the improved environment is itself a low-income resi-
dential area, the resulting economic value is not necessarily captured by 
those living in the area but is more likely to be gained by absentee prop-
erty owners who can subsequently charge their tenants higher rent for 
living in a cleaner neighborhood. At the same time, higher product 
prices and displaced job opportunities resulting from pollution control 
seem to have disproportionately adverse effects on persons with fewer 
economic resources.46 For example, much environmental land use regu-
lation reduces the amount of land available for housing. This reduction 
increases the price of both land and, therefore, housing, thus effectively 
reducing the amount of affordable housing available to low-income 
persons.47 
Few of these studies confront the race issue directly. One study that 
did concluded that distributional inequities existed along racial lines in 
the distribution of the costs associated with water pollution control. The 
Natural Resource Policy: Distributional Information and the Public Participation Process, 15 RE-
SOURCES POL'y 282 (1989). 
45 Dorfman & Snow, supra note 44, at 115. Those who question the extent to which existing 
environmenta1laws promote efficiency, however, would likely contend that those laws are, for that 
same reason, wrong-headed in both respects; that is, they promote neither efficiency nor distribu-
tional fairness. The Office of Management and Budget and some federal judges, for instance, have 
recently suggested that environmental laws actually undermine public health concerns because they 
make people poorer, and "richer is safer." In other words, an individual with more economic re-
sources (i.e., wealth) is likely to be more healthy than an individual with fewer such resources. 
Hence, because environmental laws decrease economic wealth (or so proponents of this theory as-
sume), they simultaneously decrease public health. See, e.g., International Union v. OSHA, 938 
F.2d 1310, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Williams, J., concurring) ("higher income can secure better 
health, and there is no basis for a casual assumption that more stringent regulation will always save 
lives"); Frank Swoboda, OMB's Logic: Less Protection Saves Lives; Letter Blocking Health Stan-
dardsfor 6 Million Workers Shocks Officials at Labor Dept., WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1992, at A15; see 
also Frank Swoboda, OMB to Review Standards of Health Covering 6 Million, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 
1992, at A19 ("OMB said it has not abandoned the idea that federal agencies should be required to 
determine whether protective health standards harm more workers than they help."). 
46 See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 36, at 273-74. To the extent that the cost of environmental 
protection is imposed uniformly, moreover, its net impact is likely to be regressive. See Elliott, supra 
note 38, at 8. 
47 Daniel R. Mandelker, The Conflict Between Environmental Land Use Regulation and Housing 
Affordability, 15 ZoNING & PLAN. L. REp. 1 (1992). 
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study's author found, specifically, that "[w]hites have a greater absolute 
burden, while nonwhites generally have a slightly greater proportional 
burden" in the distribution of such costS.48 
(b) Environmental risks.-Studies addressing the redistribu-
tion of environmental risks are far fewer in number than those concerned 
with economic costs, but race has more frequently been a focus of inquiry 
in the former. Two studies are no doubt the most widely acknowledged 
because they advance the thesis that race matters in the distribution of 
environmental risks and that racial minorities receive a disproportionate 
amount of those risks. 
The first study, entitled Siting of Hazardous Waste Landfills and 
their Correlation with Racial and Economic Status of Surrounding Com-
munities, was prepared by the General Accounting Office (GAO) in 
1983. Conducted in response to a request by Walter E. Fauntroy, a con-
gressional representative from the District of Columbia,49 the GAO sur-
veyed locations of hazardous waste landfills in the southeastern United 
States.50 Specifically, GAO examined off site hazardous waste landfills 
(not part of or contiguous to an industrial facility) located in eight south-
eastern states. The GAO found that "[b ]lacks make up the majority of 
the population in three of the four communities where the landfills are 
located."51 The GAO also found that "[a]t least 26 percent of the popu-
lation in all four communities have income below the poverty level and 
most of this population is Black."52 
The second study, undertaken by the United Church of Christ Com-
mission for Racial Justice (UCC) and reported in 1987, was far more 
sweeping in its scope. 53 It purported to examine the location of con-
trolled and uncontrolled hazardous waste sites across the United States 
for the purpose of determining whether they were disproportionately lo-
cated in racial minority neighborhoods. 54 The report concluded that 
48 Gianessi & Peskin, supra note 44, at 97. 
49 Representative Fauntroy made his request in the aftermath of his arrest at a demonstration 
protesting the siting of a hazardous waste facility in a mostly black community in Warren County, 
North Carolina. See Godsil, supra note 14, at 394 & n.3. 
so U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SmNG OF HAzARDOUS W ASrE LANDFILLS AND THEIR 
CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND EcONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES (1983). 
SlId. at 2. 
52Id. 
53 UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE 
IN THE UNITED STATES (1987) [hereinafter UCC STUDY]. 
54 Id. at ix. The report defined "minority popUlation" as the "summation of the foIlowing popu-
lations: (1) Black population not of Spanish origin; (2) Asian & Pacific Islander, American Indian, 
and Eskimo & Aleut populations not of Spanish origin; (3) Other non-white populations not of 
Spanish Origin; and (4) Hispanic population." Id. at 63. The report was based on minority popula-
tion figures derived from the 1980 U.S. Census, id. at 9, and on the 415 operating commercial haz-
ardous waste facilities then listed in EPA's hazardous waste management system. Id. at 10. The 
study compared five major variables, including" 'minority percentage of the population,', 'mean 
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"[a]lthough socio-economic status appeared to play an important role in 
the location of commercial hazardous waste facilities, race still proved to 
be more significant."55 According to the report's authors, "[t]his re-
mained true after the study controlled for urbanization and regional 
differences. "56 
The uee study found, in particular, that "[i]n communities with 
two or more operating hazardous waste facilities or one of the five largest 
landfills, the mean minority percentage of the population was more than 
three times that of communities without facilities (38 percent versus 12 
percent)."57 Furthermore, "[i]n communities with one operating com-
mercial hazardous waste facility, the mean minority percentage of the 
population was approximately twice that of communities without facili-
ties (24 percent versus 12 percent)."58 The study also found that "[t]hree 
out of every five Black and Hispanic Americans lived in communities 
with uncontrolled toxic waste sites."59 
The GAO and uee studies have been widely publicized, particu-
larly within minority communities, and have generated considerable con-
household income', 'mean value of owner-occupied homes', 'number of uncontrolled toxic waste 
sites per 1,000 persons' and 'pounds of hazardous waste generated per person.''' ld. 
55 ld. at xiii. 
56 ld. According to the report, however, its statistical findings reflect a 90% confidence level, id. 
at II, which is not particularly high. Apparently, the statistical methodology utilized in the UCC 
study is also not uncontroversial. The study utilizes a "discriminate" rather than "regression" anal-
ysis technique, which is the more widely accepted basis for differentiating between the effect of multi-
ple dependent variables. The UCC study also equates the siting of toxic sites with exposure to toxic 
releases, and relies on present demographic data rather than the demographic data pertaining to the 
time that the initial siting decision may have been made. A more recent study takes issue with some 
of the UCC study's conclusions. Specifically, Professor James Hamilton considers the impact of a 
community'S ability to engage in collective action on a hazardous waste facility's willingness to ex-
pand its waste processing capacity. James T. Hamilton, Politics and Social Cost: Hazardous Waste 
Facilities in a Truly Coasian World (June 1991) (unpublished working paper, on file with the North-
western University Law Review). Hamilton employs logistic regression analysis to conclude that col-
lective action potential (measured by voter turnout in the 1980 presidential election) is a statistically 
significant factor (at a 99% confidence level), id. at 22, and also concludes that "controlling for other 
factors race is not a statistically significant factor in the expansion selection process[.]" ld. at 24. 
Hamilton also concludes that "[n]one of the variables related to compensation demands such as 
income or education are statistically significant." ld. at 22. Apart from the difference in statistical 
confidence levels and methodologies utilized by the two studies, a major difference between them is 
that the UCC study focuses on where sites are now located, UCC STUDY, supra note 53, at 10, which 
allows for demographic changes after the siting decision is made, while the Hamilton paper looks to 
the factors existing at the time that a facility manager makes a particular expansion decision. Hamil-
ton, supra at 3. While the former inquiry is more descriptive of the problems actually faced by 
minorities, the latter is more relevant to constitutional analysis that is concerned with a deci-
sionmaker's subjective motivation. See infra notes 171-205 and accompanying text. 
57 UCC STUDY, supra note 53, at 13. 
581d. 
59 ld. at xiv. According to the report, blacks are significantly overrepresented in the populations 
of metropolitan areas with the largest number of uncontrolled hazardous waste sites. These include 
Memphis (173), St. Louis (160), Houston (152), Cleveland (106), Chicago (103), and Atlanta (94). 
ld. 
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troversy60 and academic inquiry. 61 The most prominent response was a 
conference held at the University of Michigan in January 1990 in which 
academics and government officials from across the country presented 
and discussed papers concerning environmental justice issues from a va-
riety of perspectives.62 The Michigan Conference participants thereafter 
met with EPA Administrator William K. Reilly who, at their urging, 
created an "Environment and Equity" working group at the agency. 
This working group was charged with auditing the agency's policies from 
60 See Michael Satchell, A Whiff of Discrimination?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp., May 4, 1992, 
at 34. 
61 The most prolific writer and advocate on the subject of "environmental injustice" is a sociolo-
gist, Professor Robert Bullard, who has written numerous articles over the last nine years describing 
how racial minorities are more likely to be exposed to toxic pollutants than are whites. See, e.g., 
Bullard, Ecqlogical Inequities and the New South, supra note 15; Bullard & Wright, Environmental-
ism and the Politics of Equity, supra note 15; Bullard & Wright, The Politics of Pollution, supra note 
15; Bullard, Solid Waste Sites, supra note 15. In 1990, Professor Bullard published a book on the 
subject, which brings together in one volume much of his research and reflection on the issue. See 
BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 15. Within that volume, Bullard explains that the largest 
commercial hazardous waste landfill is located in Emelle, Alabama, where blacks represent 78.9% of 
the population, and that the fourth largest landfill is located in Scotlandville, Louisiana, where 93% 
of the population is black. Id. at 41. According to Bullard, these two sites alone have more than 
one-third of the estimated licensed hazardous waste landfill capacity in the United States. Id. Bul-
lard also describes how waste facilities tend to be in black neighborhoods. Id. at 43. Another study 
of the impact ofrace on the siting of hazardous waste facilities has not supported either Bullard's or 
the UCC Study's conclusions. See Hamilton, supra note 56. 
62 See Bunyan I. Bryant & Paul Mohai, The Michigan Conference: A Turning Point, 18 EPA J. 
9, 10 (1992). The titles of the articles included in the published proceedings provide a sense of the 
scope of the Conference. They include: (1) Toxic Waste and Race in the United States; (2) Can the 
Environmental Movement Attract and Maintain the Support of Minorities?; (3) Environmental Black-
mail in Minority Communities; (4) Environmental Voting Record of the Congressional Black Caucus; 
(5) Toward a Model of "Environmental Discrimination"; (6) Minority Anglers and Toxic Fish Con-
sumption: Evidence from a State-Wide Survey of Michigan; (7) Invitation to Poison: Detroit Minori-
ties and Toxic Fish Consumption from the Detroit River; (8) The Effects of Occupational Injury, 
Illness, and Disease on the Health Status of Black Americans; (9) Hazardous Waste Incineration and 
Minority Communities: The Case of Alsen, Louisiana; (10) Environmentalism and Civil Rights in 
Sumter County, Alabama; (11) Uranium Production and its Effects on Navajo Communities along the 
Rio Puerco in Western New Mexico; (12) Pesticide Exposure of Farm Workers and the International 
Connection; and (13) The Dumping of Toxic Waste in African Countries: A Case of Poverty and 
Racism. These papers generally supported the findings of the UCC Study. For example, a study of 
the siting of hazardous waste incineration facilities in and around Baton Rouge, Louisiana, found 
that "minority communities have an average of one site per every 7,309 residents. White communi-
ties have only one site per every 31,100 residents." Harvey L. White, Hazardous Waste Incineration 
and Minority Communities: The Case of Alsen, Louisiana, in MICHIGAN CONFERENCE PROCEED-
INGS, supra note 37, at 142, 149. Furthermore, when volume is factored in, "[t]he white communi-
ties have less than I % of the hazardous waste ... [e]ven though the minority communities are 
significantly smaller .... " Id. at 150 (footnote omitted). The University of Michigan held a second 
symposium a year later. The published proceedings include a statistical analysis of the Detroit area, 
which concluded that while both race and income were significant determinants in terms of location 
of commercial hazardous waste facilities (the chances of blacks living within a mile of such a facility 
were approximately four-and-a-half times greater than whites), the effect of race was the "stronger" 
determinant. See Paul Mohai & Bunyan I. Bryant, Race. Class, and Environmental Quality in the 
Detroit Area, in ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM. supra note 9, at 42, 43. 
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an environmental equity perspective, including both income and race as 
factors to be considered.63 
This working group issued its "Environmental Equity" report in the 
summer of 1992.64 The report surveyed and evaluated existing data re-
garding the extent to which minorities may bear disproportionately high 
burdens from environmental pollution, and its analysis of the data was 
noticeably more refined and demanding than that of earlier studies. Per-
haps for this very reason, however, the working group's report ultimately 
lends substantial credence to the conclusions of prior, less detached 
studies. 
The report distinguished between "health effects" and "exposure to 
environmental pollutants," and found (1) that existing data shows differ-
ences in "exposure to some environmental pollutants by socioeconomic 
factors and race," and (2) "clear evidence that there are differences by 
race for disease and death rates."65 Nonetheless, EPA also concluded 
that a gap in the data exists concerning the relation between the two 
findings. Specifically, the report noted that "[e]xposure is not the same 
as health effects," and that "[t]here is a general lack of data on environ-
mental health effects by race and income" and, more particularly, on the 
"environmental contribution to these diseases."66 According to EPA, 
63 Pursuant to the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 11001-11050 (1986), there now exists a more useful source of data concerning toxic releases than 
existed at the time of the earlier investigations, including those conducted by GAO and UCC. That 
law established the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), in which companies must report the amounts of 
toxics released from their facilities. Using that data, a recent graduate of Washington University 
School of Law (St. Louis) examined the amount of toxic releases in predominantly (75% or greater) 
White and Black neighborhoods of St. Louis, Missouri. He found that there were approximately 
50% more toxic releases by weight in black neighborhoods, notwithstanding that their respective 
popUlations were roughly equal to white communities. See Kevin L. Brown, Environmental Dis-
crimination-Myth or Reality? 17 (Mar. 29, 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the North-
western University Law Review). 
64 See 1 ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY WORKGROUP, OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING, AND EVALU-
ATION, U.S. EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES, WORK-
GROUP REpORT TO THE ADMINISTRATOR (June 1992) [hereinafter EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY 
REpORT]. EPA's release of the draft report in February 1992 caused a considerable stir. The day 
that the report was released, Representative Henry Waxman (D. Cal.) held a press conference in 
which he charged that the EPA report was a "public relations ploy" rather than a meaningful effort 
"to understand and respond to the very real health problems faced by people of color." See Con-
gressman Henry A. Waxman, Environmental Equity Report is Public-Relations Ploy, News Release 
(Feb. 24, 1992) (copy on file with the Northwestern University Law Review). Representative Waxman 
released, along with his critical comments, copies of internal agency memoranda in which agency 
officials had similarly criticized the draft report for lack of candor regarding the "meagerness of 
[EPA] efforts." See Memorandum from Ed Hanley, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Adminis-
tration, to Clarice Gaylord, Re: Environmental Equity Report (December 1991) [hereinafter Hanley 
Memorandum] (copy on file with the Northwestern University Law Review). Waxman also released a 
copy of a dissenting opinion that certain EPA employees sought to have appended to the draft 
report, but which agency officials ultimately declined to include. 
65 EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REPORT, supra note 64, at 11, 13. 
66Id. 
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with the exception of lead, for which the evidence of disproportionate 
impact by race is dramatic,67 "[t]or diseases that are known to be envi-
ronmentally induced, there is a lack of data disaggregated by race and 
socioeconomic variables. "68 
The EPA report concluded that minorities have disproportionately 
greater "observed and potential exposure" to environmental pollutants 
and, specifically, noted four causes for this phenomenon.69 The first is a 
greater concentration of minorities in urban areas where emission densi-
ties tend to be greatest and, accordingly, where air pollution is usually 
the most hazardous.70 In fact, government scientists recently concluded 
that blacks and Hispanics reside in higher percentages than whites in 
geographic areas that are currently not in compliance with federal Clean 
Air Act requirements for particulate matter, carbon monoxide, ozone, 
sulfur dioxide, and lead.71 These scientists also concluded that income 
alone did not explain the percentage discrepancy: "[A] comparison be-
tween poor, Mrican American, and Hispanic percentages shows that 
these minority groups are more concentrated in [substandard air quality 
regions] than the poor population in general."72 Additionally, in another 
study described by EPA in its environmental equity report, epidemiolo-
gists found that ninety percent of steelworkers most heavily exposed to 
certain organic pollutants were nonwhite and that these persons suffered 
from respiratory cancer at a rate eight times more than would normally 
be expected.73 
Identified by EPA as the other causes of greater minority exposure 
67 See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text. 
68 EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REpORT, supra note 63, at 11. The EPA report describes an 
existing debate among commentators regarding the extent to which "differences in cancer rates be-
tween African Americans and Whites can be explained by the effects of poverty." ld. at 13. Some 
commentators contend that virtually all of the differences can be explained by poverty, rather than 
race (to the extent, of course, that the two factors can themselves be disaggregated), while others 
posit that "there is still a substantial amount of variation that seems to be explained only by race or 
ethnicity." ld. (citing Claudia R. Baquet et al., Socioeconomic Factors and Cancer Incidence Among 
Blacks and Whites, 83 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 551-57 (1991); Ann Gibbons, Does War on Cancer 
Equal War on Poverty?, 253 SCIENCE 260 (1991); Vincente Navarro, Race of Class Versus Race and 
Class: Mortality Differentials in the United States, 336 THE LANCET 1238-40 (1990)). 
69 The report stresses that the measurements of environmental contaminants represent the "po-
tential" for exposure and not "actual" exposure. "Even though the potential for exposure may be 
the same, not all potentially exposed persons will experience the same actual exposure." EPA ENVI-
RONMENTAL EQUITY REpORT, supra note 64, at 13. 
70 ld. at 13-14. 
71 ld. at 14 (citing D.R. Wernette & L.A. Nieves, Minorities and Air Pollution: A Preliminary 
Geo-Demographic Analysis, Paper presented at the Socioeconomic Research Analysis Conference II 
(June 27-28, 1991)). 
72 D.R. Wernette & L.A. Nieves, Breathing Polluted Air: Minorities Are Disproportionately Ex-
posed, 18 EPA J. 16, 17 (1992). 
73 EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REpORT, supra note 64, at 17 (citing OFFICE OF HEALTH 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL AsSESSMENT, U.S. EPA, CARCINOGEN ASSESSMENT OF COKE OVEN EMIS-
SIONS (1984)). 
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to environmental contaminants were (1) the physical proximity of minor-
ity populations to hazardous waste sites; 74 (2) minority consumption of 
contaminated food;75 and (3) minority farmworker exposure to pesti-
cides.76 In each instance, minorities disproportionately engaged in cer-
tain kinds of activities (residence, diet, and work, respectively) that 
exposed them to greater environmental risks. 
Finally, the EPA report raised the possibility that minorities may 
suffer disproportionately from environmental pollution not just because 
they are in fact exposed to it in greater amounts, but also because certain 
members of this group are more likely to be vulnerable to its adverse 
effects. For most contaminants, certain population subgroups are more 
sensitive than is the general population. According to EPA, there is rea-
son to believe that "several population groups identified as being sensitive 
to the health effects of air pollution seem to be disproportionately com-
posed of low-income or racial minority individuals compared to the gen-
eral population."77 
III. THE STRUCTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL INEQUITY 
A. General Causes: Racism and the Relative Absence of Minority 
Economic and Political Power 
The structural roots of environmental inequities are very likely the 
same as those that produce other forms of racially disproportionate im-
74 EPA's discussion of the siting issue relies exclusively on the UCC and GAO evidence regard-
ing the physical proximity of commercial hazardous waste treatment facilities or uncontrolled haz-
ardous waste sites to minority residential communities. EPA simply recounts those earlier studies. 
Somewhat surprisingly, it makes no independent effort to evaluate the veracity of these study's con-
clusions. See EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REPORT, supra note 64, at 14-15. There is a cryptic 
statement, however, suggesting the possibility of some controversy in this area. After summarizing 
the prior studies, the report simply concludes "[ilt is clear that more study of this issue is required to 
fully understand the associations of race, income, and facility location." ld. at 15. Apart from the 
possible negative implications of this statement, the report provides no hint as to any deficiencies in 
the prior studies. 
75 See Patrick C. West et aI., Minority Anglers and Toxic Fish Consumption: Evidence from a 
State-Wide Survey of Michigan, in MICHIGAN CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 37, at 108. 
According to this paper, and other recent studies relied upon by EPA, many potentially harmful 
environmental contaminants (e.g., PCBs, dioxins, furans) bioaccumulate to dangerous concentration 
levels in fish, and those fish are not only eaten in disproportionate amounts by some racial minorities 
(including Native Americans and Blacks), but are also prepared for eating in a manner (i.e., includ-
ing skin and less fat trimmed) in which more contaminants will be consumed. EPA ENVIRONMEN-
TAL EQUITY REPORT, supra note 64, at 15-16. 
76 EPA's report describes how "80-90% of the approximately two million hired farmworkers 
... are racial minorities," and how studies have shown that workplace exposure to chemicals in 
agriculture is one of the areas of greatest human health risks. EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY RE-
PORT, supra note 64, at 16. 
77 ld. at 22 ("asthmatics, persons with certain cardiovascular diseases or anemia, and women at 
risk of delivering low-birth-weight fetuses"). 
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pacts. In this regard, environmental protection is yet another expression 
of a more widespread phenomenon. 
The most obvious and common source are racist attitudes-whether 
in blatant, thinly guised, or unconscious forms-that pervade decision-
making. Historically, racial minorities have been persistent victims of 
racial discrimination in this country. Although de jure discrimination is 
now forbidden by law, racist attitudes, both consciously and uncon-
sciously held, are plainly widespread.78 These range from hostility to-
ward racial minorities, to false stereotypical jUdgments about members of 
that class. As Alex Aleinikoff recently explained, "[r]ace matters with 
respect to the people we choose to spend time with or marry, the neigh-
borhoods in which we choose to live, the houses of worship we join, our 
choice of schools for our children, the people for whom we vote, and the 
people we allow the state to execute."79 People routinely make stere-
otypical judgments about others based on racial identity.80 While such 
judgments may appear less threatening than those based on outright ra-
cial hostility, their adverse impact may in fact be more potent because of 
their pervasiveness and masked nature, which makes them so difficult to 
identify and root out. 
Therefore, it is not at all unlikely-and, indeed, it may be prob-
able-that racist attitudes and false stereotypes have influenced various 
decisions relating to environmental protection. Certainly there is no rea-
son to suppose that environmental protection is somehow immune from 
actions based on societal attitudes that, while widely condemned, are 
nevertheless prevalent. 81 For example, the use of environmental quality 
to support racially exclusionary zoning practices would seem to confirm 
that suspicion. 82 
78 Thomas A. Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1066-69 
(1991); Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987). 
79 Aleinikolf, supra note 78, at 1067. 
80 Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 429 (1988). 
81 Professor Derrick Bell's "Chronicle of the Space Trader," in which white Americans trade the 
freedom of black Americans for environmental protection is no doubt one of the most dramatic 
statements of the proposition. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., After We're Gone: Prodent Speculations on 
America in a Post-Racial Epoch, 34 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 393 (1990); Bell, supra note 8. 
82 See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); cf Interna-
tional Union v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991); see also DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, 
RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 567 (2d ed. 1980); Yale Rabin, Expulsive Zoning: The Inequitable 
Legacy of Euclid, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 101 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold A. 
Kayden eds., 1989); cf Luke Cole, The Anti-Immigration Environmental Alliance: Divide and Con-
quer at the Border, in RACE, POVERTY & ENV'T, Summer 1992, at 13. There have been successful 
equal protection claims brought against municipalities based on their failure to provide equivalent 
services, including water and sewage treatment, to black neighborhoods. See Dowdell v. Apopka, 
511 F. Supp. 1375 (M.D. Fla. 1981) (disparities in water, stormwater drainage in black/white neigh-
borhoods motivated by discriminatory intent); Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363 (M.D. 
Fla. 1978) (race discrimination based on black neighborhoods not being provided with same level of 
municipal services as white neighborhoods); see generally Martin Jaffe, Municipal Service Disparities: 
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In any event, powerful vestiges of generations of racist policies 
plainly persist, and these vestiges are self-perpetuating.83 As a result of 
racist laws and attitudes extending back to slavery itself, racial minorities 
today possess significantly less power both in the marketplace and in the 
political fora, particularly at the national level. This absence of economic 
and political clout makes it much more probable that racial minorities 
will receive an unfavorably disproportionate share of the benefits (less) 
and burdens (more) ofliving in society,84 including those associated with 
environmental protection.85 For example, the absence of economic re-
sources compounds the threat of distributional inequities associated with 
environmental protection. Because those with fewer economic resources 
are disproportionately affected adversely by across-the-board price in-
creases, such individuals are also more likely to suffer greater economic 
harm when prices rise because of environmental protection. The eco-
nomic plight of many minority communities also confines its members as 
a practical matter to the less healthy residential areas which are, for that 
reason, less expensive to live in.86 This confinement also creates the po-
tential for what some have dubbed "environmental blackmail,"87 as the 
community finds it more difficult to oppose the siting of a facility that, 
notwithstanding significant environmental risks, offers the possibility of 
immediate short-term economic relief.88 
In addition, persons with fewer economic means frequently con-
clude that they cannot afford the "luxury" of declining available work, 
notwithstanding the environmental risks associated with the job. At the 
Liability Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Feb. 1987, at 
3, 3 (using Title VI as a claim in disparity-of-services suits). 
83 See, e.g., Eric Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Discrimination, 96 HARV. L. REv. 828, 855 
(1983). 
84 See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1163, 1165 (1978). 
85 See, e.g., Bullard & Wright, Environmentalism and the Politics of Equity, supra note 15, at 25. 
86 See A. Myrick Freeman III, Distribution of Environmental Quality, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY ANALYSIS 243, 252, 257-58, 263 (Allen V. Kneese & Blair T. Bowers eds., 1972). 
87 See generally Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Blackmail in Minority Communities, in 
MICHIGAN CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 37 (environmental problems have become polit-
ical issues as they threaten public health); see also DAVID ZWICK & MARCY BENSTOCK, WATER 
WASTELAND: RALPH NADER'S STUDY GROUP REPORT ON WATER POLLUTION 400 (1971). 
88 In commenting on a public utility company's decision to site a nuclear power plant in the 
economically depressed community of Plymouth, Massachusetts, a company official reportedly re-
ferred directly to the relevance of the socioeconomic status of the town's residents to the company's 
decision: "The town is sort of down on its uppers; it's sort of poor. When we announced it, they 
said, 'Oh, Santa Claus came.' They are a better kind of people to deal with ... ." PETER YEAGER, 
THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE PUBLIC REGULATION OF PRIVATE POLLUTION 87 (1991). On the 
other hand, the promise of economic benefits in exchange for environmental pollution may be more 
illusory than real. Although the pollution and associated environmental risks will no doubt occur, 
there is reason to suspect that many of the higher paying jobs in fact do not go to those in the 
community, but to nonminority persons who reside outside the immediate vicinity of the polluting 
facility. See Austin & Schill, supra note 14, at 69, 70. 
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same time, when jobs are displaced because of pollution control costs, 
those with less seniority are the ones most likely to lose their jobs. Mi-
norities typically make up a disproportionately large percentage of those 
employees with lower seniority.89 Furthermore, there is reason to sus-
pect that minorities are also less likely to be in a position to obtain the 
more highly skilled employment opportunities that are created in the pol-
lution control industry90 or in other jobs becoming available as the nation 
shifts away from a dependency on smokestack technologies.91 
Indeed, for these reasons, those commercial interests opposing envi-
ronmental protection regulations have often sought support from minor-
ity communities. For example, in 1989 Washington D.C. voters defeated 
a mandatory beverage recycling law reportedly because industry oppo-
nents successfully targeted minority communities with advertisements 
suggesting that the law was regressive in its impact.92 More recently, oil 
company executives seeking support in their efforts to persuade Congress 
to allow oil exploration and development in the Arctic National Wildlife 
Refuge singled out presidents of black colleges and universities, arguing 
to them that their educational institutions could especially benefit from 
the promotion of such developmental interests.93 
The relative absence of political leverage is at least as significant as 
89 BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 15, at 12. Of course, these same factors can be 
turned somewhat on their head to argue against redistributive efforts in environmental protection. 
For instance, one could contend that the unilateral reduction of environmental risks in minority 
communities would be a source of racial injustice, by denying members of those communities the 
autonomy to choose for themselves between economic return and environmental risk. The members 
of the community might have preferred the benefits associated with economic development. Indeed, 
there are recent instances where industry has sought to "compensate" residents directly for the 
increased risks through advance monetary payments. See Ronald Smothers, Future in Mind, 
Choctaws Reject Plan for Landfill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1991, at A13. While this contention is not 
lacking in rhetorical force, its persuasiveness rests at least in part on its unstated acceptance of the 
legitimacy of the existing distribution of economic resources. If one were instead to assume that the 
existing distribution is itself unjust (for instance, in part a vestige of centuries of racist policies and 
attitudes), the question becomes considerably more complex. It becomes much harder in that cir-
cumstance to equate liberty with consumer choice. See WEISBROD ET AL., supra note 21, at 551; C. 
Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 
741, 794-98 (1986). To be sure, the problematic nature of overriding an individual's decision to 
forego environmental protection in favor of short term economic gain remains, but the propriety of 
doing so seems stronger. 
90 Bullard, supra note 87, at 62. 
91 ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS-BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, AND UNE-
QUAL 107-33 (1992). 
92 Paul Ruffins, Blacks Suffer Health Hazards Yet Remain Inactive on Environment, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 27, 1989, at A3. 
93 One sweltering Saturday in 1988 on a resort island in South Carolina, an oil industry lobby-
ist from Anchorage was lecturing the presidents of the nation's black colleges on the develop-
ment potential of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. 
If the presidents [of the black colleges] could drum up support among African Americans 
for oil drilling in the pristine area, [an oil industry lobbyist] said, he would make sure that black 
colleges got a slice of the estimated $297 billion revenue and royalty pie. 
Brigid Schulte, Arctic Energy Debate Rekindled, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 26, 1990, at Cl. 
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the absence of economic power. Entities within the federal government 
with the greatest impact on the give-and-take process that marks envi-
ronmental protection include the courts, offices within multiple executive 
branch agencies, and a plethora of congressional committees with over-
lapping jurisdiction on environmental matters. Bargains struck in the 
lawmaking process are expressed in the distributions of the law's benefits 
and burdens among those interest groups competing for the deci-
sionmakers' attention. Because legislative and regulatory priorities are 
established through this lawmaking process, those wielding greater polit-
ical influence over this process are more likely to have their problems 
receive ample attention in the first instance. Where the resources re-
quired to enact a law or to initiate an enforcement action are especially 
great, such a political advantage can very well be determinative of how a 
program's benefits are ultimately distributed. 
The same is true for allocations of those burdens associated with 
environmental protection. Lawmakers inevitably seek the path of least 
political resistance when allocating the burdens of environmental protec-
tion.94 In deciding both from where and to whom environmental risks 
should be reallocated in the treatment and prevention of pollution, 
lawmakers are necessarily more responsive to the demands of constitu-
ents who possess the greatest political infiuence.95 This phenomenon is 
evident in the siting of other undesirable public projects and private un-
dertakings, ranging from highways to prisons. There is no obvious theo-
retical reason why the same forces should not be at work when the object 
of the project or undertaking is pollution control. 
This is not to suggest, as some might,96 that the lawmaking process 
nowhere evinces an effort on the part of lawmakers to discern a viable 
public interest apart from the bargains struck by those special interests 
94 See Hamilton. supra note 56. 
95 This same phenomena no doubt explains recent increases in the international export of domes-
tic solid and hazardous wastes to developing countries, which the 1989 Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes seeks to address by promoting "the 
prohibition of trans boundary movements of hazardous wastes, especially [to] developing countries." 
United Nations Environment Programme Conference of Plenipotentianes on the Global Convention 
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes, Final Act and Text of Basel 
Convention, Mar. 22, 1989,28 I.L.M. 649, 657. 
96 The extent to which "public choice theory" advances this view is itself a subject of debate. 
Compare Michael E. DeBow & Dwight R. Lee, Understanding (and Misunderstanding) Public 
Choice: A Response to Farber and Frickey, 66 TEX. L. REV. 993 (1988) with Daniel A. Farber & 
Phillip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REv. 873 (1987) [hereinafter 
Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice] and with Daniel A. Farber & Phillip P. 
Frickey, Integrating Public Choice and Public Law: A Reply to DeBow and Lee, 66 TEX. L. REV. 
1013 (1988); see also William Bishop, A Theory of Administrative Law, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 489, 498 
(1990) (public choice theory "purports to explain many of the activities of modem government as 
having nothing to do with the public interest-except perhaps at the level of justification and propa-
ganda-but rather to be motivated by attempts to redistribute wealth away from one group and 
toward another."). 
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competing before them for the purpose of their own wealth maximiza-
tion. There is no doubt much merit to the contentions of those who re-
sist that more cynical view of public choice theory and suggest that the 
lawmaking process possesses some independent integrity.97 Likewise, the 
power of interest groups to influence legislative and regulatory outcomes 
seems to depend heavily on many context-specific circumstances, includ-
ing the nature of their interest and the visibility of the issue.98 
My accounting of the formation of environmental protection laws 
does not depend, however, on a wholesale embracing of public choice 
theory, particularly the narrow notion of "economic rent seeking." The 
mainstream environmental public interest organizations have clearly 
played a significant role in the fashioning of those laws, and it is hard to 
characterize fairly their interests in narrow economic rent seeking terms 
(especially those that are nonanthropocentric in character).99 But, that is 
not at all inconsistent with the common sense notions that environmental 
protection laws possess a significant distributional dimension and that 
this distribution ultimately reflects the concerns and values of those co-
alitions necessary for the law's enactment. 
Finally, whatever susceptibility minority communities have to re-
ceive a disproportionate amount of the initial burdens of environmental 
protection is multiplied over time because of their relative lack of eco-
nomic and political clout. Once a particular geographic area becomes 
the locus for an activity presenting a heightened set of risks, that has 
historically been a reason favoring, not opposing, the siting of more such 
activities in that area. The existing activities provide a surface "neutral" 
reason for subsequent siting determinations. 
B. Exacerbating Causes: The Structure of Environmental 
Policymaking 
There exist, moreover, factors more endemic to environmental law 
itself that may exacerbate distributional inequities likely present in the 
context of any public welfare law. These factors suggest more than the 
disturbing, yet somewhat irresistible thesis, that the distributional dimen-
97 See Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, supra note 96; Mark Kelman, On 
Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public 
Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988); Steven Kelman, "Public Choice" and Public Spirit, 87 
PUB. INTEREST 80 (1987). 
98 See KAy LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERI-
CAN DEMOCRACY 312-17, 394-98 (1986). 
99 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 
101 YALE L.J. 331, 356, 360 (1991). In this respect, I share Professor Don Elliott's view that much 
of the support for environmental measures is "altruistic" in character. See E. Donald Elliott, Jr., A 
Cabin on the Mountain: Reflections on the Distributional Consequences of Environmental Protection 
Programs, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 5,7 (1991); see also Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure 
in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. EcON. & ORGAN. 59, 64-65 (1992); but see WILLIAM TUCKER, PRO-
GRESS AND PRIVILEGE-AMERICA IN THE AGE OF ENVIRONMENTALISM 28-39 (1982). 
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sion of environmental protection policy likely suffers from the same ineq-
uities that persist generally in society. They suggest the far more 
troubling, and even less appealing, proposition that the problems of dis-
tributional inequity may in fact be more pervasive in the environmental 
protection arena than they are in other areas of traditional concern to 
civil rights organizations, such as education, employment, and housing. 
Indeed, it is the absence of that minority involvement so prevalent in 
the more classic areas of civil rights concern that may render the distri-
butional problem worse for environmental protection. Minority interests 
have traditionally had little voice in the various points of influence that 
strike the distributional balances necessary to get environmental protec-
tion laws enacted, regulations promulgated, and enforcement actions ini-
tiated. loo The interest groups historically active in the environmental 
protection area include a variety of mainstream environmental organiza-
tions representing a spectrum of interests (conservation, recreation, hunt-
ing, wildlife protection, resource protection, human health), as well as a 
variety of commercial and industrial concerns. Until very recently,lOl if 
at all, the implications for racial minorities of environmental protection 
laws have not been a focal point of concern for any of these 
organizations. 102 
Much of environmental protection lawmaking has also been highly 
centralized, with the geographic focus in Washington, D.C.I03 The en-
actment of environmental statutes within that geo-political setting has 
100 To my knowledge, no systematic inquiry has ever been undertaken to assess the involvement 
of minorities in environmental law. The kind of study that would be required would consider not 
just the identity and numbers of minorities within the more important points of influence, but would 
also consider the nature of their involvement and, even more particularly, their relationship with 
other persons having influence over the development of environmental protection policy. See gener-
ally EDWARD o. LAUMANN & FRANZ v. PAPPI, NETWORKS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION-A PER-
SPEcrIVE ON COMMUNITY INFLUENCE SYSTEMS 5-9 (1976) (describing principles of methodology 
referred to as "social structural analysis"). A somewhat analogous study (on an admittedly smaller 
scale) examining the structure of the Chicago Bar included just such a discussion of the racial dimen-
sion of the institution's "social structure." See JOHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHI-
CAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 295-96 (1982); see also MICHAEL J. 
POWELL, FROM PATRICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL ELITE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE NEW 
YORK CITY BAR AssOCIATION (1988). A study of "elite networks" in the national policy areas of 
agriculture, energy, health, and labor, did not identify any minorities. See John P. Heinz et al., Inner 
Circles or Hollow Cores? Elite Networks in National Policy Systems, 52 J. POL. 355 (1990). 
101 See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text. 
102 See A. Dan Tarlock, Environmental Protection: The Potential Misfit Between Equity and Effi-
ciency, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 871, 876 (1992) (describing "The Historical Roots of the Subordination 
of Equity to Efficiency" in environmental law and policy); see also Cole, The Need for Environmental 
Poverty Law, supra note 14, at 17-19. 
103 The federal government has displaced decentralized decisionmaking in response to the widely 
held perception that, given the rise of national markets and the interstate nature of many pollutants, 
nationwide solutions were required for adequate environmental protection. See Richard B. Stewart, 
Regulation in a Liberal State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537, 1543-54 
(1983). 
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required the expenditure of considerable political resources.104 As evi-
denced by the thirteen years required to amend the Clean Air Act, it is 
no easy task to obtain the attention of the numerous congressional com-
mittees, and to form the coalitions between competing interest groups, so 
necessary to secure a bill's passage. lOS 
Environmental legislation has ultimately been produced through in-
tense and lengthy horse-trading among interest groups, a process neces-
sary to secure a particular environmental law's passage. 106 This process 
has often depended upon the forging of alliances between diverse inter-
ests both within the environmental public interest community and within 
government bureaucracy. Often, these unions have included so-called 
"unholy alliances" between environmentalists and commercial and in-
dustrial interests, where the latter have perceived an economic advantage 
to be gained (or disadvantage to be minimized) by their supporting an 
environmental protection law that allocates the benefits and burdens of 
environmental protection in a particular fashion.I07 Regardless of the 
approach taken, or alliances forged, to procure a law's passage the in-
104 See Eskridge, supra note 99, at 361-63 (describing the "agenda-setting" role of interest 
groups). 
lOS See Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environ-
mental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 359-61 (1991). 
106 See, e.g., Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Adminis-
trative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431, 454-59 (1989) 
(describing how the policy preferences of the various players were key to the fashioning of the com-
promises necessary to secure passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977); Farber, supra note 
99, at 62-70. 
107 There are many examples of this phenomenon. The most widely proclaimed was no doubt the 
alliance between producers of high sulfur coal and environmentalists that prompted Congress in the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 to require percentage removal of the amount of sulfur within 
the coal combusted in addition to air emission reductions. This law had the effect of reducing air 
pollution while also reducing the competitive advantage that the law would have otherwise provided 
for producers of low sulfur coal. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, 
CLEAN COAL, DIRTY AIR OR How THE CLEAR AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DoLLAR 
BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH SULPHUR COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT 
(1981). Another example is the alliance between environmental groups and the railroads that have 
successfully resisted, mostly on environmental grounds, federal support for the development of coal 
slurry pipelines. The railroads, which receive significant revenue from coal transportation, have an 
obvious economic incentive to resist the competition presented by slurry technology. See William F. 
Webber, Coal Slurry Pipelines Are Ready, Willing, and Unable to Get There,ll ST. MARY'S L.J. 765 
(1979-80). Perhaps the most notorious instance, however, is presented by the Federal Highway 
Beautification Act of 1964, which was so successfully coopted by commercial interests that environ-
mental organizations have subsequently supported its repeal. The federal law provides so much 
protection for the billboard industry from the costs of the law's billboard restrictions that it actually 
makes it more difficult for state and local governments to impose such restrictions than would other-
wise be the case pursuant to their police power. See Ric~ard D. Lamm & Stephen K. Yasinow, The 
Highway Beautification Act of 1965: A Case Study in Legislative Frustration, 46 DENV. L.J. 437 
(1969). A recent account of alliances between environmentalists and private economic interests ad-
vances an extremely unflattering (and controversial) view of the forces behind environmentallegisla-
tion. See ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COST, PRIVATE REWARDS (Michael S. Greve & 
Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992). 
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volvement of a multitude of special interest groups is necessary. Indeed, 
one major public interest participant in the negotiations required to se-
cure passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, which were the 
culmination of over a decade of debate, characterized those negotiations 
as "a special interest feeding frenzy."los 
It is not surprising, therefore, that those environmental laws enacted 
by Congress typically address some, but hardly all, environmental pollu-
tion problems. And, even with regard to those problems that are explic-
itly addressed, there are usually discrepancies and gaps within the 
statutory scheme. Which problems are confronted, and where the dis-
crepancies and gaps occur, is quite naturally an expression of the priori-
ties of those participants who wield the greatest influence and resources 
in the political process. 
For this reason, much environmental legislation may not have fo-
cused on those pollution problems that are of greatest concern to many 
minority communities. For instance, air pollution control efforts typi-
cally have focussed on general ambient air quality concerns for an entire 
metropolitan region rather than on toxic hot spots in anyone particular 
area. Accordingly, while there has been much progress made in improv-
ing air quality as measured by a handful of national ambient air quality 
standards,109 there has been relatively less progress achieved over the last 
twenty years in the reduction of those toxic air emissions which tend to 
be of greater concern to persons, disproportionately minorities, who live 
in the immediate geographic vicinity of the toxic polluting source. For 
example, EPA has regulated only seven of hundreds of toxic air pollu-
tants since Congress enacted the Clean Air Act in 1970.110 The vast ma-
jority of governmental resources-federal, state, and local-have instead 
been directed to more ambient pollution standards, such as sulfur diox-
ide, nitrogen oxide, and particulates. Such nonenforcement of the Act's 
prohibition on toxic emissions effectively nullifies the law's environmen-
lOS See Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Court: Twenty Years of 
Change and Beyond, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241, 285 (1991) ("West Virginia and Ohio will 
get billions of dollars to build 'clean coal' plants. Steel mills in a few states will have 30 years to 
control poisonous emissions, instead of the 10 years given other industrial polluters. Florida power 
companies will get a $400-million, lO-year break on pollution control costs. Senators get more than 
exemptions for their home state.") (quoting Michael Kranish, Politics and Pollution, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Apr. 9, 1990, at AI). Professors Robert Glicksman and Christopher Schroeder recently 
summed up the phenomena nicely, albeit unsympathetically: 
It would appear that the senators saw little distinction between the Clean Air Act and a fight 
over which defense installations to close, or an appropriation for public works project. The 
pork tastes as good, from whichever barrel it comes. Each constitutes an opportunity to benefit 
the groups or interests that can in turn-benefit the politician. 
Glicksman & Schroeder, supra at 286. 
109 COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REpORT 17 (1986) (sum-
marizing environmental protection accomplishments since 1970). 
110 S. REP. No. 490, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 151 (1990). 
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tal protection mandate. I II 
Likewise, and at the behest of mainstream environmental groups, 
substantial resources have also been directed to improving air and water 
quality in nonurban areas. Programs for the prevention of significant 
deteriorations in air quality, the reduction of "acid rain," and the protec-
tion of visibility in national parks and wilderness areas, all require signifi-
cant financial expenditures.112 Substantial resources have similarly been 
expended op. improving the quality of water resources that are not as 
readily accessible to many minorities because of their historical exclu-
sion.113 Without meaning to suggest that these programs lack merit on 
their own terms (for the simple reason that they possess great merit), 
their return in terms of overall public health may be less than pollution 
control programs directed at improving the environmental quality of ur-
ban America's poorer neighborhoods, including many minority 
communities. 
Lead poisoning provides an excellent illustration of how redirection 
of some financial resources may go a long way toward improving the 
health and welfare of minorities. There seems to be a widespread consen-
sus that black children are disproportionately victims of excessive ab-
sorption of lead, a toxic chemical.114 The Federal Center for Disease 
Control, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), 
reported in 1988 that percentages of black children with excessive levels 
of lead exceeded by several orders of magnitude the percentages of white 
children with such levels. I 15 These differential impacts, moreover, could 
III John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 EcOLOGY L.Q. 233, 277 (1990). 
That there may have been neutral reasons for Section 112's nonenforcement, based on the impracti-
cability of its mandate, see, e.g., John D. Graham, The Failure of Agency-Forcing: The Regulation of 
Airborne Carcinogens Under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 1985 DUKE L.J. 100, 117-32, does not 
explain away the discrepancy in resource allocation. Had toxic emissions been a greater priority to 
majoritarian interests, it is unlikely that such nonenforcement would have been tolerated or, at the 
very least, that needed legislative reform of the program would have taken over thirteen years to be 
enacted (the time between passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 
Stat. 686, and enactment of the 1990 amendments to the law. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2468). 
112 Craig N. Oren, The Clean Air Act of 1990: A Bridge to the Future, 21 ENVTL. L. 1817 (1991); 
Craig N. Oren, The Protection of Parklandsfrom Air Pollution: A Look at Current Policy, 13 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REv. 313 (1989); see also Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Environmental Policy-It is Time for a 
New Beginning, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 111, 117-18 (1989). 
113 One possible exception might be the Clean Water Act's construction grants program, which 
authorizes federal grants for municipal wastewater treatment, see 33 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1299 (1988), 
but the effectiveness of that program, to be discontinued in 1994, has long been controversial. See 
FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION-LAW AND POLICY 461-62 (2d 
ed. 1990); see also Collins, supra note 40. 
114 See generally Lead Poisoning Hearings, supra note 12, at 6 (describing how lead poisoning 
affects low-income and minority communities). 
liS See AGENCY FOR TOXIC SUBSTANCES AND DISEASE REGISTRY, THE NATURE AND EXTENT 
OF LEAD POISONING IN CHILDREN IN THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS at V7-V16 
(July 1988) [hereinafter ATSDR]; see also Marta Mahoney, Four Million Children At Risk: Lead 
Paint Poisoning Victims and the Low, 9 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 46 (1990). 
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not be explained on economic grounds. According to the ATSDR, black 
children have a higher incidence of excessive levels of lead at all income 
levels. 116 
The absence of any systematic considertion of minority interests in 
environmental protection has also likely effected the implementation of 
environmental protection laws. The siting of hazardous waste treatment, 
storage, and disposal facilities is a prime example. EPA is currently plac-
ing significant pressure on states to establish licensed hazardous waste 
facilities with the capacity to handle hazardous wastes generated within 
their borders. Under the federal Superfund law, EPA is required to deny 
Superfund monies for remedial cleanups to states that do not meet these 
"capacity assurance requirements."117 In choosing a location, the rele-
vant state agency, as well as any private company involved, inevitably 
must consider the political implications of the siting, including the poten-
tial for effective, local political opposition. 118 Few proposals survive the 
volatile public review that often accompanies announcement of the rec-
ommended siting of a hazardous waste facility.119 
Similar considerations are also likely to affect the development and 
implementation of environmental enforcement priorities, including the 
allocation of resources necessary for inspections of polluting facilities and 
other factfinding investigations. Potential and realized programmatic 
benefits and burdens are not the same. Congress may enact a statute, or 
an agency may promulgate a generic rule, but neither detecting the viola-
tion of an environmental statute in the first instance, nor the subsequent 
bringing of an enforcement action to compel compliance, automatically 
116 See ATSDR, supra note 115, at V7-V13; see also Michael Weisskopf, Minorities' Pollution 
Risk Is Debated, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 1992, at A25 (summarizing ATSDR study: "For families 
earning less than $6000,68 percent of black children have lead poisoning, compared with 36 percent 
of white children. In families with incomes exceeding $15,000, the ratio spread to 38 percent of 
black children and 12 percent of whites."). 
117 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3) (1980), "[t]he President shall not provide any remedial 
actions pursuant to this section unless the State in which the release occurs first enters into a con-
tract or cooperative agreement with the President providing assurances [that] ... the State will 
assure the availability of a hazardous waste disposal facility .... " Id. Facilities must "have ade-
quate capacity for the destruction, treatment, or secure disposition of all hazardous wastes that are 
reasonably expected to be generated within the State during the 20-year period following the date of 
such contract or cooperative agreement and to be disposed of, treated, or destroyed." 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9604(c)(9) (1980). The facilities must comply with federal environmental requirements and either 
be within the State "or outside the State in accordance with an interstate agreement or regional 
agreement or authority." Id. See John Holusha, The Nation: In Some Parts the Battle Cry is "Don't 
Dump on Me", N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1991, § 4, at 5; New York Announces Lawsuit Against EPA for 
Failure to Enforce Capacity Requirement, [Current Developments] Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No.2, at 1363 
(Sept. 27, 1991); State, Industry Waste Minimization Urged as Part of Capacity Assurance Plans, 
[Current DeVelopments] Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 103 (May 10, 1991). 
118 See Hamilton, supra note 56. 
119 Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing in the Siting of Hazardous and Radioactive Waste 
Facilities: A Comprehensive Approach to a Misperceived Crisis 1 n.5 (Jan. 21, 1993) (unpublished 
draft manuscript, on file with author). 
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follows from passage of the law. 120 
Whether, where, and when such detections occur, and whether, 
where, and when they lead to enforcement actions, are the complex prod-
uct of a host of "extra-legal" variables. Significant among these variables 
are the complex relationships between those charged with monitoring 
and enforcement responsibilities, the regulated community, those ad-
versely affected by the violation, and any watchdog organizations over-
seeing the law's enforcement.121 Just as these relational factors apply 
when the substance of an environmental statute or regulation is fash-
ioned in the first instance, they continue to influence enforcement priori-
ties and policies at both the regional and local level where the impact 
of an environmental law on environmental quality is ultimately 
determined. 122 
In the environmental law context, substantial resources are gener-
ally required to discover a violation of a prescribed environmental quality 
standard, to bring an enforcement action against the violator, and to 
monitor for future violations. However, given the sheer breadth of fed-
eral environmental protection laws, any comprehensive enforcement 
scheme capable of ensuring compliance with the laws' requirements is 
wholly impractical. The federal government never has, and likely never 
will, allocate the resources necessary to guarantee such compliance. At 
best, there has been a "half-hearted" commitment of federal resources to 
the monitoring and enforcement of federal environmental restrictions.123 
Similarly, state governments have proven unwilling or unable to 
commit the resources or efforts to ensure such compliance.124 And, pub-
lic interest organizations have never been capable of enlisting those re-
sources necessary to bring the huge number of citizen suit enforcement 
actions that would be required to fill the enforcement gap. Nor is it 
clear, given the needs of other competing social welfare programs, that 
the government's (or public interest organizations') failure to do so is 
incorrect from either an economic efficiency or social justice perspective. 
Be that as it may, what remains clear is that the allocation of those re-
sources necessary to ensure actual compliance-whether the enforcer be 
the federal, state, or local governments, or a public interest organiza-
tion-is a significant determinant in the distribution of benefits and bur-
dens ultimately realized. Compliance will necessarily be greater in both 
120 Farber, supra note 99, at 63, 69, 75. 
121 Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Dynamics of Continuing Relations in the Administra-
tive Process, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 741, 742-43. 
122 Professors Austin and Schill recount how the absence of effective enforcement of environmen-
tal standards in a minority community in Dallas, Texas, has resulted in the long-term exposure of 
residents to unsafe levels of pollution from lead smelters. Austin & Schill, supra note 14, at 71. 
123 Clifford S. Russell, Monitoring and Enforcement, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 243, 243-70 (paul R. Portney ed., 1990). 
124 ld. at 248-53; see, e.g., Sonia L. Nazario, Pesticide Regulation, Mainly the States' Job, is Spotty 
and Weak, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 1989, at AI. 
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those substantive and geographic areas where the government decides to 
allocate its limited investigative and enforcement resources. And, in the 
absence of such governmental initiative, compliance is more likely where 
the community members possess the resources necessary to launch an 
independent, citizen-based, enforcement effort. 
Some evidence supports the claim that, because of inequities in the 
distribution of enforcement resources, environmental quality is actually 
less in minority than in nonminority areas. 125 This may be reflected in 
less generous cleanup remedies,126 lower fines, 127 slo~er cleanups,128 or 
125 See generally Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection-The Racial Divide in 
Environmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at Sl-S12 ("A Special Investigation"). The Na-
tional Law Journal report includes perhaps the most comprehensive empirical investigation to date 
regarding the existence of a disparity, based on race or income, of EPA's allocation of enforcement 
resources and leverage. It explains one of the possible reasons why environmental protection laws 
may not have resulted in disproportionately favorable improvements in environmental quality for 
racial minorities, notwithstanding that their communities tended to be disproportionately polluted in 
the first instance. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text. The National Law Journal may, 
however, overstate its findings in at least one significant respect. Rather than define white communi-
ties as those with an especially high percentage of white residents, and minority communities as 
those with an equally high percentage of racial minority residents, the authors decided to divide the 
communities in their sample "into four equal groups or 'quartiles,' ranging from those with the 
highest to those with the lowest white populations." ld. at S4 (Methodology). They then compared 
"the quartile with the highest white popUlation to the quartile with the lowest white population." 
ld. For their Superfund data, the comparison was between communities with a white popUlation of 
more than 98.3% and those with a white population ofiess than 84.1 %. For their enforcement data, 
the corresponding percentages were 97.9% and 79.2%, respectively. For this reason, however, the 
authors' use of the term "minority community" to describe the community with the lowest white 
population is somewhat misleading; most of the communities falling under that label are in fact 
predominantly white. However, the authors point out that, in light of segregated residential pat-
terns, even communities with an 80% white popUlation may have a different character, or at least be 
perceived different than communities that are nearly 100% white. ld. 
126 See Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 125, at S2 (EPA chooses "containment" remedy-which 
leaves hazardous wastes on site-more often than a treatment remedy-which seeks to eliminate the 
waste's hazardous constituents-more frequently when the sites are located in nonwhite communi-
ties); Bullard & Wright, The Politics of Pollution, supra note 15 (contrasting governmental buyouts 
of hazardous waste sites located in predominately white areas of Love Canal, New York, and Times 
Beach, Missouri, with refusal to buyout residents in all-black town of Triana, Alabama); Lavelle & 
Coyle, supra note 125, at S2 (when hazardous waste site located in community with greater-than-
average minority population, it takes 20% longer from the time the site is discovered to the time it is 
placed on the Superfund national priority list; EPA more often chooses controversial containment 
remedy rather than the treatment remedy favored by most localities when site located in area with 
greater-than-average minority popUlation); see also CLEAN SITES, HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES AND 
THE RURAL POOR: A PRELIMINARY AsSESSMENT 17, 51-53 (1990) (hazardous waste sites in rural 
poor communities are less likely to be placed on Superfund National Priority List, but once on that 
list, no difference in cleanup achieved); John A. Hird, Superfund Expenditures and Cleanup Priori-
ties: Distributive Politics or the Public Interest?, 9 J. POL'y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 455, 466, 478 (1990) 
("EPA's site-specific decisions have been made more with the public interest in mind than with the 
influence of key legislators." Thus, "preliminary examination suggests that the distribution of 
Superfund sites is consistent with the objective of maintaining a high level of congressional 
support. "). 
127 Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 125, at S2 (EPA enforcement penalties between 1985 and March, 
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more frequent violations of pollution control laws, 129 in areas where mi-
norities reside in greater percentages than nonminorities. For example, 
"nonattainment" areas under the Clean Air Act are primarily urban ar-
eas where minority populations are disproportionately high. 130 Addi-
tionally, among those reasons cited for the continuing problem of lead 
poisoning in minority communities are that "federal efforts to create the 
necessary infrastructure to abate high-priority lead hazards from paint 
are still essentially at ground zero, and funding for abatement activities 
in low-income communities is grossly inadequate."131 Finally, report-
edly ninety percent of farm workers in the United States are persons of 
color, and those workers are routinely exposed to pesticides in their work 
because EPA has generally been unable to implement-as mandated by 
the Federal Insecticide Fungicide and Rodenticide Actl32-the necessary 
protective regulations for a majority of pesticides covered by the law. 133 
In all events, racial minorities have had little influence on either the 
lawmaking or priority-setting processes at any of the legislative, regula-
tory, or local enforcement levels.134 They have not been well represented 
1992, were 46% higher in communities with greater white populations, as measured against commu-
nities with greater-than-average minority populations; Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
penalties 506% higher). 
128 Id. at S4 (empirical evidence suggesting that minority and low-income communities wait 
longer than white and wealthy communities for Superfund cleanup and that the disparity by race is 
greater than the disparity by income). 
129 See Lead Poisoning Hearings, supra note 12, at 4 (testimony of Dr. Robert BuIlard describing 
how stringent city lead ordinance was "worthless" because of lack of enforcement in its application 
to lead smelter poIluting minority community); Felicity Barringer, In Capital, No.2 River Is A Cause, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1991, at A24 (contrasting poIluted waters of Anacostia River in poorer minor-
ity communities with cleaner waters of Potomac in wealthier, nonminority communities); Barnaby 
Dinges, Blacks Hit Hardest by Fly Dumping Epidemic, 19 CHICAGO REp. 1 (1990) ("Fly dumping-
iIlegaIIy dumping tons of waste from a moving truck-has reached epidemic proportions in black 
populated wards."). In a conversation this author had with EPA enforcement personnel in New 
York City, one attorney volunteered that the agency tended to react less quickly to alleged environ-
mental violations in minority communities. EPA's regional office in San Francisco recently surveyed 
migrant labor camp drinking water systems and found "a higher noncompliance rate than for any 
other category of small water systems." USEPA Fact Sheet-Cultural Diversity and Environmental 
Equity-U.S. EPA Initiatives (Oct. 23, 1991) (copy on file with author). 
130 Elliott, supra note 37, at 9-10; Wernette & Nieves, supra note 72; see supra notes 70-73, and 
accompanying text. 
131 Lead Poisoning Hearings, supra note 12, at 6 (testimony of Fred Krupp, Executive Director, 
Environmental Defense Fund). 
132 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988). 
133 Ivette Perfecto & Baldemar Velasquez, Farm Workers: Among the Least Protected, EPA J., 
March/April 1992, at 13, 13-14; see also John P. Giasor, Note, Pesticide Safety Regulation Under the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act: Debacle at the Environmental Protection Agency, 
1 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REp. 47 (1989) (criticizing as ineffective the implementation of the "Special 
Review" administrative procedure authorized by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide 
Act); WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., 3 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: PESTICIDES AND TOXIC SUBSTANCES 
at xi (1988). 
134 ReiIly, supra note 36, at 17 (debate proceeds without participation of representatives of the 
urban poor). 
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among the interest groups lobbying and litigating before governmental 
authorities on environmental protection issues. Nor have they been well 
represented, especially at the national level, within those governmental 
organizations actively involved in the relevant environmental processes. 
Their voices have not been heard in the mainstream environmental pub-
lic interest organizations that participate in the policymaking debates 
and that, in the absence of governmental enforcement, are behind citizen 
suits filling the void. Traditional civil rights organizations have histori-
cally had little interest in, and have infrequently become involved with, 
environmental issues.13S At the same time, mainstream environmental 
organizations have historically included few minorities in policymaking 
positions. 136 In 1990, this fact prompted several members of various civil 
rights organizations and minority groups to send a widely publicized let-
ter to the national environmental public interest organizations charging 
them with being isolated from minority communities. According to the 
letter, none of the major environmental organizations was headed by a 
minority, and there were virtually no minorities within their professional 
staffs. 137 
Minorities are likewise underrepresented in those parts of the na-
tional government that dominate environmental protection policymak-
ing. The gains minorities have made in obtaining elective office are 
almost exclusively at the state and local level. 138 However, it is at the 
national level that environmental protection policy-including the allo-
cation of its benefits and burdens-is largely determined by Congress, by 
those federal agencies responsible for statutory implementation, and by 
the federal courts of appeals through judicial review of agency deci-
sions. 139 Very few minorities have been elected to Congress. Until this 
13S Bullard & Wright, Environmentalism and the Politics of Equity, supra note 15, at 22-23; 
Reilly, supra note 36, at 16; Paul Ruffins, Black America: Awakening to Ecology, WASH. POST, Dec. 
24, 1989, at Cl. 
136 Pat Bryant, Toxics and Racial Justice, Soc. POL'y, Summer 1989, at 48; Paul Mohai, Public 
Concern and Elite Involvement in Environmental-Conservation Issues, 66 Soc. SCI. Q. 820, 821 
(1985). 
137 Maura Dolan, Race. Poverty Issues Grow Among Environmentalists, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 
1990, at AI; Philip Shabecoff, Environmental Groups Faultedfor Racism, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 1, 1990, 
at A2; see BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 15, at 4, 13; WEISBROD, supra note 23, at 118, 
136, 139. 
138 There are, at the very least, higher percentages of black elected officials at the local level 
because of the emergence of black majority electoral districts. Whether, however, this increasing 
number of black elected officials has resulted in a concomitant increase in the interests of blacks 
being addressed in the political process is more questionable. See Lani Guinier, The Triumph of 
Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH L. REV. 1077, 
1116-34 (1991). 
139 This is, of course, somewhat of an oversimplification. Delegations to state agencies of aspects 
of federal programs are pennitted under most federal environmental laws, and states are otherwise 
assigned significant implementing responsibilities by some of those laws. The state implementation 
planning process under the Clean Air Act, the construction grants program and NPDES pennitting 
program under the Clean Water Act, and the siting of hazardous and solid waste disposal and treat-
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year, there had been no blacks in the Senate for more than a decade, 140 
and only a small number of blacks are elected Representatives in the 
House. 141 Moreover, almost none of these few representatives has long 
been a major player in congressional committees and subcommittees with 
jurisdiction, and thus influence, over environmental protection issues. 142 
Until relatively recently, they have not been especially active on environ-
mental issues. 143 
ment facilities under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act are three obvious examples. In 
most instances, however, federal law establishes the general framework within which state and local 
agencies must comply, leaving little room for the adaptation of programs more acceptable to each 
community. 
140 Carol Mosely-Braun (D. Ill.) was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1992 and is the first black 
Senator since Ed Brooke of Massachusetts was defeated in 1978. Additionally, newly-elected Ben 
Nighthorse Campbell (D. Colo.) is the first Native American to serve in the Senate in more than 60 
years. The District of Columbia elects two "Senators," but because the District is not a state, neither 
individual has formal senatorial status. 
141 According to one survey, the number of black officeholders increased from 1469 to 6681 be-
tween 1970 and 1987. But in 1989, there were only 23 black members of Congress, representing 
5.3% of the 435 members in the House (there were no black Senators). BULLARD, DUMPING IN 
DIXIE, supra note 15, at 31; see generally BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS-A NATIONAL ROSTER (17th 
ed., 1988). 1 1991 CoNGRESSIONAL STAFF DIRECTORY (Ann L. Brownson ed., 1991) (indicating 
that in 1991 there were 31 minority representatives in the House, with 26 being members of the 
congressional black caucus). Last year's elections, however, saw the number of blacks elected to the 
House of Representatives increase to 39 with the addition of 16 new members. Jeffrey L. Katz, 
Growing Black Caucus May Have New Voice, 51 CoNG. Q. 5 (1993). Additionally, nine newly-
elected Hispanic representatives increase total representation for this minority group to 19 (includ-
ing delegates from Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands), its largest ever. See Ines Pinto Alicea, 
Hispanics Gain Members, Power, 51 CoNG. Q 7 (1993). 
142 For instance, during the first session of the 102d Congress, Representative Edolphus Towns 
(D. N.Y.) was a member of the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce, and also of the Subcommittee on Environment, Energy, and Natu-
ral Resources of the House Committee on Government Operations; and Representatives William J. 
Jefferson (D. La.) and Soloman P. Ortiz (D. Tex.), who is Hispanic, were members of the Subcom-
mittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Committee on 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries. Representative Craig A. Washington (D. Tex.) is currently the 
fourth-ranking member of the Subcommittee on Energy and Power, and also serves on the Subcom-
mittee on Health and the Environment, both of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. 
Additionally, Representative John Conyers (D. Mich.) is likely one of the most active minority 
members of Congress on environmental matters in his current capacity as chair of the House Sub-
committee primarily responsible for legislation that would elevate EPA to a cabinet agency. Repre-
sentative John Lewis (D. Ga.) has likewise begun to take a more active role on environmental issues. 
See infra note 143; 1 1991 CoNGRESSIONAL STAFF DIRECTORY (Ann L. Brownson ed., 1991); Key 
House Member's Inaction Raises Pessimism About EPA Cabinet Bill Changes, INSIDE EPA, Feb. 28, 
1992, at 11. Finally, such historical inaction may be changing as environmental justice concerns 
grow with the increasing black membership in Congress. For example, at least one newly-elected 
representative, Carrie Meek (D. Fla.), has become a member of the Subcommittee on Energy and 
Water Development of the House Appropriations Committee. 
143 See Henry Vance Davis, The Environmental Voting Record o/the Congressional Black Cau-
cus, in MICHIGAN CoNFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 37, at 84-85. By contrast, their voting 
record appears to be quite favorable to conservation interests. According to a League of Conserva-
tion survey for the years 1980-86, the Congressional Black Caucus "had the highest average of 
support of conservation issues of any group surveyed." Id. at 81. Recent years have also witnessed 
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The same pattern of underrepresentation and lack of interest ap-
pears to be repeated within the federal agencies principally charged with 
implementing the federal environmental protection laws. These agencies 
include the EPA, Department of the Interior, National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration, and, within the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent itself, the Council on Environmental Quality, Office of Management 
and Budget, and the Domestic Policy Office. For instance, within EPA 
there is an Office of Civil Rights, but that Office has traditionally been 
almost exclusively concerned with personnel issues. It has had virtually 
no ongoing programmatic responsibility regarding the implementation of 
any environmental protection laws within the agency's jurisdiction. l44 
The number of minorities in policymaking positions at EPA is also re-
portedly small. 145 
C. Some Possible Explanations 
Commentators offer several possible explanations for the relative ab-
sence of minority participation in the formation of environmental policy. 
Deliberate exclusion and racial stereotyping are two possible causes. An-
other explanation is that minorities are relatively less interested in envi-
ronmental protection issues and, accordingly, are less likely to 
participate in those processes by which environmental policies are formu-
lated. For instance, opinion surveys taken of blacks reportedly suggest 
that they are less concerned about the environment and, even where con-
cern does exist, are less likely to translate that concern into action di-
greater attention to environmental issues by minority members of Congress. In June 1992, Repre-
sentative John Lewis (D. Ga.) introduced the Environmental Justice Act of 1992 (co-sponsored by 
then-Senator AI Gore), intended to require EPA consideration of environmental justice issues. See 
S. 2806, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (introduced by Sen. Gore (D. Tenn.), 138 CONGo REC. S7489 
(June 3, 1992)); H.R. 5286, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (introduced by Rep. Lewis (D. Ga.), 138 
CONGo REc. H4157 (June 4, 1992)). More recently, Representative John Conyers (D. Mich.), Chair 
of the House Committee on Government Operations, announced that he would hold hearings on 
"environmental racism." See Marianne Lavelle, Discrimination Probe Planned, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 
28, 1992, at 1. 
144 As described earlier, supra pp. 117-20, EPA has responded to recent claims of "environmental 
injustice" by forming an Environment and Equity working group within the agency to determine 
how the agency might improve its decisionmaking in this regard. Members of EPA's Office of Civil 
Rights are actively participating in that process. This represents a significant expansion of that 
Office's mandate, which has been traditionally confined to narrow matters relating to personnel. In 
response to its own report on environmental equity, last year EPA created an Office of Environmen-
tal Equity within the agency. 
145 In an internal agency memorandum, a high ranking EPA official recently described how 
"[t]he Agency's minority profile and hiring history are ... not very laudable. The lack of minorities, 
especially in positions of influence, almost certainly has contributed to the lack of insight into equity 
issues that the workgroup found to be characteristic of both EPA and our traditional constituency 
groups." See Hanley Memorandum, supra note 64. The memorandum further stated that "EPA has 
proven resistant to the generic rationale for minority hiring for over two decades, and it is not clear 
that the Reilly initiative [to promote such hiring] will change things in any fundamental way." ld. 
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rected at those issues. 146 This difference in attitude, if it exists, might be 
related to economic considerations. Faced with a choice between in-
creased income or improved environmental quality, those with less in-
come tend to vote in favor of the former. 147 To the extent that blacks 
have disproportionately less income, they may not be willing or able to 
promote restrictions that, while improving environmental quality, may 
adversely affect the availability of employment or increase personal 
expenditures. 148 
Another proffered explanation is that because blacks and other mi-
norities were historically excluded from many of the "public" opportuni-
ties to enjoy the natural environment, they may still feel socially 
unwelcome in those areas. 149 Having been effectively denied the oppor-
tunity to experience and enjoy parks, wildlife, wilderness, and scenic riv-
ers, blacks are less likely to be concerned about those resources or to 
become politically involved in their protection. ISO In support of this the-
ory, some commentators contend that more recent studies suggesting a 
greater concern among blacks about environmental issues can, in fact, be 
explained by the federal government paying greater attention to those 
urban environmental issues touching more directly on the lives of black 
americans, including the dangers of toxic and hazardous wastes. lSI 
Finally, some commentators challenge altogether the premise that 
146 Stephen R. Kellert, Urban American Perceptions of Animals and the Natural Environment, 8 
URB. EcOLOGY 209,226 (1984) ("Urban blacks had significantly lower scores on every measure of 
knowledge, appreciation, interest, and concern for wildlife and the natural environment. Moreover, 
these differences remained significant and sometimes even increased after controlling for socioeco-
nomic status, rural background, and farming occupation among the respondents' parents."); 
Dorceta E. Taylor, Blacks and the Environment: Toward an Explanation of the Concern and Action 
Gap Between Blacks and Whites, 21 ENV'T & BEHAV. 175, 176-80 (1989). 
147 Robert Deacon & Perry Shapiro, Private Preference for Collective Goods Revealed Through 
Voting on Referenda, 65 AM. EcoN. REv. 943 (1975). 
148 Bullard & Wright, Environmentalism and the Politics of Equity, supra note 15, at 22-23; Eric 
J. Dolin, Black Americans' Attitudes Toward Wildlife, 20 J. ENVT'L EDUC. 17, 19 (1988); Paul 
Ruffins, Blacks Suffer Health Hazards Yet Remain Inactive on Environment, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 
1989, at A3; UCC STUDY, supra note 53, at xii. Indeed, commercial interests have even exploited 
this factor to defeat environmental initiatives. A business association opposed to a mandatory bever-
age recycling law in Washington, D.C., reportedly targeted blacks in advertisements that suggested 
that wealthy whites were behind the law, which would impose disproportionate burdens on blacks. 
See Paul Ruffins, No Deposit. No Return: How the Politics of Race Defeated the DC Bottle Bill, 
RACE, POVERTY & ENV'T, Summer 1990, at 9. 
149 Dolin, supra note 148, at 19; Taylor, supra note 146, at 186-89. A somewhat related explana-
tion is that it might be because many minorities associate environmental organizations with the 
"establishment" that "is seen by many as condoning racism," Julian Agyeman, Ethnic Minorities-
An Environmental Issue?, 9 Ecos 2, 3 (1988), and, in some instances, even promoting racism by 
endorsing environmental protection measures that have racially exclusionary effects. See supra note 
82. 
ISO Taylor, supra note 146, at 175, 176-80, 186-89, 192-93; see also Freeman, supra note 36, at 
270-72. 
lSI Judi A. Caron, Environmental Perspectives of Blacks: Acceptance of the "New Environmental 
Paradigm", 89 J. ENVT'L EDUC. 21, 25-26 (1989). 
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minorities, including blacks, have ever been less interested in environ-
mental issues. ls2 Instead of evidencing a lack of concern, these commen-
tators suggest that the lack of minority participation in environmental 
issues reflects two other variables that have stifled the transformation of 
that concern into social activism: ls3 a shortage of available resources (fi-
nancial and political), and a lack of personal confidence in one's ability to 
induce social change. Both are disproportionately found in environmen-
tal activists. ls4 
This generic political access problem is exacerbated in the environ-
mental law context because of the heightened difficulty of gaining access 
to the various environmental protection debates that take place within 
Congress, agencies, and the courts. These debates are invariably highly 
technical and complex. Those who are either unwilling or unable to ex-
pend the resources to obtain the expertise necessary to participate in the 
debate are effectively excluded from it. ISS 
Many within minority communities may simply conclude that their 
limited political and legal resources need to be devoted to other, more 
pressing issues that compete for their time and attention (such as educa-
tion, employment, and housing).ls6 Indeed, for many minorities, these 
are the more important "environmental issues" ignored by mainstream 
environmental groups. Not surprisingly, those who reside and work in 
152 Of course, the mere appearance of little or no racial minority interest is likely, by itself, to 
contribute to the problem. Public and private officials trying to decide where to locate an industrial 
or waste treatment, storage or disposal facility may act in part on the mere appearance that racial 
minorities possess less environmental consciousness and are more concerned about economic 
growth. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 15, at 34-36; Bullard & Wright, Environmental-
ism and the Politics of Equity, supra note 15, at 25. The path ofleast resistance is more often the one 
selected when, as is the case for waste disposal facilities, public and private officials are seeking to site 
an unpopular activity. See BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE, supra note 15, at 4, 33; Rosemari Mealy, 
Charles Lee on Environmental Racism . .. "Clean Environment Without Social Justice?", in PANOS 
INSTITUTE, WE SPEAK FOR OURSELVES: SOCIAL JUSTICE, RACE AND ENVIRONMENT 8, 10 (Dana 
Alston ed., 1990). 
153 Paul Mohai, Public Concern and Elite Involement in Environmental-Conservation Issues, 66 
Soc. SCI. Q. 821, 836 (1985). 
154 Id. at 823-24, 836-37. 
ISS See Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modern Property Law, 41 STAN. L. 
REv. 1529, 1554 (1989); Peter C. Yeagar, Structural Bias in Regulatory Law Enforcement: The Case 
of the u.s. Environmental Protection Agency, 34 Soc. PROBS. 330 (1987); see also Bruce A. Acker-
man & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incen-
tives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 171 (1988) (characterizing current regulatory system as being 
dominated by "technocratic mumbo jumbo"); Michael J. Fitts, Look Before You Leap: Some Cau-
tionary Notes on Civic Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1651, 1660 (1988); Peter H. Shuck, Regulation, 
Non-Market Values, and the Administrative State: A Comment on Professor Stewart, 92 YALE L.J. 
1602, 1612 (1983). 
156 See SYDNEY HOWE, THE POTOMAC INSTITUTE, ENVIRONMENT AND EQUITY 5 (1976) ("It is 
a sick society that can beat and murder black people in the streets, butcher thousands of people in 
Viet Nam, spend billions of dollars on arms and destroy mankind, and then come to the conclusion 
that pollution is America's number one problem.") (quoting an unidentified member of the Black 
Panther Party). 
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polluted urban areas place greater priority on the urban and industrial 
environment than do those in the environmental community who have 
tended to influence statutory priorities. 157 These urban residents and 
workers tend to identify "environmental" progress with improvements in 
housing, transportation, and air quality.158 As one minority environ-
mentalist put it, "[i]f you're only concerned with clean streams and dol-
phins and whales, then that limited view of environmentalism smacks 
people of color in the face. . .. We've been working on issues that affect 
our environment-health care, lead in public housing, gang violence."159 
IV. PURSUING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
The pursuit of "environmental justice" within the context of envi-
ronmentallaw is necessarily problematic because to define the issue ex-
clusively in those terms misapprehends the nature of the problem in the 
first instance. The distributional inequities that appear to exist in envi-
ronmental protection are undoubtedly the product of broader social 
forces. To be sure, features endemic to the ways in which environmental 
protection laws have historically been fashioned may have exacerbated 
the problem in the environmental context. But the origins of the result-
ing distributional disparities do not begin, nor will they end, with re-
forming either the structure of environmental protection decisionmaking 
or the substance of environmental law itself. 
Hence, while a series of measures within the environmental law 
arena have the potential for redressing or, at least reducing, the existing 
distributional inequities, their undertaking cannot be to the exclusion of 
more broadly directed actions. Distributional inequities are very likely 
rooted in past and present racial hostility, racial stereotypes, and other 
forms of race discrimination. The vestiges of past discrimination may be 
the greatest factor contributing to such disparities because of the self-
perpetuating impact of such discrimination on racial minority economic 
157 Reportedly, a survey in 1989 of 248 CEOs and their equivalent in mainstream environmental 
groups showed that their interests lay primarily in the areas of conservation and preservation, with 
the greatest amount of their resources being devoted to fish and wildlife and public land manage-
ment. See Dorceta Taylor, Can the Environmental Movement Attract and Maintain the Support of 
Minorities?, in MICHIGAN CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 37, at 41. 
158 Robert Gottlieb & Helen Ingram, The New Environmentalists, PROGRESSIVE, Aug. 1988, at 
14. 
159 Safir Ahmed, Building A Rainbow Coalition, RIVERFRONT TIMES, Nov. 6-12, 1991, at 11 
(quoting delegate at First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit); Safir Ah-
med, Seeing Red Over the Green Movement, RIVERFRONT TIMES, Nov. 6-12, 1991, at 10 (quoting 
Dana Alston, Director, Panos Institute) ("We refuse the narrow definition of environmentalism .... 
It's not just ancient, old-growth forests. It is not just the spotted owl and other endangered species. 
Our communities and our people are an endangered species, too."); Paul Ruffins, Environmental 
Commitment as if People Didn't Matter, in ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM, supra note 9, at 51, (because 
" 'environment' is seldom defined as the places where people live and work[, there are] large holes in 
the way we deal with environmental regulation, the way we allocate money, and the way we estab-
lish environmental priorities."). 
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and political power. These vestiges effectively deny minorities the au-
tonomy to choose, either by purchase or through the ballot, the level of 
environmental quality that they will enjoy or the amount of pollution 
that they will tolerate. 
With that significant, threshold caveat, important reforms can nev-
ertheless be implemented within the existing environmental law frame-
work. These reforms could both ameliorate the inequities currently 
resulting from those laws and, more importantly, provide a much-needed 
impetus to those seeking broader social reforms. These reforms include: 
(1) providing environmental policymakers with a better understanding of 
the nature and scope of the problem; (2) litigating the associated civil 
rights issues as civil rights issues; (3) rethinking the substance of environ-
mental law to take better account of distributional concerns; (4) re-
forming the structure of environmental policymaking to promote 
minority involvement and interests; and (5) reclaiming the common 
ground of environmentalism and civil rights. Each reform is discussed 
below. 
A. Providing A Better Understanding 
Both those who believe that distributional inequities exist in envi-
ronmental protection, and those who remain skeptical, should be able to 
join in one common recommendation: the need for better empirical in-
vestigation. To date, there have been relatively few technically rigorous 
studies addressing the distributional issue.160 Moreover, those that pur-
port to be, such as the UCC study, advance significant conclusions but 
not with especially high levels of statistical confidence. 161 Furthermore, 
a separate study casts some doubt on the UCC's central finding concern-
ing the role that race plays in the distribution of environmental benefits 
and burdens. This study concludes that it is the ability of a community 
to engage in collective action, rather than either race or income, that is 
the statistically significant factor affecting facility decisions to expand ex-
isting hazardous waste processing capacity.162 
EPA currently collects massive amounts of information relating to 
environmental pollution and quality. The agency needs to correlate this 
data with information already available on race, ethnicity, and socioeco-
nomic status. One obvious source of such data is the toxic release inven-
tory, collected pursuant to the Emergency Planning and Community 
160 Ken Sexton, Cause for Immediate Concern: Minorities and the Poor Clearly are More Ex-
posed, EPA J., Mar./Apr. 1992, at 38, 39 (author is Director of EPA's Office of Health Research) 
("[T]here is a paucity of data relating class and race to specific environmental pollutants and associ-
ated health effects."). 
161 The uee findings were based on statistics with only a 90% confidence level. See supra note 
56. 
162 See Hamilton, supra note 56. Of course, race is not unrelated to collective action potential. 
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Right-to-Know Act.163 This inventory provides an authoritative ac-
counting of all toxic releases throughout the country.l64 By joining this 
data with existing census information, a nationwide correlation between 
toxic releases and race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status should not be 
difficult to derive.165 One pending congressional proposal that would 
help in this regard would require that the National Academy of Sciences 
study the extent to which "minority and low-income populations in the 
United States are disproportionately impacted by environmental health 
hazards" and identify the extent to which existing Federal environmental 
programs "adequately address the priority environmental needs of such 
minority and low-income populations .... "166 
To be sure, distinguishing the effects of socioeconomic status from 
race will not be easy. Those two variables are themselves closely inter-
twined for the simple reason that the socioeconomic status of minorities 
is plainly tied to their racial identity. And, as previously discussed, there 
are a host of secondary factors ranging from diet, job-related stress, and 
cultural practices that are likely to affect the degree of environmental 
health-related risk. 167 
The need for "better understanding" should not, however, be con-
fined to formal empirical investigation. It must also include efforts aimed 
at increasing awareness among both the general public and policymakers 
about the potential for, and impact of, distributional inequities. As de-
scribed by one minority environmentalist, who warned against address-
ing the problem by simply including more minority representation, 
"[t]here is a need for diversity not only in the makeup of the organiza-
tions, but also in how these [environmental] issues are looked at .... For 
environmental groups to consider issues like wetlands, global warming, 
and wilderness protection as being the only environmental issues flies in 
the face of reality."168 
B. Litigating The Civil Rights Issue 
Litigation provides another medium for addressing the distribu-
tional issue. Two basic litigation strategies are available. First, an ad-
ministrative or judicial complaint could be filed on behalf of a minority 
group for the purpose of preventing the siting of an unwanted facility in 
163 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1988); see supra note 63. 
164 Cynthia H. Harris & Robert C. Williams, Research Directions: The Public Health Service 
Looks at Hazards to Minorities, EPA J., Mar./Apr. 1992, at 40. 
165 A third-year law student at Washington University in St. Louis recently undertook such an 
analysis in focusing on the relative amounts of toxies released in predominantly black and predomi-
nantly white neighborhoods in St. Louis. He found that substantially higher amounts oftoxies were 
released per capita in the black neighborhoods. See supra note 63. 
166 H.R. REp. No. 428, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1990) (quoting H.R. 3847). 
167 Sexton, supra note 160, at 38-39. 
168 David Hahn-Baker, The Need/or Cultural Diversity and Environmental Equity, in ENVIRON-
MENTAL RACISM, supra note 9, at 5, 6, 8. 
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its community, and the basis of the lawsuit could be the facility's non-
compliance with an applicable environmental statute. The possibility of 
distributional inequities would not be directly relevant to the substantive 
merits of the administrative challenge or lawsuit. It would simply be the 
reason why the lawsuit was necessary and why, for example, a minority 
community should be entitled to a greater share of enforcement re-
sources. Alternatively, the distributional inequities could provide the 
substantive basis for the lawsuit by supporting a civil rights cause of ac-
tion. In other words, the cause of action would itself derive from the fact 
that a distributional inequity exists. 
To date, minority plaintiffs appear to have favored the civil rights 
approach. However, virtually none of those suits has been successful. 
This is largely because existing equal protection doctrine, which has been 
the focal point of most lawsuits, has not proved hospitable to the kinds of 
arguments upon which environmental justice claims have depended. For 
this reason, federal and state environmental laws may offer the best op-
portunity for minority plaintiffs to ameliorate environmental inequities. 
Many of these statutes impose a panoply of procedural and substantive 
limitations on those wishing to site polluting facilities, and many confer 
private attorney general status on citizens aggrieved by actions that vio-
late applicable statutory limitations. Plaintiff organizations with the nec-
essary resources have consequently been quite successful in resisting 
environmentally undesirable facilities under these environmental stat-
utes. 169 To the extent that such legal and technical resources are made 
available to minority communities, those statutes could likewise provide 
a basis for considerable relief from distributional inequities.170 
169 See e.g., Marianne Lavelle, Plant Foes Light Legal Fires, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1993 at 1; Ger-
rard, supra note 119, at 57-88. 
170 For instance, minority plaintiffs represented by the California Rural Legal Assistance Foun-
dation successfully invoked the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) to persuade a state 
trial court to set aside a county board decision to permit the construction and operation of a hazard-
ous waste incinerator in a predominantly minority community. See El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua 
Limpio v. County of Kings, [1991] 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,357 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. 
Ct. 1991). The court ruled that the county's "Final Subsequent Environmental Impact Report" did 
not satisfy CEQA's requirements because its analysis of air quality impacts and mitigation, agricul-
tural impacts, cumulative air quality impacts, and project alternatives were all inadequate. Id., slip 
op. at 2-10. Although most of the court's ruling was thus based on technical deficiencies unrelated 
to environmental inequity per se, the court's further ruling that the county's failure to provide a 
spanish translation of its formal environmental analysis violated CEQA's public participation re-
quirement is directly related to equity concerns. Id., slip op. at 10. Because almost 40% of the 
residents of the city in which the proposed incinerator was to be located are monolingual in spanish, 
the court reasoned, the absence of such a translation deprived these residents of an opportunity for 
"meaningful involvement" in the decisionmaking process. Id. Another successful environmental 
case brought on behalf of minority residents was Houston v. City of Cocoa, No. 89-92-CIV -ORL-19 
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 1989), in which residents of a historically black neighborhood invoked provi-
sions of the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1988), and the National Historic 
Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1988), to protect the community from unwanted commercial 
development. See Karl S. Coplan, Protecting Minority Communities with Environmental, Civil 
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There is nonetheless substantial reason for continued emphasis on 
civil rights litigation aimed at redressing distributional inequities in envi-
ronmental protection. Burdens of proof are difficult to overcome under 
existing doctrine, but if litigation efforts were to receive additional re-
sources, some isolated successes might be achievable. In addition, the 
cases brought so far have relied on only a few legal theories. Several 
promising theories have not yet been fully explored and warrant greater 
attention. 
Perhaps more importantly, the real value of these lawsuits extends 
beyond their ability to obtain a favorable decision in a given case. In-
deed, the symbolic value of filing the lawsuit is itself substantial. The 
mere filing of a formal complaint provides a very powerful and visible 
statement by minorities regarding their belief that distributional inequi-
ties exist in environmental protection. The publicity that frequently sur-
rounds the complaint's filing enhances public awareness of these 
concerns and thereby serves an important educational function. Should, 
moreover, a victory on the merits be achieved, the benefits could be tre-
mendous. For many within the minority community it is extremely im-
portant that a formal judicial decision be obtained confirming their belief 
that environmental protection presents its own unique civil rights issues. 
1. Equal Protection and the Problem of Discriminatory Intent.-
Equal protection claims have been the principal focus of most environ-
mental justice lawsuits brought to date. l71 One of the earliest cases rais-
ing an environmental justice claim in the siting context, Harrisburg 
Coalition Against Ruining the Environment v. Volpe,l72 was a lawsuit 
seeking to enjoin construction of two major highways through a public 
park. Brought by minority residents of a neighborhood in Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania, the plaintiffs argued that the proposed highways denied 
"black residents of equal opportunities to housing and recreation in vio-
lation of the Fourteenth Amendment."173 More particularly, the plain-
tiffs alleged that the siting of the highways through a park "was partly 
motivated by an awareness that the predominant use of the [p]ark was by 
Rights Claims, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 20, 1991, at 1. Another case currently pending in federal district 
court in Tennessee provides an example of a challenge to a municipal siting decision grounded, inter 
alia, on alleged violations of federal and state hazardous waste laws. See Complaint at 8, 11-12, 
Bordeaux Action Comm. v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville, No. 90·0214 (M.D. Tenn. filed Mar. 
12, 1990). Finally, a group of black residents in Wallace, Louisiana, recently stopped the siting of a 
$700 million wood, paper, and rayon plant in their community. See Suro, supra note 12. 
171 See generally Godsil, supra note 14, at 410-16 (describing two cases raising equal protection 
challenges against municipalities for discriminatory solid waste landfill sitings in which the courts 
held the evidence insufficient to establish that racial discrimination motivated the challenged official 
decisions). 
172 Harrisburg Coalition Against Ruining the Env't v. Volpe, 330 F. Supp. 918 (M.D. Pa. 1971). 
173 ld. at 921. The plaintiffs also claimed violations of the "Civil Rights Acts of 1871 and 1964." 
ld. 
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the black citizens of the City."174 The court rejected the constitutional 
claim, finding insufficient evidence of either discriminatory motivation or 
results. 175 
Courts have since rejected similar minority plaintiffs' equal protec-
tion claims, but have done so notwithstanding showings of "discrimina-
tory results" rather than because no such showing was made. In 1976, 
the u.s. Supreme Court made it considerably more difficult for civil 
rights plaintiffs to prevail on equal protection grounds by requiring that 
such litigants establish a "discriminatory intent" or "purpose" underly-
ing the challenged action.176 This means that plaintiffs must show that 
race "has been a motivating factor in the decision," and that the deci-
sionmaker chose or reaffirmed a given course of action "because of" its 
adverse effect on the group.177 While some courts have diminished the 
harshness of this requirement by allowing for a burden shifting once dis-
parate treatment is shown, the defendant can overcome such a showing 
by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory motive for its behavior, 
which the plaintiff can in tum overcome only by a showing of mere 
pretext. 178 
As commentators have long contended, the practical effect of the 
required "discriminatory intent" element is devastating to most civil 
rights claims because of the inordinate difficulty of proving the subjec-
tive, motivating intent of a decisionmaker.179 In addition, where many of 
the existing distributional inequities are more proximately traceable to 
the self-perpetuating vestiges of past discrimination, the equal protection 
174 Id. at 926. 
175 Id. at 926-27. 
176 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-48 (1976). 
177 Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan HollS. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-66 (1977); see Godsil, 
supra note 14, at 409-10. 
178 Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 
HARV. L. REV. 817, 861-63 (1991). On the other hand, it is not a legitimate nondiscriminatory 
motive to rely on a stereotypical judgment about a racial class, even if such an inference might be 
supported by rational statistics. For instance, government officials or industrial owners cannot claim 
that their neutral motive was the desire to site the facility in a location where people were less likely 
to complain or less likely to mount political opposition, if their judgment that such was the case in a 
particular area was based on the race of the residents. It is no defense that such an inference might 
be supported by a rational statistical inference. Such a judgment is an impermissible racial classifica-
tion. See id. at 862 (citing Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1531 (7th Cir. 1990». 
179 Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional 
Adjudication, 52 N. Y.U. L. REV. 38, 114-17 (1977); Kenneth L. Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered 
Inquiry, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1163 (1978); Randall L. Kennedy, Competing Conceptions of "Ra-
cial Discrimination": A Response to Cooper and Graglia, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 93, 98 (1991); 
Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (1989); cf Elizabeth 
Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent Under Title VIL· United States Board of Governors v. 
Aikens, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1201 (1982). There are, of course, exceptional cases where the evidence is 
somehow fortuitously available to make the required showing. See Dowdell v. Apopka, 511 F. Supp. 
1375 (M.D. Fla. 1981) (disparities in water, stormwater drainage in black/white neighborhoods mo-
tivated by discriminatory intent). 
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test simply cannot be met. For instance, a community may become a 
"minority community" only after a hazardous waste facility is located 
there, because of the decrease in property values caused by that siting. 
A case decided just a few years after the Supreme Court's imposition 
of the "discriminatory intent" requirement illustrates the pitfalls of reli-
ance on equal protection litigation theories. In Bean v. Southwestern 
Waste Management Corp.,IS0 minority plaintiffs sought to enjoin the sit-
ing of a solid waste disposal facility within their community in Houston, 
Texas. The claim was brought, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, against the 
state agency that issued a permit for the facility and against the operators 
of the facility itself, and alleged an equal protection violation. The ap-
proved solid waste site was within 1700 feet of a predominantly black 
high school with no air conditioning and was also close to a predomi-
nantly black residential neighborhood. Plaintiffs' claim rested on two 
theories: (1) that the state agency's "approval of the permit was part of a 
pattern or practice by it of discriminating in the placement of solid waste 
sites,"ISI and (2) that the state agency's "approval of the permit, in the 
context of the historical placement of solid waste sites and the events 
surrounding the application, constituted discrimination. "IS2 
The district court denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary in-
junction,183 and the complaint was ultimately dismissedls4 on the ground 
that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the decision to grant the permit 
was attributable to an intent to discriminate on the basis of race. ISS 
While the court commented that some of the statistical data "at first 
blush, looks compelling,"IS6 it ultimately concluded that the data was 
not sufficient to establish discriminatory intent. The size of the census 
tracts made it difficult to show that the approved sites were located in 
minority neighborhoods. Notably, while the census tracts encompassed 
predominantly white populations (thus undermining the discrimination 
charge), the approved sites were specifically located in minority neigh-
borhoods within those larger census tracts.187 However, the small 
ISO 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd without op., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986). 
181 [d. at 677. 
182 [d. at 678. 
183 The judge who first denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction went out her way, 
however, to comment on the potential strength of plaintiff's claim of disparate impact and to suggest 
how plaintiffs might establish their entitlement to relief in the subsequent permanent injunction hear-
ing. That same judge, who is a minority, was not the judge who later presided over the permanent 
injunction hearing. According to the lawyer who represented the plaintiffs in Bean, the transfer 
occurred shortly before the hearing. Linda McKeever Bullard, Remarks at the Proceedings of the 
First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit (Oct. 1991) (notes available from 
author). 
184 The court initially denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, providing the plaintiffs with an 
opportunity to proceed with discovery. 482 F. Supp. at 680. 
185 [d. at 677-80. 
186 [d. at 678. 
187 [d. at 677. 
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number of prior solid waste sites made it difficult to draw statistical infer-
ences,188 and the location of the sites could be linked to the location of 
industry. 189 
Not long after Bean, the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of North Carolina, in NAA CP v. Gorsuch, 190 rejected on sim-
ilar grounds a constitutional challenge to the proposed siting of a PCB 
disposal facility. The plaintiffs in this class action alleged that the fact 
that the county in which the facility would be located "has the highest 
percentage (at least 63.7%) of minority residents of any county in North 
Carolina was at least one factor in deciding to place the PCB dump 
there." 191 The district court denied the plaintiffs' request for preliminary 
injunctive relief, concluding that there was "little likelihood that plain-
tiffs will prevail on the merits." 192 According to the court, "[t]here is not 
one shred of evidence that race has at any time been a motivating factor 
for any decision taken by any official-state, federal or local-in this long 
saga." 193 
Minority plaintiffs' claims in Georgia met a similar fate in 1989. In 
East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & 
Zoning Commission,194 the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Georgia rejected an equal protection challenge to a local zon-
ing board decision to permit the location of a privately owned landfill in 
a predominately black community. The court concluded that the plain-
tiffs' evidence of disparate impact was inadequate because it relied heav-
ily on decisions made by local authorities other than the zoning board, 
and because there was no evidence of "improper racial animus."195 The 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 196 
Finally, and even more recently, the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia, in R.LS.E v. Kay, rejected an equal pro-
tection challenge to the siting of a regional landfill in an area populated 
primarily by blacks. 197 The court agreed that the county's siting of land-
fills over the past twenty years had had a disproportionate impact on 
racial minority communities198 but, relying on Arlington Heights v. Met-
188 [d. at 678 ("[T]here are only two sites involved here. That is not a statistically significant 
number."). 
189 [d. at 679 ("But those sites, the Assistant Attorney General argues persuasively, are located in 
the eastern half of the city because that is where Houston's industry is, not because that is where 
Houston's minority population is."). 
190 No. 82-768-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 10, 1982). 
191 [d., complaint at 2. The plaintiffs also raised a Title VI claim based on the allegedly adverse 
effects of the PCB facility on minority property values. [d. at 12. 
192 [d., slip op. at 9. 
193 [d. at 9-10 n.8. 
194 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989). 
195 [d. at 885-87. 
196 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989). 
197 R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff'd, 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992). 
198 The court examined the racial composition of both the locations of the proposed, and three 
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ropolitan Housing Development 199 and Washington v. Davis,2OO ruled that 
a showing of disproportionate impact is not enough; to prevail the plain-
tiff must go further and show discriminatory intent.201 The Fourth Cir-
cuit affirmed.202 
The existing case law, therefore, does not give minority plaintiffs 
much reason to be optimistic about their likelihood for successfully chal-
lenging particular actions or decisions based on an equal protection the-
ory. What is even more striking about the uniformity of these rulings, 
however, is that they contrast quite sharply with decisions in a closely 
analogous area where courts have been far more receptive to equal pro-
tection claims. Specifically, these other cases have involved the disparate 
provision of municipal services. In that context, some federal courts 
have more readily inferred discriminatory intent based on the govern-
ment's knowledge of disparate impacts stemming from the provision of 
governmental services.203 Theoretically, there is no obvious reason why 
those two types of cases should be treated differently by the courts. 
What is necessary to establish discriminatory intent should be the same 
whether the stakes are the benefits of municipal services or the burdens of 
undesirable environmental cleanup facilities such as landfills. One likely 
reason for this disparity in the case law may be that the judiciary per-
ceives significant differences in the harm-shifting implications that arise 
with the type of relief sought in each kind of case. 
When municipal services are at stake, the problem can seemingly be 
remedied by providing better or more services to those bringing the ac-
tion. Significantly, there is not an immediate perception that the parties 
are involved in a zero-sum game where winners and losers must necessar-
ily offset each others' gains and losses. Raising services for one group 
does not, in all likelihood, mean that the services of others will be com-
promised.204 However, where the question is how environmental risks 
previously sited, landfills in the county, which has a population of approximately 50% black and 
50% white. The court found that 100%, 95%, and 100% of the residents living in the immediate 
vicinity of the three previous sites were black, and that 64% of the residents within a half-mile radius 
of the proposed site were black. ld. at 1148. 
199 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
200 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
201 768 F. Supp. at 1149. The court also concluded that, notwithstanding the disproportionate 
impact on black communities, a "[c]areful examination of the administrative steps taken by the 
Board of Supervisors ••. reveals nothing unusual or suspicious. To the contrary, the Board appears 
to have balanced the economic, environmental, and cultural needs of the County in a responsible and 
conscientious manner." ld. at 1149-50. 
202 977 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1992). 
203 See Ammons v. Dade City, 783 F.2d 982 (11th Cir. 1986); Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 
F.2d 1181 (11th Cir. 1983); Baker v. City of Kissimmee, 645 F. Supp. 571 (M.D. Fla. 1986). All 
three of these cases, and how the courts inferred the requisite element of discriminatory intent based 
on government official knowledge of existing disparities in municipal services, are discussed in God-
sil, supra note 14, at 416-20. 
204 Of course, to the extent that government revenues are fixed, this may not be true. But it is the 
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are to be distributed or redistributed, a court is more likely to perceive 
the necessary tradeoffs. In short, the risks must go somewhere. Under 
these circumstances, courts seem far less willing to invoke the equal pro-
tection clause to dictate to local government how harms such as environ-
mental risks must be redistributed in a community, perhaps because the 
redistribution would so directly implicate the quality of the environment 
enjoyed by those in the community wielding great political and economic 
influence.205 Hence, the success of civil rights litigation for the pursuit of 
environmental justice will likely tum not just on whether attempted theo-
ries avoid the doctrinal burdens posed by equal protection, but also on 
whether the courts are less troubled by (or at least less focused on) the 
harm-shifting implications of the judicial relief being sought. 
2. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act: The Search for Federal Funds to 
Avoid the Intent Limitation.-One option not yet well explored by civil 
rights plaintiffs in the environmental context is Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. Title VI provides that: "No person in the United 
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance. "206 
The principal advantage of Title VI over equal protection is that 
courts have not required a showing of discriminatory intent in the Title 
VI context; disparate impact has been enough. Hence, in Lau v. Nich-
01s,207 where non-English-speaking Chinese students had allegedly been 
deprived of equal educational opportunities, the Supreme Court con-
cluded that Title VI had been violated because of the discriminatory ef-
fect of the challenged school policies "even though no purposeful design 
is present."208 Although the Court's subsequent ruling in Regents of 
University of California v. Bakke 209 casts some doubt on the continuing 
validity of this aspect of Lau, 210 the Court later reaffirmed, in Guardians 
judicial perception of the practical consequences, rather than the actual consequences, that likely 
explain the differences in judicial approach. 
205 Cf. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 
(1985) ("effective remedies for harm attributable to discrimination in society in general will not be 
granted to blacks if that relief involves a significant cost to whites."). 
206 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988); see generally Charles F. Abernathy, Title VI and the Constitution: 
A Regulatory Modelfor Defining "Discrimination", 70 GEO. L.J. 1 (1981) (discussing interpretations 
of Title VI and the role of regulatory agencies in effecting its purposes). 
207 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
208 Id. at 568. 
209 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
210 See id. at 318-19 (opinion of Justice Powell), 351-52 (opinion of Justice Brennan, joined by 
Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun, concurring in part and dissenting in part); see generally 
CHARLES F. ABERNATHY, CIVIL RIGHTS CONSTITUTIONAL LmGATION-CASES AND MATERIALS 
516-19 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the o~inions in Bakke and analyzing their treatment of the discrimi-
natory effects test set out in Lau). 
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Ass'n v. Civil Service Commission,211 that discriminatory intent is not re-
quired under Title VI where that had been the view historically endorsed 
by applicable federal agency regulations implementing the statutory 
mandate. Notably, EPA's Title VI regulations embrace a discriminatory 
effects test.212 It is also well settled that Title VI provides an implied 
private right of action on behalf of individuals who have suffered discrim-
ination deemed unlawful by Title VI.213 
There are, however, two limitations to Title VI. Although each is 
significant, Title VI's reach in the environmental protection arena re-
mains potentially great. The first limitation is that Title VI's nondiscrim-
ination mandate applies only to "any program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance."214 Thus, while covering all federal agency 
activities, nonfederal actions are within Title VI's mandate only when a 
sufficient federal financial nexus can be established. Federal financial 
assistance for environmental protection is extensive, however, particu-
larly assistance to state governments. Virtually all federal environmental 
laws, including those dealing with hazardous waste,21S toxic sub-
stances,216 water pollution control,217 and clean air218 provide funding to 
state programs. These state programs make many of the decisions that, 
when not initiated by the federal government, effectively determine the 
distribution of benefits and burdens from environmental protection at the 
state and local level. In 1986, for example, federal grants to state govern-
ments made up forty-six, thirty-three, and forty percent of the state 
budgets for air, water, and hazardous waste programs, respectively.219 
211 463 U.s. 582, 584 & n.2 (1983), cerL denied, 463 U.S. 1228 (1983). 
212 40 C.F.R. § 7.35 (1991). 
213 463 U.S. at 593-95. 
214 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988). 
21S Both the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. II 1990), and the Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. II 1990) offer large amounts of federal 
monies. CERCLA authorizes expenditures for the cleanup of inactive and abandoned hazardous 
waste sites. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9611 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). RCRA provides substantial finan-
cial assistance to states. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6931 (assistance for "the development and implementation 
of authorized State hazardous waste programs"), 6947-6948 (assistance for development and imple-
mentation of federally approved state solid waste management plans), 6949 (assistance to rural com-
munities for solid waste management facilities) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). 
216 Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2627 (1988) (authorizing "grants to States for the 
establishment and operation of programs to prevent or eliminate unreasonable risks within the States 
to health or the environment which are associated with a chemical substance or mixture and with 
respect to which the Administrator is unable or is not likely to take action under this chapter"). 
217 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1252(c) (comprehensive programs), 1254(b)(3), (g)(l) & (g)(3) 
(research, investigation, training, and information), 1255 (research and development), 1256 (for pol-
lution control programs), 1259 (training grants and contracts), 1281(g) (publicly owned treatment 
works), 1281(h) (privately owned treatment works), 1282 (treatment works) (1988). 
218 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7405, 7505, 7544 (1988). 
219 U.S. EPA, A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC COSTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION: 1981-2000, at 9 (1988). 
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Given this significant federal financial assistance to state environmental 
programs, the potential reach of Title VI is correspondingly great. 
The second Title VI limitation is remedial in nature. Until recently, 
it appeared fairly well settled that in the absence of a showing of discrim-
inatory intent, equitable relief was the only remedy available to redress a 
Title VI violation.220 Just this past Term, however, the U.S. Supreme 
Court unanimously ruled, in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public 
Schools,221 that a damages remedy is available in implied private rights of 
actions brought under Title IX of the Education Act Amendments of 
1972.222 Because the language of Title IX was expressly modeled after 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, and because the Court has frequently 
relied on constructions of one in interpreting the other,223 it would seem 
fair to assume that a damages remedy is now generally available for Title 
VI violations, even absent a showing of discriminatory intent. 
To date, however, there has been very little reliance on Title VI in 
any of the litigated cases.224 EPA has likewise not exploited its Title VI 
responsibilities as it could to redress distributional inequities. There are 
a host of ways that EPA could implement Title VI's nondiscrimination 
mandate in the agency's disbursement of federal pollution control funds. 
A relatively modest measure would be for EPA to require the recipient of 
the funds to make a showing that the funds are being disbursed accord-
ing to racially neutral criteria. A more aggressive approach would be to 
require a further showing that racial minority groups are proportionately 
represented among the ultimate beneficiaries of the federal funds. Such a 
showing could include proof that the "neutral" distribution of federal 
funds in no manner perpetuated the vestiges of past racial discrimination 
within the relevant community. For instance, in the case of a federally 
funded wastewater treatment facility, EPA would need to be satisfied 
that the community'S sewage treatment program provides service to mi-
nority communities (e.g., connections to sewage treatment plants) equal 
to that provided to nonminority communities in the affected area. 
EPA's decision to playa reduced role under Title VI seems to have 
220 In Guardians, four justices embraced the view that Title VI, as affected by administrative 
regulations, forbids both intentional discrimination and "effects" discrimination, and provides a 
damages remedy for each type of transgression. 463 U.S. 582, 615-34 (Marshall, J., dissenting), 635-
45 (Stevens, Brennan & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (1983). Justice White provided the fifth vote in 
favor of the former proposition, but concluded that the damage remedy was available only upon a 
showing of discriminatory intent. Id. at 593. 
221 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992). 
222 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1988). 
223 E.g., Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 463 U.S. at 594 (opinion of White, J.); Cannon 
v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-703 (1979). 
224 In those isolated instances when a Title VI claim has been raised in the complaint, such as in 
Harrisburg Coalition Against Ruining the Env't V. Volpe, 330 F. Supp. 918 (M.D. Pa. 1971), and 
NAACP V. Gorsuch, No. 82-768-CIV-5 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 10, 1982), the plaintiffs do not appear to 
have pressed the issue very far. In Gorsuch, for example, plaintiffs raised a Title VI claim in their 
complaint but did not argue the issue in their memorandum in support of an injunction. 
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been made very early on in the agency's history. During hearings before 
the United States Commission on Civil Rights in 1971, just a few months 
after EPA's creation, EPA officials acknowledged that the agency was 
taking a narrow view of Title VI's relevance to its work.225 Specifically, 
EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus testified that there were "limi-
tations" on what a "regulatory agency" such as EPA could do consistent 
with its statutory mandate to achieve pollution control.226 In particular, 
Ruckelshaus explained that any denial or termination of pollution con-
trol funding to a community would cause that community to violate pol-
lution control standards, but without necessarily prompting the 
community to change its racially discriminatory practices: 
[I]t would not be a penalty against that community at all and it would be no 
incentive for them to go ahead and do what we were asking them to do, 
because in fact they might consider it a benefit not to have to spend that 
additional money for the construction of a sewage treatment plant which 
our matching fund would force them to spend.227 
Administrator Ruckelshaus acknowledged that EPA could couple its de-
nial of federal funding, pursuant to Title VI, with a lawsuit against the 
community to compel its compliance with water quality standards, but 
contended that such an approach was problematic because it would nec-
essarily cause further delay in the accomplishment of national pollution 
control objectives pending resolution of the litigation.228 For this reason, 
Ruckelshaus concluded, absent a "clear violation" of Title VI, "the needs 
of the community" would have to be taken into account "in the determi-
nation of what mandate receives priority" in a particular case.229 
In a 1975 report on federal civil rights enforcement, the United 
States Commission on Civil Rights faulted EPA for its lack of effort 
under Title VI. The Commission found that EPA 
had not yet fully recognized ... [its] ... responsibility to ensure that condi-
tions such as the lack of fair housing laws, absence of a fair housing agency, 
or the existence of exclusionary zoning ordinances do not contribute to the 
effective exclusion of minorities from EPA assistance by aiding their exclu-
sion from a community which has applied for or receives EPA 
assistance.23o 
In response to EPA's defense of its Title VI efforts, the Commission 
225 u.s. CoMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 146-56 (June 
14-17, 1971) (testimony of William Rucke1shaus, Administrator of the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency). 
226 ld. at 147. 
2271d. 
228 ld. at 151 ("there are circumstances that can arise where it would seem that our ability to 
achieve the purposes of the Civil Rights Act flies in the face of our mandate by Congress to insure 
that water quality standards are complied with."). 
229 ld. at 1007 (Draft Statement of William D. Ruckelshaus before U.S. Civil Rights Commis-
sion, June IS, 1971). 
230 6 U.S. CoMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EF-
FORT-1974, 598-99 (1975) (footnote omitted). 
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stated more categorically that "EPA provides funds to municipalities 
without taking adequate steps to ensure that they are in compliance with 
Title VI, and . . . EPA has been lax in executing its Title VI man-
date."231 The Commission further concluded that "unless EPA takes 
positive steps to insure an end to the systemic discrimination which has 
resulted in inadequate sewer services in many minority communities, 
EPA will be responsible for perpetuating that discrimination. "232 
Whatever the merits of EPA's decision in 1971 to deemphasize its 
civil rights responsibilities, it now seems appropriate for both EPA and 
those parties litigating environmental justice claims to take the steps nec-
essary to ensure a fuller realization of Title VI's environmental protec-
tion mandate. Indeed, Title VI has been an effective means of redressing 
distributional inequities in other related areas. For instance, minority 
plaintiffs have successfully utilized Title VI in administrative and judicial 
actions to challenge the siting of federally financed highways, prisons, 
hospitals, and other facilities that would tend to have a substantial ad-
verse or beneficial impact on their communities.233 The gist of these Title 
VI legal complaints has been the disproportionate impact that the facil-
ity, or its absence, would have on a minority community. Such a show-
ing, while not sufficient by itself to prove a Title VI violation, shifts to the 
recipient of federal funds the burden of articulating a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the siting decision. In many instances, the recipi-
ent of the federal financial assistance meets this challenge.234 Quite 
often, however, the practical effect of this burden-shifting is to prompt 
the recipients of federal financial assistance to settle a Title VI claim. 
There is no apparent reason why similar Title VI claims might not be 
raised against federally financed facilities that impose disproportionate 
environmental risks on minority communities or, conversely, fail to pro-
vide such communities with a commensurate level of environmental 
benefits. 
231 ld. at 591. 
232 ld. at 595. EPA responded to the Commission report by stating that "the report should give 
more recognition to the fact that EPA is essentially a pollution abatement agency and, as such, is to 
be distinguished from an agency principally concerned with community development." ld. at 586 
(Letter from Carol M. Thomas, Director, EPA Office of Civil Rights, to John A. Buggs, Staff Direc-
tor, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (July 8, 1975». EPA further asserted that "[w]e do not con-
sider it as our major responsibility to see to the sewering of minority communities nationwide 
irrespective of pollution abatement considerations." ld. at 589. In reply, the Commission character-
ized EPA's position "as tantamount to saying that, in the face of environmental considerations, EPA 
may see fit to weaken or even abandon civil rights standards." ld. at 591 (U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights' reply to Carol M. Thomas' letter of July 8, 1975). 
233 See, e.g., North Carolina Dep't of Transp. v. Crest Street Comm. Council, 479 U.S. 6 (1986) 
(highway); NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Ctr., 689 F.2d 1161 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 
U.S. 1052 (1983) (hospital). 
234 E.g., Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Ohio 
1984) (defendants rebut plaintiffs' showing of disparate impact in siting of highway by articulating 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the siting determination). 
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Indeed, there is Title VI precedent virtually on point that has largely 
been ignored by those bringing environmental justice claims. These are 
cases where minority plaintiffs have invoked Title VI to redress distribu-
tional inequities associated with the availability of environmental ameni-
ties or quality resources, such as public parks and water quality 
treatment facilities. Courts have upheld Title VI challenges to these fed-
erally financed programs based on their racially disparate effects.235 
In sum, Title VI provides a possible basis for civil rights litigation to 
redress environmental inequities and is an approach that warrants 
greater emphasis and attention. Most importantly, by using Title VI as a 
vehicle for these suits, the bugaboo of proving discriminatory intent can 
be avoided. And, while Title VI's federal financial assistance require-
ment is not insignificant, the fact that states receive so much of their 
environmental budgets from the federal government suggests that that 
limitation may not be much more practically significant than equal pro-
tection's threshold requirement that there be "state action." Finally, 
courts may be more willing to grant relief under Title VI than under 
equal protection because the focus of the lawsuit is, at least superficially, 
the provision of governmental benefits as opposed to the redistribution of 
environmental risks. To that extent, a Title VI lawsuit is more analogous 
to equal protection challenges concerning provision of municipal services 
(which have fared substantially better in the federal courts) than to those 
suits which more overtly seek a judicial redistribution of "harmful" envi-
ronmental risks. 
3. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 u.s.c. § 1982: The 
Need to Bridge Housing and the Environment.-Two other potentially 
useful, but even less explored, civil rights causes of action are Title VIII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968236 and 42 U.S.C. § 1982. Title VIII 
makes it unlawful "[t]o discriminate against any person in the ... sale or 
rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connec-
tion therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status or na-
tional origin."237 Section 1982 provides that all United States citizens 
"shall have the same right ... to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and 
convey real and personal property."238 
There are several threshold advantages to Title VIII's nondiscrimi-
nation mandate. Like a claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, and unlike a constitutional equal protection claim, no showing of 
235 See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (black neighbor-
hoods not being provided with same level of municipal services as white neighborhoods). As de-
scribed above, similarly based equal protection claims have been successfully advanced. See supra 
note 207 and accompanying text. 
236 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1988). 
237 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1988). 
238 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988). 
839 
HeinOnline -- 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 840 1992-1993
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 
discriminatory intent is required under Title VIII. An unjustified, ra-
cially discriminatory impact may alone be sufficient to establish a Title 
VIII violation.239 Furthermore, unlike either Title VI or the equal pro-
tection clause, but like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,240 Title 
VIII applies to some purely private conduct. A showing of federal finan-
cial assistance is not, therefore, always necessary. Finally, as under Title 
VI, the focus of a Title VIII complaint is the provision of governmental 
services, which seems to be a more favorable context within which to 
bring a civil rights claim. 
The ultimate usefulness of Title VIII's nondiscrimination mandate 
in redressing environmental inequity largely turns, however, on the 
meaning of "provision of services or facilities" within Title VIII. In par-
ticular, what kinds of "services or facilities," and what types of provid-
ers, fall within the statute's scope? The statutory language suggests some 
potentially significant limitations. For example, it does not purport to 
bar discrimination in the distribution of services or facilities generally. 
Instead, Title VIII proscribes only those "dealing with the specific 
problems of fair housing opportunities"241 and, even more specifically, 
the "services or facilities" restricted are those "in connection with [the] 
sale or rental of a dwelling."242 Clearly, some issues related to environ-
mental quality would more easily fit within this analytical framework 
than others. 243 
The significance of Title VIII's command that all federal agencies 
"administer their programs and activities relating to housing and urban 
239 Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); see generally JOSEPH G. COOK & JOHN L. SOBIESKI, JR., 3 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS 'il19.07 (1992) (examining the extent to which discriminatory effects alone 
can constitute a violation of Title VIII). 
240 Pub. L. No. 88·357, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified at scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1976 & 
Supp. 1991». 
241 Vercher v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth., 454 F. Supp. 423, 424-25 (M.D. Pa. 1978) ("To say that 
every discriminatory municipal policy is prohibited by the Fair Housing Act would be to expand 
that Act to a civil rights statute of general applicability. . .. We do not believe the act was intended 
to have such a wide scope."). 
242 Laramore v. Illinois Sports Facilities Auth., 722 F. Supp. 443, 452 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (rejecting 
Title VIII challenge to siting of a new baseball stadium that would compel black residents to move 
because the alleged discriminatory act was not in connection with a "sale or rental of a dwelling"). 
The structure of the statutory language also lends some support to the contention that the kinds of 
"services or facilities" to which Title VIII applies are limited to those "of any person in the business 
of selling or renting dwellings, or of any employee or agent of any such broker, agent, salesman, or 
person." 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1) (1988). 
243 Courts have indicated that Title VIII extends to "services generally provided by governmental 
units such as police and fire protection or garbage collection." Southend Neighborhood Improve· 
ment Ass'n v. County of St. Clair, 743 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1984). But they reject the notion 
that Title VIII "was designed to reach every discriminatory act that might conceivably affect the 
availability of housing." Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419, 423·24 (4th Cir. 1984) 
(denying relief to plaintiff who claimed that hazard insurance was a "service in connection with 
dwellings" and, therefore, could not be provided discriminatorily). 
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development in a manner affirmatively to further the purposes of [Title 
VIII]" turns on similar considerations. As with Title VI, EPA has his-
torically adhered to a narrower construction of that command than the 
United States Commission on Civil Rights. EPA concluded early on that 
its pollution control programs did not "relat[e] to housing and urban 
development" within the meaning of Title VIII.244 Hence, EPA has de-
clined to withhold "treatment works construction grant assistance from 
communities which are charged with having exclusionary zoning ordi-
nances precluding location of low cost and medium income housing 
within their jurisdictions."245 The Civil Rights Commission faulted EPA 
for failing to apply a "liberal construction of Title VIII" and for failing 
to recognize that "EPA's program for sewage treatment is essential for 
the development and maintenance of urban areas, and thus it is clear that 
even within the strictest meaning of the term 'program relating to hous-
ing and urban development,' it is covered by Title VIII."246 
Whether Title VIII could play a significant role in helping litigants 
establish distributional equity in environmental programs is not yet clear. 
It is not a cause of action upon which environmental plaintiffs have his-
torically relied, and EPA has not yet given any indication that it will 
soon adopt a broader view of its Title VIII responsibilities. One signifi-
cant case raising a Title VIII claim in the environmental justice context is 
El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. Chemical Waste Management, 
Inc., now pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of California.247 The complaint in that case, which challenges 
the proposed siting of a hazardous waste disposal facility in a minority 
community,248 raises several civil rights claims, including a Title VIII 
cause of action that advances a fairly expansive interpretation of the 
"provision of services or facilities" language in Title VIII.249 
Finally, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 provides an alternative basis for a civil 
rights lawsuit based upon interference with property rights. Although 
244 U.s. CoMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 230, at 589 (quoting Letter from Carol M. 
Thomas, Director, EPA Office of Civil Rights). 
245Id. 
246Id. 
247 EI Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc., No. C-91-2083 (B.D. 
Cal. filed July 8, 1991). 
248 Id.; see Miles Corwin, Unusual Allies Fight Waste Incinerator, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1991, at 
A3. 
249 Complaint at 28, El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc., No. 
C-91-2083 (B.D. Cal. filed July 8, 1991). Although the federal court has yet to rule on this claim, a 
state trial court in a parallel state law proceeding recently issued a favorable decision on one of the 
plaintiffs' claims. EI Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. County of Kings, [1991] 22 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,357 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1991). The state court agreed with the 
plaintiffs that the county had violated an applicable state environmental law by failing to provide the 
general public with a copy of the statutorily required description of the proposed facility's environ-
mental effects in Spanish because that was the principal language of many of those residing in the 
community that would be adversely affected by the facility. Id. 
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Section 1982's proscription is generally less comprehensive than Title 
VIII, unlike Title VIII, it extends to the mere "hold[ing]" of real and 
personal property. Section 1982 also applies, although not without de-
bate, to both private and public action.250 Because, moreover, the u.S. 
Supreme Court has previously intimated that Section 1982 "might be 
violated by official action that depreciated the value of property owned 
by black citizens,"251 it would at least seem to offer a theoretical basis for 
bringing an environmental justice claim based on a civil rights law.252 
While the issue remains unsettled, Section 1982's primary limitation is 
that federal courts are likely to require a showing of discriminatory in-
tent under this statute.253 
C. Rethinking The Substance Of Environmental Law To Take Better 
Account Of Distributional Concerns 
A better accounting of the distributional implications of environ-
mental protection wi11likely also require substantive reform of the fed-
eral environmental laws. This is in part because EPA has historically 
resisted embracing a distributional mandate in its enforcement of these 
laws. The agency has consistently viewed "sociological" concerns, such 
as distributional impacts, as outside the purview of its purely "technical" 
mandate of establishing technically effective, and economically efficient, 
pollution control standards.254 
Notwithstanding EPA's apparent assumption, the agency's failure 
to take distributional equity into account has not resulted in a neutral 
distribution of the benefits and burdens of environmental protection. In-
250 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 
481 U.S. 615, 616 (1987); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
251 City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 123 (1981). 
252 The viability of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 as a legitimate basis for such a claim is outlined in Colquette 
& Robertson, supra note 14, at 198-99. A 42 U.S.C. § 1982 claim is included in the complaint 
pending in Bordeaux Action Comm. v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville, No. 3-90-0214 (M.D. Tenn. 
filed Mar. 12, 1990), which challenges the siting of a sanitary landfill in a minority community. 
253 The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue in the context of 42 U.S.C. § 1982, but the 
Court has ruled that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 requires a showing of discriminatory intent, see General Bldg. 
Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 382-91 (1982), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 
share common origins. See, e.g., Terry Properties, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.), 799 F.2d 1523, 
1536 (lith Cir. 1986); see generally, CHESTER J. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS § 48 (2d 
ed. 1980 & Clark Boardman Callaghan Supp. 1991). 
254 EPA's belief that these matters were outside the proper scope of the agency's mandate is 
reflected in the agency's response in the early 1970s to the United States Commission on Civil 
Rights' criticism of the agency's failure to do more to enforce civil rights laws through environmen-
tal laws. See supra notes 225-32 and accompanying text. A similar attitude is evident in a high-
ranking agency official's response in 1987 to claims that hazardous waste sites were disproportion-
ately located in racial minority communities. The EPA Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and 
Emergency Response reportedly stated that "[t]here's no sociology to it. It's strictly technical." See 
Charles Lee, Toxic Waste and Race in the United States, in MICHIGAN CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, 
supra note 37, at 25 (quoting Michael Weisskopf, Rights Group Finds Racism in Dump Siting, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 1987, at A7 (quoting J. Winston Porter». 
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deed, the agency's position may instead have facilitated a distributional 
skewing unfavorable to those persons, such as racial minorities, less able 
to influence the legislative, regulatory, and enforcement agendas that ul-
timately determine who will receive the benefits and burdens of a particu-
lar legislative initiative. 
Two kinds of statutory reforms could address this problem. One 
possibility would be to require formal agency consideration of the distri-
butional impacts associated with a particular decision. Such considera-
tion could be required where the agency establishes rulemaking agendas, 
promulgates implementing regulations, and determines enforcement pri-
orities. It could also be required when the agency allocates grant monies 
and technical assistance. The second, more ambitious, reform would be 
to establish equitable benchmarks that would provide standards for judg-
ing discretionary agency determinations with significant distributional 
impacts.255 
Neither substantive reform is as radical a proposal as it might seem. 
Indeed, there is plenty of applicable precedent for infusing distributional 
factors into the fashioning of legal standards and agency priorities. For 
example, environmental impact statements, prepared pursuant to the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act,256 have long included discussions of 
the socioeconomic effects of certain proposed federal actions.257 Some-
what ironically, the notion of a more overt distributional inquiry finds 
precedential support in legislation now pending that would require fed-
eral agencies to consider the impact of their actions on private property 
rights.258 Whatever the merits of that legislative proposal, which oppo-
nents fear will chill the promulgation of needed environmental regula-
tion,259 the racial minority status of a person would certainly seem to be 
255 Representative John Lewis (D.Ga.) and then·Senator, now Vice President, AI Gore intro-
duced environmental justice legislation in the 102nd Congress which included both types of provi-
sions. See supra note 143. That legislation would have required the identification of "environmental 
high impact areas," mandated the allocation of enforcement resources to those areas, provided tech-
nical assistance funding to allow local communities to participate in decisionmaking processes, and 
imposed a moratorium on the siting or permitting of any new toxic chemical facility in an area 
identified as "high impact" under specified circumstances. See S. 2806, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); 
H.R. 5326, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). 
256 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1988 & Supp. II 1990). 
257 See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (1991); but cJ. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear 
Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 776 (1983) (NEPA not concerned with human health and welfare per se, but 
only with effects on either resulting from a "given level of alteration of our physical environment or 
depletion of our natural resources."). 
258 See 137 CoNG. REc. S13,963 (daily ed. Sept 13, 1991) (debate on the amendment proposed by 
Senator Symms which would require federal agencies to consider whether proposed agency action 
will "take" private property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution). 
259 See Tom Kenworthy & Bill McAllister, Environmentalists See Roadblock in "Taking" Ap-
praisals, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1991, at A23. 
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a more compelling trigger for such a particularized distributional ac-
counting of agency environmental decisionmaking. 
Even more broadly, federal and state natural resource laws have 
routinely included substantive distributional standards. The purpose of 
these standards was generally to ensure a fair distribution of the nation's 
natural resource wealth. It should be equally acceptable to ensure that 
the risks associated with environmental protection are also fairly distrib-
uted. For example, homestead,260 mining,261 mineralleasing,262 and rec-
lamation laws263 historically included acreage limitations. These 
limitations were intended to promote a fair and equitable distribution of 
public resources. Neither economic efficiency, nor the maximization of 
resource production, was the overriding statutory goal to the extent that 
it interfered with these distinct distributional objectives. 
More recent congressional enactments in the natural resources area 
can likewise be viewed as having an overt, progressive distributional ob-
jective. Historically, many of the nation's public land laws subsidized 
commercial exploitation of natural resources both by failing to charge 
market prices for public resources and by failing to restrict resource ex-
ploitation methods that were environmentally destructive.264 To the ex-
tent that more recent legislative revisions have sought to correct each of 
these problems, the distributional impact has been potentially progres-
sive. For example, the increased economic rents captured by the govern-
ment from competitive bidding and increased royalty rates are available 
for redistribution in government welfare and service programs.265 And, 
the curtailment of environmentally destructive activities on the public 
lands may reduce those negative externalities suffered disproportionately 
by certain groupS.266 
260 Homestead Act of 1862, 43 U.S.C. §§ 211, 212 (repealed 1976). 
261 General Mining Law of 1872, 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1988). 
262 Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 184 (1988). 
263 Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. § 375 (1988). 
264 GEORGE C. COGGINS, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 2.02 (1992). 
265 See, e.g., Federal Onshore Oil & Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, tit. 
V, subtit. B, §§ 5101-13, 101 Stat. 1330-256 to 1330-263; Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management 
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-451, 96 Stat. 2447 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1757 (1988»; Federal 
Coal Leasing Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-377, 90 Stat. 1083 (codified at 30 U.S.C. 
§§ 181-287 (1988». Of course, as in the case of environmental law, commercial interests that have 
benefitted from natural resources laws that, in effect, confer below-market-cost benefits on them 
(e.g., low cost water, grazing fees), have also quite successfully resisted legislative proposals to elimi-
nate these subsidies completely. See GEORGE C. COGGINS & CHARLES F. WILKINSON, FEDERAL 
PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 128-33, 693-94 (2d ed. 1987). 
266 Adam Rose et aI., Assessing Who Gains and Who Loses From Natural Resource Policy-Distri-
butional Information and the Public Participation Process, 15 RESOURCES POL'y 282, 287 (1989) 
(concluding that "[t]he groups with the highest probability of a loss [from allowing coal mining in a 
particular national forest] are those in the low and middle income groups since environmental dam-
age tends to be spread more evenly than gains in personal income"). Of course, for the same reason 
(e.g., allocation of enforcement resources) that there seems to have been a gap between potential and 
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There are also instances where Congress has specifically sought to 
ameliorate the adverse distributional impacts caused by a shift in the na-
tion's natural resource policies. For example, Congress enacted the 
Powerplant Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 (PIFUA) "to reduce the 
importation of petroleum and increase the Nation's capability to use in-
digenous energy resources," especially coal.267 In recognition of the fact 
that such a dramatic shift in resource emphasis would have severely ad-
verse socio-economic impacts on certain regions of the country, Congress 
authorized substantial federal financial assistance to those areas.268 
Water transfer policy provides another illustration of how distribu-
tional concerns are more routinely accounted for in natural resources 
law. Especially in water-scarce western States, water transfers are taking 
on new urgency as existing water uses, such as irrigation, do not neces-
sarily reflect the highest and best use of the resource (often needed in 
urban areas). Accordingly, additional sources must be found to satisfy 
demand. For this reason, some states are now allowing existing water 
rights users to contract for the "transfer" or sale of their rights to others, 
even when such transfers require a diversion of the waters to a different 
place. Because, however, such transfers may adversely affect third par-
ties who, as neither seller nor buyer, are unable to affect the contract's 
terms, both the federal government and interested states are studying the 
possibility of regulating such transfers in a way that takes into account 
third-party effects.269 
realized benefits in other areas of environmental law, see supra notes 120-33 and accompanying text, 
that same phenomenon could occur in the implementation of these natural resource laws. 
267 42 U.S.C. § 8301(b)(1) (1988); see generally Daryl Robertson, The Powerplant and Industrial 
Fuel Use Act of 1978: Fuel Replacement, 3 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 214 (1979) (discusses the provi-
sions of PIFUA and explores the disadvantages of the Act, including its disproportionate impact on 
certain consumers). 
268 See 42 U.S.C. § 8401 (1988). 
269 See NATIONAL REsEARCH CoUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, WATER 
TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992) [hereinafter 
WATER TRANSFERS]; Charles T. Du Mars & Michele Minati, New Mexico Water Law: Determining 
Public Welfare Values in Water Rights Allocation, 31 ARIz. L. REv. 817 (1989). The National 
Research Council of the National Academy of Science has identified several categories of third-party 
effects of water transfers, including "the environment," "ethnic co=unities and Indian tribes," and 
"nonagricultural rural co=unities." WATER TRANSFERS, supra at 5. The National Research 
Council recently studied third-party effects of a series of specific proposed water transfers. 
The extent to which distributional factors can properly be taken into account under existing 
state law, however, is still unsettled. For instance, a New Mexico state trial court recently held 
unlawful a proposed change of water use from livestock and irrigation to use for a ski resort, because 
its third-party impacts made the change not in the "public interest." The court reasoned that "[t]he 
Northern New Mexico region possesses significant history, tradition and culture of recognized value, 
not measurable in dollars and cents," that "[t]he relationship between the people and their land and 
water is central to the maintenance of that culture and tradition," and that "[t]he imposition of a 
resort-oriented economy ... would erode and likely destroy a distinct local culture which is several 
hundred years old." Sleeper v. Ensenada Land & Water Ass'n, No. RA 84-53(C), slip op. at 7-8 
(N.M. Dist. Ct., July 2, 1985). The state court of appeals, however, reversed the trial court on the 
ground that public interest considerations were irrelevant to the lawfulness of the proposed change 
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In one notable respect, moreover, the nation's natural resources 
laws take explicit account of their distributional impact on an identifiable 
minority group: Native American tribes. The Bureau of Indian Affairs 
within the Department of the Interior is charged, inter alia, with honor-
ing the United States' treaty obligations and general fiduciary duties to 
Native American tribes. The existence of that formal voice within the 
executive branch may, in part, explain why some federal environmental 
protection laws articulate specific exemptions aimed at ameliorating 
some of the distributional impacts that those laws may have on Native 
Americans, particularly when those laws adversely affect some of their 
subsistence ways of life.270 
There are also state analogues in the natural resource area. Some 
state land use planning requirements incorporate "fair share" doctrines, 
requiring that certain cities share in the need to supply lower income 
housing.271 California's coastal zone law, for example, originally im-
posed affordable housing requirements.272 The result was that lower in-
come households benefitted most from a state land conservation law. 273 
in water use. See Application of Sleeper, 760 P.2d 787 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988), cert. quashed, En-
senada Land & Water Ass'n v. Sleeper, 759 P.2d 200 (N.M. 1988); see also Shannon A. Parden, 
Note, The Milagro Beanfield War Revisited in Ensenada Land & Water Assn v. Sleeper-Public 
Welfare Defies Transfer of Water Rights, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 861 (1989). I am indebted to Dan 
Tarlock for bringing this latter case to my attention. See Tarlock, supra note 102, at 880-81. 
270 See, e.g., Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 u.s.c. § 3120 (1988) (requir-
ing federal agency to consider the impact on "subsistence uses" prior to making any land use deci-
sion); Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 V.S.C. § 668(a) (1988) (permitting otherwise 
unlawful activities "for the religious purposes of Indian tribes"); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1539(e) (1988) (permitting otherwise unlawful activities when taken by "any Indian, Aleut, or 
Eskimo who is an Alaskan Native who resides in Alaska"); Fur Seal Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1153 (1988) (exemption for Aleuts, Eskimos, and Indians); Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 
U.S.C. § 1371(b) (1988) (exemptions for Alaskan natives); National Forest Management Act, 16 
U.S.C. § 543(f) (1988) (protection of traditional Indian uses in scenic areas); see also American In-
dian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988) (promoting the exercise of traditional religions 
by the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians). This is not, of course, to suggest 
that similar problems of inequity do not exist on Native American reservations. Tribal governments 
have long complained that they should have greater authority and autonomy to protect the natural 
environments within their reservations. See Mary Beth West, Natural Resources Development in 
Indian Reservations: Overview of Tribal, State. and Federal Jurisdictions, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 71 
(1982); Richard A. Du Bey et al., Protection of the Reservation Environment: Hazardous Waste 
Management on Indian Lands, 18 ENVTL. L. 449 (1988); Douglas A. Brockman, Note, Congres-
sional Delegation of Environmental Regulatory Jurisdiction: Native American Control of Reservation 
Environment, 41 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 133 (1992). In 1990, Congress enacted the 
Indian Environmental Regulatory Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-408, 104 Stat. 883 (1990), for 
the express purpose of granting monies to tribal governments to enhance their ability to develop and 
enforce environmental protection laws. 
271 Mandelker, supra note 47, at 2-3 (citing Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of 
Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975». 
272 Id. at 4. 
273 David E. Hansen & S.1. Schwartz, Income Distributional Effects of the California Land Con-
servation Act, 59 AM. J. AGR. ECON. 294 (1977). California subsequently modified the program, 
transferring it to local governments, with the far less demanding requirement that housing develop-
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California law also generally requires that the state consider the effect of 
zoning ordinances on low income housing needs.274 
Significant opportunities exist for including such distributional anal-
ysis in formal EPA decisionmaking. For example, EPA has not tradi-
tionally accounted for equitable considerations in its risk assessment 
analysis, which has become the linchpin of agency decisionmaking in re-
cent years. Thus, while EPA's practice has resulted in risk minimization 
in the aggregate, the agency has not generally taken into account how 
that risk is specifically being spread.275 The end result may be a policy 
determination that minimizes the risk to society overall, but which does 
so at the expense of an identifiable segment of the population that ulti-
mately receives more than its "fair share" of the risks being distrib-
uted.276 Such equitable concerns are a proper and necessary factor to be 
considered in most EPA policy decisions and rulemakings. 
Indeed, rulemakings provide another opportunity for a more sys-
tematic consideration of distributional factors. EPA and other federal 
agencies are already required by various executive orders to account for 
the distributional impact of their rules on business,277 family,278 states 
rights,279 and private property.280 EPA could conduct similar account-
ment in the coastal zone include low and moderate income housing "whenever feasible." See 
Mandelker, supra note 47, at 4; Robert A. Johnston et al., Inclusionary Housing in the California 
Coastal Zone, 18 CoASTAL MGMT. 15 (1990). 
274 Mandelker, supra note 47, at 5 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65863.6 (West 1992)). 
275 Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative 
Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 562, 593 (1992). 
276 EPA has recently acknowledged that the agency's programs fail to "address cumulative and 
synergistic effects or multiple pathways of exposure." EPA ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY REpORT, 
supra note 64, at 18, 20 ("never been a consistent EPA policy to address equity issues with respect to 
racial and income groups"), 27 ("[H]igh risk populations in some cases have been overlooked."). Of 
course, some of the environmental laws do strive to take account of persons (like the elderly, 
asthmatics) who might be especially sensitive to certain pollutants. The Clean Air Act, for instance, 
requires EPA to set standards at a level that can protect such sensitive persons from the adverse 
effects of air pollution. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1988 & Supp. II 1990); Lead Industries Ass'n v. 
U.S. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1146, 1152-53, 1156-60 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980). 
And, in that context, EPA has taken into account the distribution of risks within a particular ex-
posed popUlation in setting emission standards for hazardous pollutants such as benzene. See 54 
Fed. Reg. 38044, 38046 (1989). But, even then, there has been no distributional accounting of the 
potential for cumulative risk aggregation in certain communities as a result of agency determinations 
under various laws and regarding various kinds of environmental risks. Professor Donald Hornstein 
has recently published a forceful critique of EPA's comparative risk analysis based on its inability to 
take account of such equitable factors. See Hornstein, supra note 275, at 600-04. 
277 Exec. Order No. 12,291,46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981); see Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas 
H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1075 (1986); Peter L. 
Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and the Office of Management and Budget in 
Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181 (1986). For a much less flattering view of the opera-
tion of this executive order, see Robert U. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Over-
sight of the Environmental Protection Agency, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (1991). 
278 Exec. Order No. 12,606, 52 Fed. Reg. 34,188 (1987). 
279 Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (1987). 
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ings of the impact that its rules have on racial minorities and low-income 
persons. Indeed, in 1985 the u.s. Department of Energy (DOE) did just 
this, undertaking a study to assess how an EPA proposal to reduce 
leaded gasoline use would effect minority and low-income households. 
The DOE report concluded that a reduction 
[W]ould benefit minority and low-income households proportionately more 
than the overall U.S. population. . . . This is due to the relatively large 
share of minority and low-income households living in [Standard Metropol-
itan Statistical Area] central cities, as well as to the relatively large share of 
these households with small children."281 
The report also considered the relative economic impact of the EPA pro-
posal on those same communities, concluding that its costs would be 
"comparatively high" for the "Hispanic and other minority (except 
black) and low income households that do own vehicles [because they] 
have a greater than average share of vehicles that require leaded 
gasoline. "282 
State and local siting decisions are also amenable to a more routine 
consideration of distributional factors. In Texas, for instance, the state 
Department of Health reportedly requires landfill permit applicants to 
include socio-economic information concerning the proposed site.283 
N ew York City's Charter now requires that rules for the selection of sites 
for city facilities "further the fair distribution among communities of the 
burdens and benefits associated with city facilities."284 Other jurisdic-
tions, such as the State of New York, 285 are considering the adoption of 
similar programs.286 
Finally, because EPA is currently contemplating greater utilization 
280 Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (1989). 
281 K. ROSE ET AL., ARGONNE NAT'L LABORATORY, EFFECTS ON MINORITY AND Low-IN-
COME HOUSEHOLDS OF THE EPA PROPOSAL TO REDUCE LEADED GASOLINE Use 30 (1985) (multi-
year research program, concerning minority energy consumption and expenditures, conducted by 
Argonne National Laboratory at request of Department of Energy's Office of Minority Economic 
Impact). 
282 ld. at 1. For those without a vehicle, however, the costs would accordingly be disproportion-
ately lower. ld. 
283 The state adopted this approach in the aftermath of the Bean litigation, which involved an 
unsuccessful equal protection challenge brought against the siting of a landfill in a predominantly 
minority Houston community. See supra notes 180-89 and accompanying text. See also Bullard & 
Wright, Environmentalism and the Politics of Equity, supra note 15, at 30. 
284 Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerrard, "Fair Share" Siting of City Facilities, N.Y. L.J., June 
21, 1990, at 1 (quoting N.Y. City Charter § 203(a»; Tsao, supra note 14, at 375-77. 
285 See supra note 12. 
286 A recent student note discusses the potential benefits of creating a state "super review" "oard 
that "would be responsible for selecting an inventory of candidate sites for commercial hazardous 
waste facilities," taking "into consideration the racial and socioeconomic makeup of the potential 
candidate sites. If existing commercial hazardous waste facilities are sited disproportionately in mi-
nority communities, the board can remove sites that are predominantly minority from the inven-
tory." Godsil, supra note 14, at 426. Another possibility, discussed in the same student note, is to 
create a federal cause of action under RCRA requiring states and localities to demonstrate "environ-
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of decentralized approaches, such as market incentives, for the accom-
plishment of environmental quality objectives, the need for overt distri-
butional inquiry may be all the more pressing. Reliance on market 
incentives reduces the distributional inequities that result because of the 
enhanced political access that some enjoy to centralized decisionmakers 
under a command-and-control regulatory regime. But, rather than elim-
inate inequities, this approach more likely just shifts the cause for such 
distributional inequity away from a relative absence of political power at 
the national level to the relative absence of market power at home. For 
instance, the distribution of pollution under a market system of transfera-
ble pollution rights will tend to replicate existing income and property 
distributions that, to the extent that such distributions are themselves the 
product of racial discrimination, will only continue to produce and exac-
erbate inequitable results.287 The likely outcome is the further occur-
rence of pollution "hot spots" in racial minority communities and low 
income neighborhoods.288 
This problem could be addressed in a number of ways. One ap-
proach would be to impose certain substantive limitations on the market 
system to guard against the likelihood of inequitable distributions. For 
instance, there could be fixed limits on the amount of pollution that 
would be permitted within anyone geographic community. Another ap-
proach would be to work within the market system by leveling the play-
ing field. Communities identified as lacking in resources might, for 
example, be allocated vouchers that would allow them to bargain more 
effectively within the pollution rights market.289 
mental necessity" to overcome a plaintiff's showing that the siting of a proposed facility would result 
in a disparate impact on minority communities. ld. at 421-25. 
287 Errol Meidinger, The Politics of "Market Mechanisms" in u.s. Air Pollution Regulation: So-
cial Structure and Regulatory Culture, in DISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL RE-
SOURCE POLICY 15()'86 (Allan Schnaibert et al. eds., 1986). 
288 See Manley W. Roberts, Comment, A Remedy for the Victims of Pollution Permit Markets, 92 
YALE L.J. 1022, 1027-28 & n.40 (1983); see also Ackerman & Stewart, supra note ISS, at 188-89. 
289 This approach might be criticized, however, on the ground that those with fewer resources 
would have little meaningful choice even under this scheme but to allow themselves to be bought off 
by those seeking to pollute in their neighborhoods. A related proposal, susceptible to the same 
criticism, would be to conduct a so-called "reverse auction" in which communities would indicate 
how much they would be willing to be paid to accept an otherwise environmentally undesirable 
facility. Under that scenario, the owner of a hazardous waste facility would not have to comply with 
applicable environmental laws, but would additionally have to purchase, in effect, the right to locate 
the facility in a particular community. See Herbert Inhaber, Of LULUs, NlMBYs, NlMTOOs, 107 
PUB. INTEREST 52 (1992). Such a regulatory regime might, of course, create a host of perverse 
incentives, pitting a locality'S desire to regulate with its desire to increase municipal coffers. See 
Vicki Been, "Exit" As A Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Condi-
tions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 594 (1991). 
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D. Reforming The Structure Of Environmental Policymaking To 
Promote Minority Involvement 
Apart from the substance of environmental law, serious considera-
tion should be given to reforming the structure of environmental poli-
cymaking so as to enhance minority access to relevant decisionmaking 
fora. Governmental and nongovernmental organizations that currently 
dominate the process need to promote minority participation in the dia-
logue and, even more fundamentally, they need to educate themselves 
about minority concerns.290 It is not enough to provide minorities with 
an opportunity to adequately represent their own interests because cor-
rection of distributional equities is not, and should not be, the sole re-
sponsibility of racial minorities. Those in positions of authority, whether 
or not they happen to belong to a racial minority, have an independent 
responsibility to work toward the fair distribution of environmental bene-
fits and burdens. 
Mainstream environmental groups need, therefore, to work towards 
better representation of minorities within their organizations, both as 
members and as professional employees.291 They should likewise lend ex-
pertise to local communities in need of financial, legal, and technical 
assistance,292 and should also target those communities in their educa-
tional programs.293 There are currently a host of new environmental or-
ganizations, more directly involved with environmental issues of special 
290 At least during the recent "transition" between administrations, the Clinton administration 
made an effort to do so, by including two very prominent spokespersons on environmental justice 
matters, as members of the EPA "transition team." See Marcia Coyle et al., Washington Brie/-
Justice Voices, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 28, 1992, at 9. 
291 Paul Ruffins, Blacks and Greens, RACE, POVERTY & ENV'T, Summer 1990, at 5. It is proba-
bly fair to say that the mainstream environmental groups are currently more aware of the past 
inattention to minority concerns and now at least profess an intent to do better in their future. See, 
e.g., John H. Adams, The Mainstream Environmental Movement, EPA J., Mar'/Apr. 1992, at 25; 
Have Minorities Benefitted .. . ? A Forum, EPA J., Mar./Apr. 1992, at 32-33 (comments of Michael 
Fischer, Executive Director of the Sierra Club). 
292 Taylor, supra note 157, at 43-52. A recent example of just such financial assistance occurred 
when the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the National Wildlife Federation 
defrayed the expenses associated with a representative from a local minority community organiza-
tion to travel to Washington, D.C. and present testimony before Congress on the impact of lead 
poisoning. See Lead Poisoning Hearings, supra note 12, at 4 (testimony of Rev. James R. Josey, on 
behalf of The Kingsley Park Coalition). Additionally, NRDC recently brought a lawsuit, along with 
several minority groups, challenging the siting of a sewage treatment plant in a poor neighborhood in 
Harlem, New York. See Suro, supra note 12. Another laudable example was a recent program, 
sponsored by the National Conference of Black Lawyers, to instruct legal service lawyers and others 
on the workings of environmental protection laws. See Challenging Race Discrimination in Envi-
ronmental Law and Policy Making (Dec. 3, 1992) (unpublished conference materials, on file with 
author). 
293 See, e.g., Maralee Schwartz & Dan Balz, Activists Challenge Lawmakers' Claims on Environ-
ment, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 1990, at A9; Samara F. Swanston, Underrepresentation 0/ Minorities in 
Environmental Law Can Be Remedied, NEW YORK STATE BAR AsS'N ENVTL. L. SEC. J., Feb.IMay 
1991, at 7, 8. 
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concern to racial minorities, which could greatly benefit from the main-
stream groups' sharing of available resources.294 
Those minority environmental organizations, however, have served 
notice that any relationship with the mainstream organizations must be 
as "equals."295 To that end, those in the mainstream environmental 
movement need to appreciate what they can learn from the newer minor-
ity environmental organizations.296 They need to increase their aware-
ness and understanding of the potential for inequity in the allocation of 
benefits and burdens from those environmental protection programs that 
they have historically supported.297 They also need to guard against 
their natural tendency, based on their highly successful fundraising pro-
grams, to exploit the "environmental justice" issue in a manner that 
enhances their own fundraising efforts at the expense of minority organi-
zations possessing far fewer resources.298 
The challenge of opening up existing fora to minority involvement is 
substantial. Many in the minority community continue to harbor a deep-
seated distrust of both mainstream environmentalists, whom they view as 
too closely tied to industry,299 and of a federal government that some 
294 These include: Black Environmental Science Trust ("to increase the participation of African 
Americans in the shaping of the environmental future"); Center for Environment, Commerce, and 
Energy ("promoting the efficient use of natural resources through education and activism, which 
seeks to represent minority and low income communities that suffer disproportionately from envi-
ronmental hazards"); Community Environmental Health Care ("provides technical assistance to 
African-American, Latino and low-income communities in New York City to organize around envi-
ronmental issues that affect them"); Native Americans for a Clean Environment ("works with Na-
tive American communities and Tribal governments on a variety of environmental issues ranging 
from waste management to protection ofland and water"); and South West Organizing Project ("a 
multi-racial, multi-issue grassroots community organization whose mission is to empower the disen-
franchised Southwest to realize social and economic justice"). See PANOS INSTITUTE, supra note 
152, at 38-39; see also Austin & Schill, supra note 14, at 77-79 (describing emergence of minority 
grassroots environmentalism that is "anti-bourgeois, anti-racist, class conscious, populist, and par-
ticipatory," and that "attacks environmental problems as being intertwined with other pressing eco-
nomic, social, and political ills"); Grass-Roots Groundswell, EPA J., Mar./Apr. 1992, at 45-53 (six 
articles describing rise and progress of "grass-roots" environmental movement). 
295 Ahmed, Seeing Red Over the Green Movement, supra note 159, at 10 (quoting Dana Alston, 
Director, Panos Institute) (" 'We refuse a paternalistic relationship .... If you are to form a partner-
ship with us, it will be as equals.' "). 
296 For a thoughtful discussion of the kind of relationship needed between lawyers representing 
local communities and those clients, see Cole, The Need for Environmental Poverty Law, supra note 
14, at 41-47. 
297 Brian Bloom, Pollution Prevention & Grassroots Activism, RACE, POVERTY & ENV'T, July 
1990, at 7-8, 10; Victor Lewis, A Challenge to the Environmental Movement, RACE, POVERTY & 
ENV'T, Apr. 1990, at 4, 19. 
298 Remarks of Dana A. Alston, Director, Panos Institute, at the proceedings of The First Na-
tional People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit held during October 1991 in Washington, 
D.C. (notes available from author). 
299 See Eric Mann, Environmentalism in the Corporate Climate, 5 TIKKUN 60, 61 (1991) ("[T]he 
institutional matrix is frightening: corporate polluters derail environmental regulations in Congress; 
corporate pollution managers make lucrative deals that neither restrict polluters nor effectively clean 
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view as a mere "spokesperson for industry."300 Environmental organiza-
tions are not infrequently characterized as ignoring the legitimate needs 
of minority communities, valuing those needs less than they do wildlife 
protection and the preservation of scenic beauty.30l 
In addition, some minority commentators have suggested that both 
mainstream environmental organizations and governmental officials bear 
some direct responsibility for the ultimate siting of environmentally risky 
facilities in minority communities. After all, it is because these same or-
ganizations have been so successful in resisting the siting of such facilities 
in their own neighborhoods (and in those of their membership), that 
many of the facilities have instead been located in minority neighbor-
hoods.302 Some minorities have also expressed suspicion of population 
control proposals, commonly advocated by mainstream environmental 
groups, based on their perception that those proposals are principally 
intended to limit the growing populations of persons of color.303 
Finally, the advantages of a less centralized policymaking regime 
need to be re-examined in light of environmental justice concerns. As 
described above, the highly centralized nature of environmental poli-
cymaking may be one of the most significant structural causes of existing 
distributional inequities.304 There is certainly reason to suspect that ra-
cial minorities today possess more real political power in many localities, 
and in certain state governments, than they do within the federal govern-
ment. If true, that would add yet another way in which the disadvan-
tages of centralized authority, and the advantages of decentralized 
decisionmaking, may historically have been underestimated.305 
up the toxins; government agencies set up ostensibly to protect the environment become captive to 
the polluters and pollution managers; and corporate boards of directors co-opt the most malleable 
and greedy environmentalists to clean up their image-but not their products."). 
300 Former Governor Calls for Rethinking at EPA to Combat Effects of "Environmental Racism ", 
[Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 1655, 1656 (1991) (quoting Toney Anaya, 
former Governor of New Mexico) ("But if it's not going to be protective of the environment, then all 
we're doing is giving cabinet status to a spokesperson for the industry and we're just not interested in 
doing that."). 
301 For example, two Ute tribes in Colorado are currently in a conflict with environmentalists 
because of the tribes' desire to construct a federally funded water diversion project. Environmental-
ists are concerned about the impact of the project on the endangered Colorado squawfish. Dirk 
Johnson, Indian's Water Quest Creates New Foe: Environmentalists, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1991, at 
Al (" 'Environmentalists like to wrap themselves in Indian blankets when they can,' said Charles 
Wilkinson, a law professor at the University of Colorado, who works with both groups. 'And there 
is some natural alliance. But that alliance comes into collision in the face of such terrible poverty in 
Indian country.' "). 
302 Austin & Schill, supra note 14, at 78. 
303 See supra note 298. 
304 See supra pp. 125-36. 
305 Several commentators have suggested that decentralized regimes offer significant advantages 
over the typical centralized command-and-control regulatory approach, including the empowerment 
oflocal communities and the fostering of democratic values and cultural diversity. See Gerald Frug, 
Why Neutrality?, 92 YALE L.J. 1591, 1600 (1983); Stewart, supra note 103, at 1545-46; see also 
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E. Reclaiming The Common Ground Shared By Environmentalists 
and Civil Rights Advocates 
Environmentalists need to do more, however, than simply modify 
the structure of environmental lawmaking and reform its substance to 
take better account of distributional concerns. Environmentalists need to 
return to the roots of modem environmental law, reacquainting them-
selves with the natural relationship that exists between what is advocated 
by both environmentalism and civil rights. Much suspicion and resent-
ment currently exists between the two social movements. However, the 
potential for claiming substantial common ground and shared values 
still persists, as it did in the late 1960s when the civil rights movement 
first spawned both the rhetoric and the tactics of modem" 
environmentalists.306 
Similarities between the two movements, however, run deeper than 
shared rhetoric or tactics. Both challenge the status quo as a means of 
promoting and protecting the interests of those with less political power, 
whether they be racial minorities, future generations of persons, or en-
dangered species. Furthermore, to that end, both movements seek to re-
form those rules that tend to deny access to the institutions capable of 
bringing about legal reform. 
More substantively, both movements are redistributive in their ulti-
mate focus. Civil rights plainly depends on a redistribution of wealth to 
achieve its ends.307 Similarly, environmentalism requires a de-emphasis 
of existing absolutist notions of private property rights in natural re-
sources, because the unrestrained exercise of such rights can create tre-
mendous environmental degradation. 308 Therefore, both movements 
Richard B. Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 335, 340-41 (1990) (describing how 
command and control confers great power to federal bureaucracies and courts). Others have ques-
tioned the ability of local governments to adopt and implement socially progressive programs that 
benefit minority and low-income persons. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Struc-
ture of Local Government Low, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 24-58 (1990); Richard Briffault, Our Local-
ism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 346, 405-35 (1990). In the 
environmental law context, I have recently joined those commentators in rebutting the thesis that 
restrictions on property occasioned by modem environmental and natural resources law portend a 
return to a hierarchical "feudal" order. See Richard J. Lazarus, Debunking "Environmental Feudal-
ism": Promoting the Individual Through the Collective Pursuit of Environmental Quality, 77 IOWA 
L. REv. 1739 (1992). 
306 See supra note 10. 
307 See generally HACKER, supra note 91; see also Bell, supra note 205, at 11-12 & nn.27-29. 
308 See Joseph L. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. REv. 481 
(1983); Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: 
Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REv. 631, 693-702 (1986); David B. Hunter, An 
Ecological Perspective on Property: A Callfor Judicial Protection of the Public's Interests in Environ-
mentally Critical Resources, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 311 (1988); Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and 
Accommodation in Modem Property Low, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1529, 1548 (1989). 
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tend to view, regardless of their legitimacy,309 those constitutional provi-
sions aimed at preserving the status quo by protecting the existing distri-
bution of private property rights as significant obstacles to the 
achievement of their desired ends. Indeed, some civil rights scholars sug-
gest that the Constitution's "giving priority to the protection of prop-
erty" was intended to protect property in slaves.310 Similarly, 
environmentalists describe how "[t]he law is wedded to a concept of 
property that gives precedence to a right to change the existing biologic 
character of the land over increases in the owner's individual wealth. 
The constitutional shibboleths of the Justices could freeze the fluid 
stream of property law in the posture of acquisitive individualism."311 
Environmentalists also need to apply ecological values closer to 
home. There is some painful truth to the perception of many minorities 
that environmentalists overlook the plight of humankind in their rush to 
protect nature.312 Indeed, in the end there is something perverse about 
separating out human welfare-including the poverty suffered by whole 
nations of persons around the world-from what it means to promote the 
natural environment. Perhaps the reasons for this tendency lie in the 
sheer tragedy of that human misery associated with the former; misery 
that leads many otherwise well-intentioned individuals to shy away from 
intertwining their own lives with such seemingly intractable and wrench-
ing sadness. 
Ecological values must recognize and embrace human welfare as an 
invaluable part of the natural community.313 Environmentalists should, 
therefore, strive to redress the basic human needs of those who are want-
ing as part of their central mission. Environmental protection should be 
seen as a legitimate basis for promoting human welfare and opportunity 
and, in particular, for redistributing environmental amenities (and risks) 
more fairly among all persons.314 The alternative, which juxtaposes the 
environment against humankind, is a flawed and ultimately self-defeating 
frame of reference for environmentalism. 
Some recent scholarship suggests a possible reclamation of common 
ground by the environmental and civil rights movements. Commenta-
309 See Tarlock, supra note 102, at 416 (positing distinction between "legitimate" and "illegiti-
mate" property law claims). 
310 Bell, supra note 205, at 6-7. 
311 J. Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 CONST. COMMENTARY 39, 249 (1990) ("The opinions of 
Scalia and Rehnquist suggest that a radical transformation of property law to reflect ecological val-
ues would encounter judicial resistance .... The task of green property law is both to find practical 
mechanisms for utopian aspirations and to criticize those elements of the legal culture that obstruct 
urgent reforms."); see Freyfogle, supra note 308, at 1544. 
312 See supra notes 135-37, 159 and accompanying text. 
313 Cj. William H. Rodgers, Jr., Bringing People Back: Toward A Comprehensive Theory o/Tak-
ings in Natural Resources Law, 10 EcOLOGY L.Q. 205 (1982). 
314 Lazarus, supra note 305; MARK SAGOFF, THE EcONOMY OF THE EARTH-PHILOSOPHY, 
LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 155-58, 167-70 (1988). 
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tors have begun to look anew to civil rights discourse for ideas and inspi-
ration for environmental protection law.31S They point out the relevance 
in each of notions of community, empathy, egalitarianism, and intercon-
nectedness. For example, "Ecofeminism" embodies this new tradition of 
cooperation in its effort to apply feminist ideology to environmental pro-
tection policy.316 
It is essential, however, that the common ground that must be seized 
extend beyond the inspirational or thematical and include pragmatic pro-
posals for joining environmental protection and civil rights objectives in 
shared endeavors. Mass transit is a simple, yet powerful example. Our 
society'S excessive reliance on private motor vehicles needlessly wastes 
natural resources and degrades the environment. Such reliance can also 
create a substantial economic barrier to many career and recreational 
opportunities. Those with fewer economic resources are less likely to 
have access to the private transportation required to take advantage of 
those opportunities.317 Finally, billions of dollars are spent to construct 
highways that subsidize the lifestyles of those who choose to live in the 
more affluent neighborhoods outside major urban areas. For all these 
reasons, however, promotion of mass transit offers the potential for pro-
moting the interests of both minority and low-income persons and envi-
ronmental protection.318 Mass transit, in short, improves the 
environment while simultaneously redistributing life's amenities more eq-
uitably. Environmentalists need to develop and promote other such nat-
ural unions between the two movements.319 
31S See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist View of Joseph Sax's Public 
Trust Theory of Environmental Protection, and Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of Law Re-
form, 44 VAND. L. REv. 1209, 1220-21 (1991); Freyfogle, supra note ISS, at 1547-48; A. Dan 
Tarlock, Earth and Other Ethics: The Institutional Issues, 56 TENN. L. REv. 43 (1988). 
316 See generally REWEAVING THE WORLD: THE EMERGENCE OF EcOFEMINISM (Irene Dia-
mond & Gloria Feman Orenstein eds., 1990) (a collection of writings describing the history, philoso-
phy, and goals of ecofeminism). 
317 See, e.g., Martha Mahoney, Law and Racial Geography: Public Housing and the Economy in 
New Orleans, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1251, 1279 (1990). 
318 See John Pucher et aL, Socioeconomic Characteristics of Transit Riders: Some Recent Evi-
dence, 35 TRAFFIC Q. 461, 480 (1981) ("[T]he poor, the elderly, minorities, and women do indeed 
make a significantly higher percentage of their trips by transit than does the general population of 
American urban areas."); see also Jonathan B. Robison, Fares and Fairness in Urban Public Trans-
portation: The Needfor a Substantive Basisfor Agency Rate Making, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 903, 915-
16 (1982) (proposes requiring public transportation agencies to have a substantive basis, rather than 
simply a procedural basis, for rate-making decisions to further, among other goals, a fare system 
based upon rider's ability to pay). 
319 An experimental program now being tested by the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency 
further illustrates how the interests of minority and low-income persons may be harmonized with 
environmental protection goals. Dubbed the "Clunkers for Cash" program, the Illinois EPA has 
recently offered to buy pollution-prone older vehicles from 200 residents of Chicago's southside. 
Prices for the vehicles vary depending on the level of pollution emitted by the car, with higher 
emission vehicles bringing the owner a larger rebate. Officials hope that program participants will 
use the cash to purchase or use more environmentally efficient transportation. See Toby Eckert, 
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v. CONCLUSION 
Environmental justice offers two important lessons. The first is that 
environmental policymakers need to take account of the distributional 
implications of their decisions. Environmental policymakers' two tradi-
tional inquiries - "how much pollution is acceptable," and "what kinds 
of legal rules would best ensure the accomplishment of that level of pol-
lution" - ignore an essential factor: the distribution of environmental 
benefits and burdens needs to be an explicit and well-considered element 
of the environmental policy debate. The current approach, in which dis-
tributional concerns are a matter for behind-the-scenes negotiation in the 
forging of political compromises, has led to unacceptable distributional 
inequities. Only a few groups possess the substantial resources necessary 
for entry into those closed fora where environmental decisions are made, 
and the resulting distributions naturally favor these groups' own eco-
nomic interests and/or value preferences. 
To be sure, existing empirical evidence of distributional inequity 
does not yet conclusively illustrate the depth of the problem. Therefore, 
an immediate short term goal must be to improve the empirical data 
base. However, the evidence that does exist, combined with the theoreti-
cal explanations that readily suggest why such a distributional phenome-
non is likely, lend substantial support to the need for exploring the 
possibility of more significant reforms. A theoretical analysis of the rea-
sons why such inequities may exist, moreover, suggests that certain sub-
stantive reforms in environmental law, and structural reforms in the 
policymaking framework upon which it has relied, could do much to 
promote a fairer sharing of the benefits and burdens of environmental 
protection. 
The more significant lesson of environmental justice lies, however, 
in its far broader social implications. The last two decades have wit-
nessed a radical rewriting of the nation's laws in an effort to promote 
environmental protection concerns. These laws have been widely viewed 
as progressive in their thrust, and even excessively idealistic in their 
stated goals.320 It is enormously unsettling that such laws could them-
selves be riddled with distributional inequities, especially when the na-
tion's modern environmental movement grew out of, and indeed was 
EPA Offers to Clear Clunkers Off Road. Pollutants Out of Air: Program to Help State Comply with 
Air Quality Standards. CRAIN'S CHI. Bus., Oct. 12, 1992. at 36; Stevenson Swanson, Illinois Rolls 
Out Best Deal on Wheels. at Right Price, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 6, 1992, at 1. Insofar as these older 
vehicles are primarily owned by low-income and minority urban residents, programs like this have 
the potential to promote the benefits of environmental protection in the very urban areas where these 
residents live and work, while insuring a more equitable distribution of the economic benefits and 
burdens associated with such environmental protection. Significantly, such programs also provide a 
unique way for low-income and minority residents to participate in the cleanup of their communi-
ties. Such incentive programs may be an important impetus for these and other residents to become 
more involved in environmental protection generally. 
320 See Dwyer, supra note Ill. 
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largely inspired by, the civil rights movement that has long resisted those 
very inequities. 
Hence, for the same reason that environmental justice cannot be ef-
fectively redressed solely within the environmental law context, its 
message must be understood as not being confined to that discrete area of 
the law. Environmental justice reinforces the continuing and compelling 
need for measures aimed at eliminating racial discrimination and its self-
perpetuating vestiges on the broadest social scale. It confirms the perva-
siveness of the distributional problems that persist and their racial ori-
gins. The problem is not one confined to a few discrete areas. The effects 
linger far beyond where one lives, goes to school, and works to include 
the price one pays for a car, the interest paid on a mortgage, and, it now 
appears, even the quality of the air one breathes and the water one 
drinks. 
A full redressing of those distributional inequities that currently 
seem to exist in environmental protection will, therefore, necessarily oc-
cur only with a change of present attitudes, including those rooted in 
racial stereotypes.321 It will likewise depend on effective redressing of the 
vestiges of past discrimination. This includes efforts directed at facilitat-
ing or enhancing minority market and political power, their access to 
information, educational facilities, and the other advantages of life, in-
cluding enjoyment of the natural environment.322 It may also require 
reform of some civil rights laws to facilitate the bringing of racial dis-
crimination claims.323 The extent to which the pursuit of environmental 
justice furthers this far more important and ambitious undertaking 
should be the ultimate measure of its succesS.324 
321 Cf Aleinikoff, supra note 78, at 1107-20. 
322 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RJGHTS REVOLUTION-REcONCEIVING THE REGULA-
TORY STATE 37, 39-41 (1990). 
323 See Ayres, supra note 178, at 863-65; Randall L. Kennedy, Competing Conceptions of "Racial 
Discrimination": A Response to Cooper and Graglia, 104 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 93, 98-100 
(1991); see generally Bell, supra note 205. The extent to which the necessary causal nexus exists 
between past constitutional violations and current racial disparities to support continuing civil rights 
remedies aimed at ameliorating the latter is a matter of great contemporary contention. See Free-
man v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992) (school desegregation). 
324 There have been several significant developments since this article first went to the printer. 
The United States Commission on Civil Rights is investigating EPA's compliance with Title VI. 
Marianne Lavelle, EPA Enforcement to be Probed: By Rights Commission, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 5, 1993, 
at 3. Dr. Ben Chavis, who authored the UCC's 1987 Study, is the new Executive Director of the 
NAACP. See NAACP Head Demands Environmental Action, NAT'L L.J., May 10, 1993, at 5. 
Finally, the Senate recently passed legislation that would establish an "Office of Environmental Jus-
tice" in a cabinet-level EPA. 139 CoNG. REc. S5342, S5362 (daily ed. May 4, 1993). 
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